In his attempt to clarify speculation over whether he is willing to endorse President Lee Teng-hui's (
Last week, Lien's camp tested the waters by sending out the message that there could be a possibility of some adjustment of the current "go slow, be patient" policy and a discussion of the "confederation model" for regulating a future cross-strait relationship.
It seems that the KMT's standard-bearer for the upcoming election is finally trying to move out of the shadow of his mentor.
What is most incumbent on Lien, however, is the task of generating his own policy on China, and at the same time balancing the position of Lee Tung-hui as the father of the current state-to-state concept -- and doing both of these while managing to avoid creating any further "surprises" that could further damage an already deteriorated cross-strait relationship.
Electoral concerns play a pivotal role here. Given that Lien is still trailing the other two leading candidates, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (
The delay of Lien's release of a China policy, which is considered one of the most crucial campaign issues for all presidential hopefuls, explains why Lien's camp has been taking a cautious and ambiguous approach in dealing with cross-strait policy.
Concerns of an external nature make up another source of possible worry for Lien.
1) Last December, the Los Angeles Times published a column by Jim Mann which was in the form of an "open letter" to Lee. Mann openly warned Lee that, "the Americans are afraid of you. Washington is truly nervous about what you might try to do during your last months in office." Mann also implied that even if Lien wins the election, Lee would still be the party chairman of the KMT and will be the anchor of Taiwan's mainland policy.
2) Two weeks after Mann's letter was published, Chen Hsi-fan (
3) During their January visit to Taipei, a US Congress delegation, led by Congressman Matt Salmon, reminded President Lee to be "extra careful" on his remarks on cross-strait relations so as to protect the "fragile" Taiwan-US relationship.
4) Ralph A. Cossa, editor of the Pacific Forum from the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed in a newsletter that "there are fears in Beijing and Washington that Republic of China President Lee Teng-hui may have another `shock' in store as the March 2000 Taiwan presidential election draws closer." Cossa even predicted the next "shock" which would bring a harsh PRC response would most likely come if Soong were to be elected.
The KMT would try to institutionalize Lee's "special state-to-state" theory prior to inauguration day on May 20 to reduce Soong's flexibility in cutting a deal with China. The DPP would also be expected to support such a move.
Lien's dilemma demonstrates not only the impact of Lee's theory on the campaign strategy of his own party but also what sort of negotiating skills would be needed for the next leader of Taiwan. All three leading presidential candidates advocate the importance of maintaining a stable and peaceful cross-strait relationship. The president of the country must understand the significance of Taiwan's (or the ROC's) independent sovereignty, the precondition of safeguarding Taiwan's national security, and the "equal basis" principle in negotiating with Beijing. The differences between the candidates lies primarily in the language they use to describe many of the same things.
First, both Lien and Chen contend that Taiwan and China are two independent and sovereign countries, while Soong portrays the relationship as "quasi-international." Second, in reaction to international pressure for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait question, both Chen and Soong have suggested the signing of "fundamental agreements" or "non-aggression agreements" between Taipei and Beijing. The "German model" and the "European Union model" were two scenarios offered by Chen and Soong in dealing with future Taiwan-China relations. Obviously, Lien is still trying to work out a similar proposal.
No matter what Lien's answer will be, the chances of his withdrawing or surpassing the "special state-to-state" framework is minimal. Since the framework reflects historical fact as well as the political status quo -- let alone that it has the support of over 80 percent of the public -- the concept will become the center of political development regarding cross-strait relations regardless of who wins the election.
What then will Lien's China policy be? Given domestic and external influences we see currently, it is hard for Lien to make any major breakthrough in cross-strait relations. What is even worse is the possibility that Lien's camp could reassert the principle of "one China with respective definitions"(
To create more momentum in the next few weeks, Lien will have to reassert the "special state-to-state relations" model with no further elaboration. He may also urge the need to "prepare" for entering the "mid-term" stage under the National Unification Guidelines (
Lien has so far made several suggestions. He has shown an interest in going forward with the lifting of the "three links" ban and establishing better mechanisms between Taiwan and China to build confidence.
He has also showed his willingness to visit Beijing once he is elected president. Although those ideas overlap with the other two main contenders, Lien will try his best to create the impression that he is the best candidate to maintain peace and stability across the Strait.
To sum up, the post-Lee Teng-hui era will be characterized by the framework outlined by Lee's 1999 announcement. Any successor who wants to move forward or backward from this declaration will have to pay a huge price. Without a mature cross-strait atmosphere for greater reconciliation, the next president of Taiwan will have to seek a "middle way" between safeguarding Taiwan's independent statehood and gradually normalizing cross-strait relations.
Liu Shih-chung is deputy director of the DPP's Department of International Affairs
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