New Year to be new era for defense

Last year was a year of plenty for the military which saw major breakthroughs in weapons acquisition and brought a new military command system into shape.

In April, the administration of US President George W. Bush approved the sale of US$6 billion of weaponry to Taiwan, which was unprecedented in terms of the variety of items to be sold at one time. Among the items approved that had long been on Taiwan's wish list at annual arms talks between the two countries were diesel-powered submarines.

The US used to reject Taiwan's request for the submarines for political and economic reasons. Politically, the US did not want to anger China by selling the submarines to Taiwan, which could be used for offensive purposes. Economically, the US did not think the deal would serve its interest because diesel-powered submarines have been out of production in the US and because the sale would necessitate the reopening of production lines at significant expense.

Against such a backdrop, it was quite remarkable that US President George W. Bush approved the highly sensitive sale to Taiwan.

For the nation's military, joy over the development was tempered with caution for fear of political complications.

In addition to the submarines, the P-3C anti-submarine aircraft, which the Bush administration also agreed to sell to Taiwan, were also long-sought by the military.

If the submarine and P-3C deals proceed as planned, the navy is expected to greatly strengthen its submarine forces and anti-submarine capabilities over the next decade. If that is the case, last year could easily come to be regarded as a watershed in the navy's development.

The military also saw a major breakthrough in its efforts to restructure its anachronistic command system last year. The system, in place since the KMT came to Taiwan over five decades ago,placed the chief of the general staff as the most powerful man in the military and made the defense minister a mere figurehead.

The arrangement worked well during the martial law period when late president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son and successor Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) controlled the military through the chief of the general staff while using a fake Cabinet system, in which the defense minister was the leader of the military in name only.

But problems began to arise as former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) initiated a series of democratic reforms 12 years ago.

Lee had appointed two civilians as defense minister between 1990 and 1994 in an attempt to change the imbalance of power between the chief of the general staff and defense minister. The two civilian defense ministers were former Control Yuan leader Chen Li-an (陳履安) and former National Taiwan University president Sun Chen (孫震). The plan failed, however, and Chen and Sun were generally considered to be ineffective.

After the Chen and Sun experiment failed, the imbalance of power increasingly came under fire in the media and on the legislative floor, with DPP lawmakers among its most vocal critics.

Eventually the landmark Defense Law and the amendment of the Organizational Law of the Ministry of National Defense were passed by the Legislative Yuan in early 2000.

Under the two laws, the defense minister is to be the leader of the military not only in name but also in fact, while the chief of the general staff is to be downgraded to the position of chief of staff to the defense minister.