After East Timor's plainly free and fair referendum resulted in a clear decision for independence from Indonesia, anti-independence forces unleashed a torrent of violence. While we do not now know the exact extent of the casualties and destruction caused by the fighting, the UN responded with what is now virtually a knee-jerk reaction by authorizing the deployment of peacekeepers to East Timor. As an Australian-led peacekeeping force now establishes itself in and around Dili, and as substantial numbers of Indonesian troops depart, it is time to ask whether all of this had to happen.
The answer is clearly "no." That it did demonstrates the lack of strategic thinking in the US, Australia and in the ASEAN region.
In April, I wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review that the US should pay more political (not just economic) attention to Indonesia because "there is a critical American interest in the manner in which the political outcome in Indonesia occurs."
I stressed as well, however, that "there is no tangible American interest in the ultimate political relationship of Indonesia's pieces -- central control, autonomy or independence." Unfortunately, the administration of US President Bill Clinton did not pay adequate attention over the past six months. As a result, UN-authorized troops, with at least US logistical and communications support, are now in East Timor with an undefined mandate, an uncertain duration and an unknown cost.
In fact, the conventional wisdom holds East Timor to be a "white hats, black hats" situation, with the government of Indonesia wearing the wrong color.
Assume for now that essentially all of the blame belongs to Indonesia: that it was wrong not to honor the referendum's overwhelming pro-independence vote; that it was wrong not to stop the violence immediately and punish the perpetrators; and that it was wrong to prevent international observers and journalists from having free access throughout the province. In such unambiguous circumstances, what should be the role of the US and the "international community" generally?
Most importantly, nearly everyone familiar with East Timor predicted that the vote's losing side (whether pro-independence or pro-Indonesia) was both ready and able to resort to violence to prevent the "wrong" outcome from being implemented. Even so, the UN Security Council authorized the referendum with no plans for what happened after the votes were counted. Those who have previously blithely assumed that the UN's supervision of elections is a minor, politically neutral act must now reassess the impact of UN involvement. We should not casually endorse the easy part of a UN operation without being willing, from the start, to undertake the hard part that may follow. A UN Security Council unprepared or unwilling to deal with the breakdown of order, such as occurred in East Timor, is dangerously naive.
This conclusion, unfortunately, is only for the future. What about today in Dili ?
The US and others clearly have substantial strategic interests at stake, such as the commerce that passes through Indonesia's waters among others, and Australia's geographic proximity speaks for itself. Those interests should not, however, have required that either country become militarily involved in potential armed conflict over East Timor, with no end in sight. The unpleasant fact is that if the citizens of "Indonesia" do not desire civil peace, no outside force is going to impose it on them in the long term.
There is simply no upside for the US to become involved in a small conflict in East Timor, followed by a small conflict in Aceh, followed by a small conflict . . . and so on. This is the model of involvement in the individual pieces of the former Yugoslavia -- a model of failure.
Clinton has allowed a tactic -- the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force -- to overshadow the US's more important objectives in the whole region. It is this near-obsession with having the UN restore order, rather than justifiably insisting that Indonesians honor their own commitments to abide by the results of the referendum, that seems to be the Clinton administration's real focus.
If the Indonesian military is now truly reconciled to East Timor's independence, then order in the province will follow almost automatically.
If the military is just playing along for the moment, and is not truly reconciled, it is perfectly capable of keeping the situation in turmoil. In that case, we have deployed peacekeepers into a conflict with no peace to keep, and where the outsiders may want peace more than the parties themselves. Thus, insistence on UN involvement seems to be the Clinton administration's major purpose, with ending the civil strife a distant second. We must refocus on avoiding the risks of a piecemeal approach to Indonesia.
Whatever the country's future shape, we want it to occur peacefully, and without inviting adventurism by China in the midst of the country's growing disorder. Whether Indonesia should have agreed to the East Timor referendum in the first place is not of only historical interest. By so doing, and by committing to abide by the results, Indonesia never had any other option but to accept the results. US policy should have been -- and can still be -- to apply intense diplomatic pressure (including sanctions) at the center, not to deploy peacekeepers at the periphery. If Indonesia's military is the problem, then Jakarta is where the kick should be felt. Madeleine Albright should have delivered that message directly, not through lightly armed "blue helmets."
There is still time to do so, before we start reading about the need to deploy peacekeepers to yet another Indonesian island.
John Bolton is senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute. During the administration of former US President George Bush, he served as Assistant Secretary of State.
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