All bets are off! You'll see a lot of testing. You'll have Russia testing, you'll have China testing, you'll have India testing, you'll have Pakistan testing. And we will be in a much, much more dangerous world," he said.
The reaction of Congress to this warning of dire consequences by US President Bill Clinton should the US abandon the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was to resoundingly defeat the treaty -- the first time the Senate had rejected a major treaty since it turned its back on the Treaty of Versailles over 80 years ago. Clinton's overstated warnings of gloom and doom notwithstanding, the CTBT's defeat is not likely to result in the immediate resumption of nuclear weapons tests, either by the US or by any of the above-referenced states. Indeed, the Chinese have elected, at least thus far, to seize the moral high road, contrasting their continued commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament with Congress' abandonment of this lofty goal. The Russians, among others, have similarly taken delight in criticizing the US for its "do as I say, not as I do" approach to foreign policy.
Ratification setback
However, the Senate's 48-51 vote -- with minor exceptions, almost exclusively along party lines -- has certainly set back, if not killed, any hope for immediate ratification of the treaty from most of the significant treaty hold-outs, most prominently India and Pakistan. As one senior Pakistani arms control official noted just before the vote, "If the largest power is out of this, it's all over -- this treaty is dead." (For the treaty to enter into effect, all 44 nations that have the presumed capacity to build nuclear devices are required to ratify the treaty. While US ratification would not guarantee that others will follow suit, the failure of the US to even come close to the two-thirds majority needed to ratify -- itself sufficient to prevent the treaty's entry into force -- also effectively removes the pressure on other significant recalcitrants to come forward.)
While this may not mean the death of the arms control and non-proliferation movement as we know it, it certainly raises legitimate questions about America's willingness and ability to continue to lead this effort. It also demonstrates US partisan politics at its very worst. As one US weekly news journal lamented, "What happened in the Senate's back alleys -- and, finally, on the Senate floor -- was a nasty political food fight over nothing less than the international arms race."
Another political commentator described the Senate's action -- in my view, rightly -- as "a dangerous abdication" of US world leadership, further arguing that "the desire to punish Clinton is no justification for a vote that caused international dismay and damaged America's national interest."
While this was clearly not one of Congress' (or America's) finest hours, it would be wrong to dismiss the vote as simply an ugly exercise of US partisan politics. There were some serious reservations about the treaty and Clinton failed to make a convincing case for ratification, causing even moderate Republicans who might be otherwise inclined to abandon the treaty.
Verification procedures
The most serious attacks against the treaty focused on two issues: verification and the ability of the US to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The verification argument seemed disingenuous to many. While it may be impossible to absolutely prove a negative -- that a country will not or cannot cheat -- the treaty allows for additional monitoring stations and challenge inspections that would significantly decrease the ability of potential violators to test. This is not a treaty based on good faith alone; it contains serious, highly intrusive verification procedures.
The maintenance argument is a tougher one to debate (or even to understand), with a variety of experts giving an even wider variety of opinions as to how easy or even possible it might be to assure the continued safety and reliability of the US nuclear arsenal relying solely on computers and sub-critical tests (which the treaty, at US insistence, still allows). But one fact is beyond debate: the US today has a clear-cut advantage over the rest of the world in all things nuclear and the treaty freezes in this advantage. Even "America Firsters" should have been able to figure this out.
More disconcerting was the Congressional reaction to legitimate warnings that both US global leadership and the non-proliferation movement are being put at risk by abandonment of the CTBT: many just did not care. This is not, as some pundits are predicting, a signal of a new isolationism in the US; I believe that isolationist tendencies, while always lingering in the shadows, are not predominant either in the Republican (or Democratic) mainstream or among the American people at large. Instead, it reflects an increasing US arrogance which caused many in Congress to dismiss, if not belittle, the unprecedented, impassioned pleas by three European heads of state (Chirac, Blair, and Schroeder) to support the treaty.
