The end of the Cold War has removed the shadow of war from the North Atlantic, but the potential still remains in Asia. Of all the flash points in East Asia, the Taiwan Strait is potentially the most explosive, and of tremendous consequence to democracy in the region and beyond. In the hopes of averting armed conflict, and building a bridge of peace over this strait of tension, we respectfully offer our views as follows.
Of the many obstacles towards easing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, three stand out as the most intractable:
1) The PRC has clung to its principle that it is the sole representative of the "one China," of which Taiwan is a part, and that "one country, two systems" is the only acceptable formula for unification.
2) Beijing has refused to renounce the threat of armed aggression against Taiwan, a threat recently fortified on Feb. 21 with one additional triggering condition -- Taipei's indefinite refusal to negotiate a peaceful unification.
The two previous triggering conditions were: a) Taiwan's declaring independence and b) foreign occupation of Taiwan.
3) In the last decade the PRC has nearly doubled its military expenditure. And it has accelerated the strategic modernization of its armed forces, including the recent deployment of M9 and M11 ballistic missiles, with Taiwan as the focus.
For more than two decades the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and three US-China communiques have guided Washington in its relations with both Taiwan and China. Embedded in those three communiques, but not in the TRA, is a bargain: The US commits not to challenge the one China myth/policy, while reserving the right of interpretation. In exchange, China agrees to incorporate Taiwan peacefully -- while reserving the right to use force against the latter.
This "creative ambiguity" has enabled Washington and Beijing to bring about a grand strategic realignment of mutual benefit.
The Clinton administration abandoned that ambiguity in 1998. In order to appease Beijing, it en-tered into a "constructive strategic partnership" with China and adopted the so-called "three nos" policy: "We [the US] do not support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement."
It should be noted that an overwhelming majority of the US Congress does not endorse this new China policy. Many of the most influential US media, regional experts and China scholars, eminent security specialists, and even national security assistants to former US presidents, do not approve of this one-sided appeasing policy either.
The "one China" policy is a myth; since 1949 there have been two Chinas. Nevertheless, Washington has embraced the myth. According to its pre-1972 version, one China meant the ROC on Taiwan. Since then, one China equals the PRC. Creative ambiguity certainly has its merits, but it has drawbacks as well.
While it has temporarily enabled Washington and Beijing to disregard irreconcilable differences and postpone a day of reckoning, it has also engendered misunderstanding.
This leads to miscalculation, and may even mislead policy makers into building long-term plans in the sand, instead of on the solid rock of reality.
Richard Nixon, inventor of the post-1972 version of the "one China" policy, later counseled against it shortly before his death. In his last political testament, titled Beyond Peace, Nixon wrote that the US must accept that "the separation [of Taiwan from the PRC] is permanent politically."
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