Although the citizenship oath that Craig Raskin cited in a recent letter to the Taipei Times (Dec. 14, Page 8) would seem to prevent dual citizenship for naturalized US citizens, this is not the case. The US does recognize dual citizenship, though it does not encourage it.
According to the a dual citizenship Web site, the US State Department decided in 1990 "not to go after people any more, as a rule, when they continue to let their old country treat them as a citizen despite US naturalization."
The US State Department declares in a document on its official Web site that "a person naturalized as a US citizen may not lose the citizenship of the country of birth" (note it reads "may not," not "cannot").
"US law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one citizenship or another," it continues.
As to which passport should be used, however, the US State Department is clear: "Most US citizens, including dual nationals, must use a US passport to enter and leave the United States."
If a dual national then uses an ROC passport to enter Taiwan, that should not be a problem as far as the US is concerned: "Dual nationals may also be required by the foreign country to use its passport to enter and leave that country. Use of the foreign passport does not endanger US citizenship."
Taipei Times readers who desire additional information may consult the highly detailed dual citizenship Web site at:
http://www.webcom.com/richw/dualcit
Mark Swofford
Panchiao
Chinese literature matters
While I was glad to see some commentary on literature on the Insight page of the Taipei Times, Cao Chang-Ching's perspective ("Chinese literature faces a century of failure," Dec. 12, Page 9)seems a bit biased against Chinese literature.
Cao seems very disappointed with the Chinese language for its paucity of strong logic and precise expression, compared with English. However, if one takes into account the development of civilization rather than only emphasizing language, one can see that the spirit of Chinese culture centers on achieving spiritual serenity whereas Western culture focuses on mind activities characterized by competition and dialectics.
While Cao criticized Lu Xun's phraseology as extraordinarily dreadful, has he ever read Lun Xun's Death of My Father (?鷟邞滲f) or Hujino-san (藤3孕y揖? or his novels Blessing (祝福) or Kung Yi Chih (??A?v)?
I don't think the language in these works is ever out of date. While Cao seems to look down upon all Chinese writers, does he ever think about Shen Chung-wen (沈從?? for his poetic description of the feelings between humankind and Mother Earth? Take a look at the Taiwanese novelist Chi Teng-sheng (?C等生) for his idiosyncratic expression of the quest of a lonely soul: it's not easy to translate.
Cao's conclusion -- that "almost all English translations of Chinese works, except poetry, are either more precise, or more beautiful, or more powerful than the originals; while at the same time, all ... Chinese translations of English works are either more obscure, coarser or weaker than the originals" was very vague.
Cao's conclusion was a lot to swallow and unfair to Chinese writers and translators.
Ni Kuo-Jung (-棪篝a)
Hsinchu
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