So, it's the 50th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Any polite Chinese would know what to say on this special occasion, the only exception, perhaps, being a small bunch of splittists in the "renegade province" of Taiwan, who could not care less about what happens in China. Let's count them out.
I wish this makes us feel better about China's future. But are the "renegades" just out there to be excluded, transformed or eliminated? Not an easy question to answer.
Who would dare to claim that "renegades" are actually inside if, in fact, they have been inside of every Chinese mindset, indeed? I mean, to some extent, China as a symbol is everyone's burden, an inexpressible burden and hence a threat from within, yet nowhere to be identified.
There is a fear to know one's complete in China, lest this should disclose the "renegade" tendency of everyone. History knows this, and this is why history is a minefield for those who shout "Hurrah!" for the 50th anniversary of China.
If you told me you were 50, I would know what you mean. To say that the People's Republic of China is 50 takes a bit more time to understand. Was the PRC born from a womb 50 years ago?
Come on, you would say, you know it's only an analogy. The analogy, however, assumes an important fact, that is, that the relationship between the PRC on Oct. 1, 1949 and anything before that day was a break. If we do not dispute this unstated assumption about the break, we would be welcome aboard the "renegade-banishing club," without knowing that we ourselves are likely the "renegades."
The danger of history lies in the revelation of the embarrassment that the PRC's birth owed a great deal to the groundwork of the KMT before 1949, and even to Dr. Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) before 1911. To name a few.
Please note that the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 brought the first arrival of the notion of "republic" -- the co-option of warlords into the Republic in 1928 was the first turn away from a disintegrated China; the War of Resistance between 1937 and 1945 was the first witness of effective nationalism; a quasi state socialism during and after the war was the first foundation of the command economy which came in 1953; the KMT-sponsored anti-landlord, anti-corruption campaign during the Civil War was the first nationwide source of legitimacy for land reform after 1949.
More importantly, what the PRC is seemingly doing today repeats the KMTs path to liberalism in Taiwan.
Although I never believe there has been genuine liberalism in Taiwan, this is not the point. The point is that China is losing its cognitive capacity in conceptualizing its future track outside liberal discourse.
Some part of China is doing extremely well if one is willing to accept a somewhat less sophisticated standard of liberalism. It takes less than two decades for Shanghai, for example, to surpass five decades of development in Taipei.
What a great achievement! Why, as the question naturally goes, bother to engage in a revolution just to find 50 years later that what we are doing are what the renegades have been doing? It should not be a coincidence that Shanghai-based think tanks consistently show the highest tolerance toward the "renegade" province's provocations. Every time.
Does not this suggest the possibility that one day Shanghai, and eventually the whole of China, would not be able resist the imperialist temptation of splitting China? What I mean is, "renegades" had been inside China before 1949 and may be ready to revive some time after 1999.
Everything we have been hearing from all these celebrations is worth celebrating indeed, but do not forget that one should not celebrate everything.
I am not sure, in the past 50 years, if what is worth celebrating outnumbers that which is not worth celebrating. The Great Leap Forward (
"It's all in the past," the Communist Party reassures us. "That is why we call 1978 the year of rectification."
But, here you are again trying to play the chronology trick on us. To suggest that everything before 1978 and everything after are entirely separate just does not work in a historical sense.
Looking at those who have embezzled from the national enterprises, shouted for military punishment of Taiwan and made legally-culpable contributions to the US Congress, one would suddenly realize that these once-cultural revolutionaries are still alive and well in the corridors of power today, leading the celebration of the 50th anniversary as if they had never existed between 1957 and 1978.
Who would potentially be the "renegades" if not those pseudo-liberals in Taiwan playing fire with nationalism in China, which their political forefathers helped to congeal? It would be them, the previous cultural revolutionaries who are thriving today.
This is probably one of the most dramatic collusions in Chinese history. Between the previous cultural revolutionaries and splittists in Taiwan, there appears to be a tacit agreement.
Acting out one's extreme patriotism against Taiwan independence serves to distract attention from genuine rectification of the revolutionary legacy in China. In turn, pseudo-liberals in Taiwan benefit from a siege mentality among the populace never ready to challenge a phony democracy allegedly bestowed upon them.
The deal stretches really far for Taiwan, as the highest authority in Beijing seeks quick economic bubbles which previous revolutionaries are best at delivering.
As a result, Beijing maintains the economic and patriotic bubbles essential for political stability, revolutionaries continue to enjoy extra-legal space, and splittists in Taiwan preserve political leadership and a wedge for future independence.
Everybody is happy while everybody closes their eyes about who helps them out.
The number 50 is an illusion. It lives on the banishment of the "renegade, "and Taiwan must be the representative of renegade so that the renegade can be placed, or projected, outside China.
The illusion prevents us from seeing history in its evolutionary continuity and therefore shuns away from the facts that the separation of Taiwan is an intrinsic part of Chinese history and that revolutionary elements not to be celebrated are widely alive.
To gain Taiwan back and rectify China's revolutionary past realistically -- to move beyond the illusion of 50 -- is a must.
Shih Chih-yu is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
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