Much of Reconciliation consists of history lessons, delivered from Bhutto's own unique perspective, about conflicting interpretations of Islamic doctrine, the Shiite-Sunni schism and the debilitating legacy of Western colonialism in the Middle East. Bhutto takes the US to task for its role in helping to overthrow the democratically elected government of Iran in 1953, arguing that this not only undermined the future of democratic government in that nation but also "made generations of Muslims
suspicious and cynical about Western motivations."
She says that if the US had not used Afghanistan as merely a "blunt instrument to trigger the implosion of the Soviet Union" and then abandoned it, history in the entire region might well have been very different. And she deems Iraq "a quagmire for the West and a great and unfolding tragedy for the people" of that country - a "colonial war in a postcolonial era" from which America cannot extricate itself.
When it comes to Pakistani history and her own role in it, Bhutto's account is considerably more problematic. She asserts that if her government "had continued for its full five-year term, it would have been difficult for Osama bin Laden to set up base in Afghanistan in 1997 when he established al-Qaeda to openly recruit and train young men from all over the Muslim world." Never mind that it was on her watch that the shadowy Pakistani intelligence service began actively promoting the Taliban in Afghanistan and recruiting young Islamic militants for its continuing struggle against India in Kashmir. Grandly equating herself with democracy in Pakistan, Bhutto also writes, "In 1998, two years after my overthrow, al-Qaeda declared war on America," and suggests that "the age of international terrorist war actually coincided with the suspension of democracy in Pakistan."
Also sprinkled throughout this book are accusations against the current Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf, with whom she had reportedly been negotiating a power-sharing arrangement, promoted by the US. Bhutto blames Musharraf's government for allowing a Taliban resurgence by pulling its own military out from North Waziristan in 2006. She writes that there were reports of "wide-spread rigging preparations" for the 2008 elections. And she accuses Musharraf's supporters of doing little to provide adequate security for her return to the country last fall, accusations that would be revived by her supporters in the wake of her assassination.
Certainly she knew the risks of returning from exile. "I would have done anything to spare my children the same pain that I had undergone - and still feel - at my father's death," she writes. "But this was actually one thing I couldn't do; I couldn't retreat from the party and the platform that I had given so much of my life to."



