We must copy China's cross-strait politics

Taipei Times: From your observations, when was China's new leadership actually decided and why did former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) ultimately retain his post as chairman of the Central Military Commission?

Lin Chong-pin (林中斌): I think all the arrangements were complete long before Jiang went to the US in October. But it did not all go smoothly, because during the meeting of the leadership at [the seaside town of] Beidaihe, Jiang Zemin in a way reversed his previous stance by saying that he wished to stay on and most people questioned why he wanted to do that. He met strong resistance from Politburo members like Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基), Li Ruihuan (李瑞環) and Wei Jiangxing (尉健行). So, he had to persuade those members one by one, and he succeeded in doing so, retaining the top military position and stacking the leadership with his people.

But the fact that the number of members of the standing committee of the Politburo increased from seven to nine is an indication of the difficulties involved in the arrangement.

TT: Do you think that the fourth-generation leaders will be free to exercise power as they see fit?

Lin: [New Chinese President] Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) will need some time to consolidate his power. But even when he has done that, he may not enjoy as much authority as Jiang currently does, because central authority will be diluted by leaders from the provinces.

The provincial leadership will become more and more influential. The central leadership will remain on top but its control will be less absolute.

TT: What are the implications for Taiwan?

Lin: Taiwan is apparently not the top priority. Hu Jintao mentioned internal unity several times at the congress. He also listed the economy, social problems and defense before the issue of unification.

TT: How should the Taiwan government face the new situation?

Lin: I would rather talk about "Beijing's tactics," than policy since its policy for the long run has remained "one country, two systems" and "peaceful unification." But its tactics have been adjusted frequently. The tactics are what I call "primarily soft-prong" since Beijing's strategy is two-pronged, with both a hard prong and a soft prong.

The soft prong includes softening of rhetoric. The words and the tone they used have become soft. They also entice Taiwanese businessmen with preferential treatment.

Military pressure and diplomatic strangulation continues.

I think it is very dangerous for us to use only one prong and we should do the same as China and use two.

We must remember that the regime is undemocratic, but the people, they are innocent -- we should be making efforts to win them over.