With the Legislative Yuan gaining more power after marginalizing the National Assembly last month, there are growing concerns that the radical reform was precipitous.
Academics fear fundamental changes could topple the current structure of Taiwan's government, which they believe is already unbalanced after six rounds of constitutional reforms over the past decade.
In an effort to centralize powers that had been divided between the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, the April 24 reform of the Constitution passed to the legislature the power to initiate impeachment of the president or vice president, to amend the constitution and to propose changes in the nation's boundaries.
Once passed by the legislature the resolutions only need to be ratified by the Assembly before being adopted.
Other functions taken from the Assembly are to elect the vice president if the office is vacant; to initiate proposals to recall the president or vice president; and to confirm Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan and Control Yuan personnel appointments after they have been forwarded by the president.
Semi-presidential stalemate?
"While the constitutional system is already slanted in a very serious way, the Legislative Yuan has gained many influences that perhaps are too strong under the present system," said Tsai Tzung-jen (
Following the 1994 constitutional reform under which the direct, popular election of the president was introduced, efforts were made during reforms in 1997 to adjust the governmental structure that made it into something similar to the so-called "semi-presidential" system of France.
But unlike the French system -- in which the president's appointment of premier goes through a confirmation process in the legislature, and in which the president has the power to dissolve the legislature -- the Taiwan system allows the president to appoint the premier without having to obtain the legislature's approval.
Under the current system, the Legislative Yuan may propose a no-confidence vote against the premier which may in turn lead to a retaliatory move from the president to dismiss the legislature and force re-elections.
Should more than one-half of the total number of legislators approve the no-confidence motion, the premier has to tender his resignation within 10 days, and at the same time may request that the president dissolve the legislature.
Should the no-confidence motion fail, the Legislative Yuan may not initiate another no-confidence motion against the same premier within a one-year period.
Tsai argued that under this system, the checks against the legislature are very weak because the threat to dissolve the legislature is nothing more than "nominal" in strength.
Furthermore, since the premier's appointment is not officially endorsed by the legislature, political chaos could result if the presidency and the majority of legislative seats are controlled by different political parties.
In fact this is the present state of affairs following the March 18 presidential election.
"Legislators can make all kinds of trouble to act against the president and the Cabinet. They don't need to launch a vote of no-confidence at all, and thus they can protect themselves from the threat of dismissal," Tsai said.
The politics appointment
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