A new book compiled by two former officials who were in charge of China affairs seeks to clarify the 1992 "consensus" reached between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The consensus paved the way for the first high-level talks in five decades between the two sides the following year. The book is being published by a KMT think tank called National Development Foundation today.
Former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi (蘇起) and former Representative to Hong Kong Cheng An-kuo (鄭安國) jointly compiled the book to try and give a perspective on the historical background of the "1992 consensus," exactly 10 years after it was agreed upon.
According to the book, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) sent his protege, Su Chi-cheng (蘇志誠), to serve as his personal envoy to China to meet with former Chinese officials in charge of Taiwan affairs, including former director of Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Zhaoguo (王兆國) between 1990 and 1992. They say that mutual trust was built through several such secretive meetings and both sides reached a consensus in November 1992 on "one China," with each side free to interpret the phrase in its own way.
The consensus laid the basis for ice-breaking discussions, generally known as the "Koo-Wang talks," the following year. The title of the talks refer to Koo Cheng-fu (辜振甫), chairman of theStraits Exchange Foundation, and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Daohan (汪道涵), chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait.
The book said that the "one China" concept was at the core of cross-strait issues, and that Su and his Chinese counterparts managed to shelve major differences to reach the consensus. However, when Lee termed cross-strait relation as "special state-to-state" in nature in July 1999, his remarks destroyed the foundation of communication between the two sides, according to the book.
When President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) succeeded Lee, Chen denied that such a consensus had ever existed, Su said.
He noted that the reason for the Chen administration's denial of the existence of the consensus is the same as Beijing's denial of its existence in 1996: both were political decisions.
Su said in the book's preface that if both sides want discussions to get back on track, building goodwill alone will be insufficient when compared to the more important issues of basic trust between the two sides and the finding of common ground and needs.
He said he worried that there is no common ground in the basic stances of both sides of the Taiwan Strait at present, and that there is no indication that mutual basic trust or parallel needs can be found and that factors that contributed to the "1992 consensus" no longer exist.
Su said he hoped that the book would help clarify the historical significance and the contribution to cross-strait relations that the "1992 consensus" had made.
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