In military manpower and hardware, the PRC enjoys a quantitative superiority that Taiwan has no hope of matching or even closing the gap.
The PRC's 2.5 million strong armed forces far outnumber Tawain's 400,000. The PRC figure does not include the one million People's Armed Police.
The PRC has over 4,000 aircraft, whereas Taiwan has some 400 "second-generation" advanced fighter aircraft.
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has about 65 attack submarines, five of which are nuclear powered, whereas Taiwan has only four diesel submarines, of which two are of the WW II vintage. The PLAN has over 60 major surface combatants while Taiwan has about 40. China has nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile force (Erpao) that can launch nuclear or conventional warheads against Taiwan.
Diminishing returns
In terms of the quality of military manpower and hardware, Taiwan still possesses a diminishing edge.
The ROC is about to complete equipping its navy and air force with new and advanced fighter aircraft (Mirage 2000, F16 and IDF) and naval frigates (Lafayette, Knox, and Perry class). Other advanced equipment such as E2C (early warning aircraft),ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and many other weapon systems have either already been deployed or are soon to enter the inventory.
Fortunately for Taiwan, quality, more than quantity, has increasingly become the decisive factor in the battle outcome. Furthermore, the speed of the platform has become less important than the quality of what it carries -- sensors, electronics gadgets, and precision-guided projectiles and munitions.
Taiwan's superiority in conventional arms, however, will be increasingly eroded by the PRC's acquisition of Russian arms in recent years. Of all the arms delivered or to be delivered to the PLA , the most troublesome are:
1) SU-27 and equivalent;
2) the Sovremenny-class destroyers, equipped with sea-skimming 150-mile range SS-N-22 Mosquito (or Sunburn in NATO's designation) and possibly also with cruise missiles; and
3) low-noise Kilo-class submarines.
A substantial quantity of those advanced Russian weapon systems cannot but present major threats to Taiwan.
Models for a PLA operation against Taiwan
The goal of most wars is to conquer the enemy's will to resist to one's terms for peace. Let's assume that should the PRC resort to a military operation against Taiwan, its goal is to coerce Taiwan through "armed persuasion" into succumbing to its formula of "one country, two systems" -- with the least cost to itself and in the shortest possible time, so as to minimize the prospects of international intervention.
Bearing this in mind, the PRC has a spectrum of military options, including but not limited to
1) preemptive missile strikes against key military targets;
2) punitive and harassing operations;
3) blockades of harbors and inter-
dictions of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs); and
4) an all out amphibious invasion.
However, none of the above operations guarantees that PRC can and will achieve its goal.
An amphibious invasion is unlikely
This is a highly risky and most unlikely option. The PRC may opt for this mode only if
1) all other options fail;
2) it has the resources to do the job;
3) it can be sure of deterring or persuading the US to stay put; and
4) it can be sure that the market democracies, especially the US and Japan, will not impose a total ban of imports from China.
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