China's recent white paper, titled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," should be viewed as the initial volley of a more intense political-military campaign to subdue democratic Taiwan. As the Feb. 21 white paper signals a new urgency on reunification, it also contains the kernel of possible conciliation. But there should be no illusions; the white paper reinforces the PRC's emphasis on military force in its political strategy toward Taipei.
A great deal of commentary will focus on the white paper's seeming concessions that Beijing hopes will provide incentives for Taipei to negotiate soon after the March elections. And it is indeed preferable for Taipei and Beijing to settle their differences peacefully, through negotiations. But as the white paper offers glimmers of encouragement, it also slams many of Taipei's previous negotiating positions, and adds an unprecedented new condition to justify use of military force against Taiwan: a perceived refusal by Taipei to accept a negotiated settlement that satisfies Beijing's demands.
The white paper also increases tensions by implicitly suggesting that an eventual deadline will be placed on such negotiations. This has already been muted in commentary in the Hong Kong press, with possible deadlines ranging from 2007, 2010, 2015 and 2020. There could truly be a debate within the PRC over such a deadline. Even if not, such noise puts psychological pressure on Taipei. However, enforcing a potential deadline requires that the PLA attain real military superiority, which puts renewed focus on the cross-strait military balance.
Could the PLA amass the necessary force to make good an early deadline like 2007? For the PLA, setting such a goal has advantages. It could use an expected preponderance of forces that would be accentuated by ongoing delays in the development of advanced US systems like the F-22 fighter, naval missile defense, and advanced technologies like lasers. It appears increasingly that if the PLA did not have to invade Taiwan, merely destroy its capacity to resist, the PLA may be able to enforce an early deadline.
The most decisive developing PLA capability that could come together by 2005 is a space-missile-aircraft reconnaissance-strike complex. Last year the Pentagon was reported to have estimated the PLA would build 650 tactical ballistic missiles of the DF-15 and M-11 variety by 2005. Add 100 to 150 more by 2007. To these add unknown hundreds of new land attack cruise missiles. In January the Jane's Defense Weekly reported that new land attack cruise missiles are already in PLA service, while a Pentagon report from last year did not expect them for some time. These missiles will benefit from new PLA imaging and radar satellites which can see through all weather. And the PLA is also interested in becoming a partner in Russia's GLONASS navigation satellite constellation, which would allow ballistic and cruise missiles to achieve high accuracy.
These missiles are intended to clear the way for the PLA Air Force, which by 2007, will be well on its way toward accomplishing its goal of becoming an offensive strike force. It will have acquired 40 to 70 Su-30 all-weather precision strike aircraft. These will carry cruise missiles, plus satellite or laser-guided bombs. The Su-30s, and possibly up to 150 Su-27 fighters will carry the long-range self-guiding Russian R-77 air-to-air missile. The PLA Air Force will still have hundreds of older J-8 and J-7 fighters, which may be upgraded with hard-to-escape helmet-sighted air-to-air missiles. And air battles will be controlled by modern radar aircraft like the Russian/Israeli A-50, and the British Searchwater radar equipped Y-8 transport which is already in PLA Navy service.
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