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US report shows Taiwan's defense weaknesses

On July 12, the US Department of Defense's Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was released for the first time since US President George W. Bush took power. It says that the threat posed to Taiwan by China is "multi-faceted," and it is not only military in nature but also political, diplomatic and economic.

Beijing's military strategies against Taipei are mainly designed to deceive and to strike the heart of the island by surprise. "Such an approach would necessitate a rapid collapse of Taiwan's national will. Coercive options include, but are not limited to, information operations, an air and missile campaign, or a naval blockade," the report states.

The report adds that China may attack Taiwan "through the sudden application of violence." Beijing may use amphibious or airborne forces as means to compel Taipei's capitulation. "Should coercive measures fail, Beijing might attempt to occupy the entire island of Taiwan. But such an operation would not be guaranteed to succeed." The people of Taiwan are in favor of maintaining the status quo, and most of them are willing to defend the island. The report points out that "a final, and perhaps most important, factor that will determine the success or failure of a PRC campaign is the degree of international, especially US, support that Taiwan enjoys."

For the US, China's military has its weaknesses. The report lists in this regard, for example, "an inability to protect air and sea lines of communication against superior naval and air forces, poor ASW [anti-submarine warfare] capabilities, a limited number of missiles, significant logistical and training weaknesses, an economy largely dependent on exports to the US and Japan, and a lack of real-time intelligence." But the US believes that Taiwan's military also has its weaknesses. Decreases in the defense budget over the past few years, for example, could impede the modernization of Taiwan's military.

The Pentagon report has revealed three important facts.

First, the US sees China as a major global competitor. By 2010, China's GDP would have risen to US$2 trillion, double that of this year. From 1996 to last year, China's total external trade increased from US$289.9 billion to US$509.8 billion. China also has the second-largest defense budget in the world, second only to that of the US. Hence the Bush administration's express comment in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report: "A military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in Asia. The East Asian littoral -- from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan -- represents a particularly challenging area." China's challenge to the US is all too obvious.

Second, the purpose of China's military strategies against Taiwan is to "besiege the enemy and strike at its reinforcements" (圍點打援), to use a Chinese saying. Its national goals include maintaining the integrity of its territory and sovereignty, as well as influencing the national policies of its neighboring countries, building an Asian order centered on China. It is Beijing's priority to make sure that its neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region will stay neutral in the event of any cross-strait conflict, in a bid to prevent Washington, by sheer intimidation, from intervening. The report notes, however, that other Asia-Pacific countries will inevitably be affected and hardly able to consider themselves uninvolved. Still, Beijing has constantly lured Southeast Asian countries to its side in recent years. It has advocated establishing a "new security concept" (新安全觀) based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation -- in an effort to seek common security. Beijing seeks to give Southeast Asia the idea that China is a helper, not a threat or a competitor. Its active promotion of a free-trade zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 東南亞國協) is evidence of this.

Third, the US does not rule out any possible military scenario that China may adopt against Taiwan. Since Taiwan and China are geographically close to each other, the island faces certain difficulties. For example, it doesn't have much military "depth" to fall back on, its early-warning period is short, and the decisive battle will be quick. In addition, Taiwan's ability to defend against China's ballistic missiles is negligible. In the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the US deployed two carrier battle groups, about 12 bombers and a wing of fighters to the region to support Taiwan. Such a reaction, however, may still prove too slow, even if the US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system is deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 1999, the US defense department conducted a comprehensive simulation of possible scenarios in Asia projected for the year 2025. In terms of a simulated crisis across the Taiwan Strait -- according to the Pentagon's Asia 2025 study -- China's first military step would be a naval blockade of Taiwan. The US would send ships to challenge the blockade. Then the Chinese would threaten missile attacks or hit American vessels. In response, US nuclear submarines and B-2 bombers would hit back at China's warships and naval facilities. Then China tightens the blockade while attacking Taiwan's warships and ports. Hesitation in Washington, however, prompts the collapse of Taiwan's national will, and Taipei is forced to reach an agreement with Beijing eventually.

Since the US has repeatedly released defense reviews on the cross-strait security situation, Taiwan must come up promptly with complete and integrated defense strategies of its own. Above all, the most urgent task is to build a missile defense system, in order to strengthen the psychological defenses of the Taiwanese people.

Lin Cheng-yi is director of the Institute of European and American Studies at the Academia Sinica.

TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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