TT: In one of your studies on Taiwan's military, you point out that Taiwan's defense strategy is primarily designed to hold out and give the US ample time to intervene. Is this a realistic strategy or just wishful thinking?
Michael D. Swaine: The strategy is realistic. It makes sense, although some here say Taiwan shouldn't rely on others and that Taiwan must defend itself independently. Of course, you can make that argument in terms of Taiwan being a sovereign state, but you have to face reality.
Over time, the situation could become extremely difficult for Taiwan if China is dedicated enough [to using force against Taiwan]. The critical element is the psychological will of Taiwan's people. If they are under attack and without hope of assistance coming from the US, the people's ability and willingness to hang on will be very limited. This is the worst case scenario.
You also need to set up a capability to deter attacks. The bottom-line for Taiwan's military is to avert war, not to win the war. Taiwan does not have any prospect of winning the war. They [the Chinese] can't take Taiwan and Taiwan can't defeat China, either. Taiwan is not big enough.
TT: What do think of the reported plan for Taiwan's air force to send fighter planes to the Philippines in the initial stages of a war with China to retain a second-strike capability?
MS: That is the most extreme scenario. That seems to me a high-risk option, sending aircraft to the Philippines. I don't know the flight time between Taiwan and the Philippines. But the assumption made in this strategy is that there is a fear that the air force could be overwhelmed in a very short period of time. But if you send the aircraft away too late or wait for too long, you will lose Taiwan and there is no point in retaliation. It seems to me that Taiwan's military would be much better off creating a proper defense at its air bases to be able to withstand missile and air attacks. The Chinese air force does not have the capability to mount a sustained attack against Taiwan. But missiles are different.
TT: It looks like we are preparing for the worst.
MS: I don't think that's necessarily the case. But you have to do what's necessary, that is to try to deter and strengthen your ability to sustain attack. Taiwan people want to develop real military capability, not just acquire big-ticket items and large weapon platforms. Taiwan needs to pay attention to integrating systems in more effective ways so that China looks at Taiwan as a place which has real capability.
Of course, the general concern is that Taiwan can't just focus on the military. The military is only one part of the picture and it is the less important part because this problem is ultimately a political one.
TT: As you said in your report, advanced weapons systems in Taiwan are sometimes desired and/or acquired from foreign sources without full consideration of the appropriate operational and maintenance requirements of such systems. Could you elaborate on that?
MS: Buying these sophisticated weapons should be based on a clear understanding about what's required to operate them at full capacity and what purposes they serve in the larger defense strategy. What are these weapons' specific purposes and limitations? These are the things that need to be understood very clearly.
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