Calling clinton's bluff
Most importantly, the treaty episode demonstrated a growing tendency to play domestic politics with international issues both in the Clinton administration and within Congress -- the tying of US financial contributions to the UN to the abortion issue is an even more flagrant example. In the case of the CTBT, Clinton was obviously not prepared to take "yes" for an answer when, in his own exercise of partisan politics, he pressed Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to bring the treaty up for a vote, seemingly comfortable in the belief that this would not happen. In a rare case of successful Republican oneupsmanship, Lott called Clinton's bluff, knowing that the votes were not there and that the administration was ill-prepared for the battle, especially given the short amount of time allotted for debate. Having scored a sufficient number of political points, the right thing for the Republican-controlled Senate to have done -- at least from the point of view of those who value both the cause of non-proliferation and the preservation of US global leadership -- would have been to defer the vote. Unfortunately, a handful of hardcore opponents of disarmament (many of whom were also eager to embarrass Clinton regardless of the international consequences) managed to rule the day.
It is important to note, however, in the wake of the treaty's resounding defeat, that the US has not yet abandoned the CTBT. Clinton has stated that the US will continue to honor the test ban as long as he remains president and over 80 percent of the American people continue to support an end to nuclear testing, as do many of America's current and former senior military leaders who see the benefit of locking in the US' current advantage. Many Republican senators also acknowledge their support for a comprehensive test ban in principle, even if the current CTBT, as written, causes them some concern. Others would no doubt readily support the treaty, even as written, if it were being tabled by any president other than Clinton.
There is at least one way out of this impasse, if both sides were willing to set aside politics in the name of US national security interests. Former Bush administration senior officials Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kantor have offered a relatively simple, straight-forward approach to get beyond what they describe as a "triumph of partisan wrangling over responsible debate about the national interest."
They acknowledge both the importance of continued American leadership in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and the potential validity of the more serious concerns about the treaty's viability. In response, they call for a US initiative to renegotiate the treaty for the sole purpose of limiting its initial term to a fixed period -- for example, five years -- with the option for renewal for additional fixed periods.
Unlimited duration
This is the approach that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty originally followed, until all parties agreed on indefinite extension in 1995, after some 25 years of experiencing the NPT in action. The CTBT is currently of unlimited duration, raising concerns about the ability over time to maintain stockpiles or react to other technological breakthroughs. Such an initiative, in Scowcroft's and Kantor's words, allows the US to "pick up the pieces and re-establishes US credentials as leader of the community of nations."
It deserves serious attention, although the prospects of either the Clinton administration or the Senate being willing to set aside partisan politics, as the 2000 presidential campaign heats up, remain slim.
In the meantime, the question remains as to which nation or nations will step forward and take the lead in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament now that the US has abrogated this responsibility. Will the Russians seize the moral high road and push forth their own ratification of the CTBT and START II to demonstrate their commitment to the cause? Not likely.
Will Chinese actions match Beijing's lofty words? Don't hold your breath.
The Japan factor
While China has made it clear that it will not be the first to break the moratorium and test, it also laments the fact that they are the least advanced -- and thus most disadvantaged by the CTBT -- of the five major nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia, Britain and France rounding out this group) and would be more likely to respond to renewed testing by the latest members of the nuclear club (India and Pakistan) or by any new entrant by resuming testing themselves.
Enter Japan!
The Japanese have long championed the cause of non-proliferation and are genuinely committed to the broader goal of nuclear disarmament. It's time for them to step forward and put some teeth behind their effort. Today, all states presumed capable of testing nuclear weapons, at least in the near term, proclaim a commitment to sustain the moratorium. For example, while the Senate's action has let India and Pakistan (among others) off the ratification hook, neither has revoked its earlier pledge not to test. Japan can help them continue to see the wisdom of this decision through a few simple, concrete actions.
First, Japan can announce unilaterally that it will permanently cut off all overseas developmental assistance to, and will aggressively discourage direct financial investment in, any country that defies the global consensus against nuclear weapons testing.
This is an action Tokyo can take today, as a matter of principle. Tokyo should stress that this action is not aimed at any specific party, but is merely a genuine reflection of heartfelt Japanese public opinion and international priorities.
Second, Tokyo can challenge its fellow G-8 members to emulate this move at their next meeting. This will effectively separate the talkers from those who are willing to match their lofty words with concrete actions aimed at permanently halting future nuclear weapons tests.
Japan has, rightfully, been seeking a more prominent role in international security affairs. Washington's failure to ratify the CTBT has given Tokyo an opportunity to take the initiative.
Ralph A. Cossa is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, a non-profit, foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.