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China at a loss in cross-strait affairs

China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) adopted a harsh voice and a stern look in dealing with Taipei's delegation at the APEC summit. But while his demeanor may be very unpleasant, the popular resentment it triggers could turn the DPP into the majority party in Taiwan after the year-end elections.

It is too early for the DPP to celebrate, however, as the development of cross-strait relations is unlikely ever to proceed according to either Taipei's or Beijing's expectations. The funny thing is, though, that Taipei hasn't noticed that Beijing has been unable to steer cross-strait relations in the direction of its choosing.

The past few years have demonstrated that China's Taiwan policy has not given it control over cross-strait relations. It has in fact suffered one defeat after another and made one retreat after another.

The governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are capable of influencing popular sentiment to some degree, but they are unable to conclusively dictate the material results of such influences.

Beijing, therefore, has often changed its tone. China's President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) seemed almost friendly toward Taiwan at the recent memorial ceremony for the 90th anniversary of the Hsinhai Revolution (辛亥革命), when the nationalists overthrew the Ching Dynasty in 1911.

Taipei, however, has remained clueless about the underlying causes of the changes in Beijing's attitude. In fact, each time Beijing has softened its tone, the change has not been the result of any hard work by Taipei. In fact, changes are often misinterpreted by Taipei as a demonstration of China's "two-faced tactics."

What Jiang's performance at the memorial ceremony and Tang's at the APEC summit actually reflected, however, was incompetence, not any real change in cross-strait relations. Neither Jiang nor Tang has any real ability to lead relations in a new direction.

At a time when Taipei is busy escalating efforts to intensify cross-strait hostility for the sake of winning the Dec. 1 elections, and Washington is busy with its war on terrorism, Beijing has not -- quite unusually -- taken on an increasingly high profile.

The reason should be obvious to all. Upon seeing the growth in non-governmental cross-strait exchanges, the chaotic political scene and the struggling Taiwanese economy, Beijing thought it could change its Taiwan policy, despite President Chen's evasiveness on cross-strait issues.

Enthusiastic non-governmental exchanges, however, continued to make great progress on their own while Beijing was pointing its fingers and aiming its arrows at Taiwan, making Beijing's frequently hostile position appear ridiculous.

Then it was immediately challenged by Taipei over the APEC summit issue. Tang's rudeness at APEC, therefore, was not a calculated move to degrade Taiwan. It was simply anger resulting from his embarrassment at being caught off guard.

Over the past ten years or so, China has never quite succeeded in putting into effect its so-called "correct policy" toward Taiwan. At first, it thought acceptance of its "one China" principle by Taiwan would involve no more than a simple declaration of that principle by Taiwan. But Taiwan's Guidelines for National Unification (國統綱領) made the issue much more complicated.

In addition, China's missile exercises in 1995 and 1996 brought anti-China sentiment in Taiwan to its zenith. As Beijing started to denounce Taiwan, it saw Taiwanese tourists and businesses continue to pour into China. It therefore had no choice but to restrain itself.

Then, when it thought Taiwan had switched to a pro-independence stance, with the pro-independence DPP taking the reins of power last year, Beijing again started to "drill the troops and groom the horses" (厲兵秣馬) for battle. So delighted was China, however, to see non-governmental exchanges continuing that it was very difficult to keep up its military threats.

It is thus clear that China, faced with the ever-changing Taiwanese people, is at a loss as to what to do. When Beijing thought that its threats to Taiwan might work, the Taiwanese people did not yield to Beijing. When Beijing was so angry that it tried to make hostile moves, smiling Taiwanese arrived in China to travel or do business.

Beijing is so exhausted from spinning around to keep up with the Taiwanese people that outsiders cannot grasp the extent of the emotional roller-coaster it has been riding. After all, the people of Taiwan did not mean to go against Beijing's policies. They simply acted in the pursuit of their needs, emotions and interests.

What results, however, always occurs in a manner counter to what Beijing had expected. Such fluidity cannot be explained by discussions based on nationalism and the balance of power, because the focus of such discussions is the government, not the people.

Therefore, Beijing mistakenly thought that the fluidity of the people could only be controlled through the promotion of nationalism or the consolidation of sovereignty. The private sector, while it doesn't control cross-strait policy, reacts in a way that makes a total mockery of the Chinese leadership.

China's government does have a certain talent. Whenever it is defeated by the people, it is able to get right back onto its horse by pretending that it is acting in the people's interest.

In all likelihood, Beijing will get mad at Taiwan again during the December elections, but in time the Taiwanese are sure to do something to make China unable to continue its rage.

Perhaps the only thing on the mind of China's government is staying in power, rather than the interests of the people. But as long as they can adjust themselves in accordance with the steps of the Taiwanese, it doesn't matter if they have the people in mind.

Shih Chih-yu is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University.

Translated by Eddy Chang
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