'China's democratic future'

By Bradley Winterton
CONTRIBUTING REPORTER
Sunday, Oct 23, 2005, Page 18

This is a very optimistic book. In it, Bruce Gilley sticks his neck out and insists that a democratic China is an inevitability. It may happen tomorrow, or it may happen in 20 years' time, but happen one day it surely will.

Enemies this view, he writes, are either mystical "Orientalists" who believe that China is somehow different from other countries, or "Manichaeans" who think that the Communist Party's apparatus of control is far more sophisticated than he believes.

Against view that China is somehow a special case, Gilley argues that Asia has already spawned viable democracies in India, Japan, Thailand, South Korea and, most

significantly of all, Taiwan. China is no more "different" than anywhere else in the region. And

liberal democracy, he believes,

following Francis Fukuyama, has now become the accepted "best pattern" for social and political

organization world-wide, a fact sometimes disguised by the

triumphalism of the West.

In support of this optimistic analysis and set of predictions, the author argues that change from the current one-party system in China is most likely to come in the form of a "young Turks" take-over by people quite highly placed in Beijing's

CHINA'S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE By Bruce Gilley, 297 Pages, Columbia University Press.

government, rather than by a

revolution from below such as was attempted with such catastrophic results in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. "It remains a singular fact," he insists," that one of the world's biggest, dynamic and

culturally rich societies continues to be ruled by a corrupt and

repressive dictatorship.

"The departure of the Chinese Communist Party will be simply the passing of yet another Chinese dynasty, he argues, albeit also one of the most important events of the 21st century. He goes on to assert that it's quite possible the CCP will limp along through the first couple of decades of this century, but that this will have little effect on its ultimate destiny.

"Diplomatic vitriol from Beijing," he writes, "and the narrow business and academic interests of those involved in China have exerted a strong influence in curtailing the debate. But doing so ... risks leaving the world unprepared to deal with this major event."

How will such a change come about? Gilley mentions several scenarios -- the official reversal of the party-line on Tiananmen, a "southern tour" by a leading reformer in the style of the one Deng Xiaoping took in order to announce his economic reforms -- but both of these would merely be the outward and visible signs of something deeper. Somehow the moment has to happen when those holding power acquiesce in surrendering it to others. Many such moments

elsewhere are studied, but all are

different, the author points out, and influenced by local conditions.

What the effect be on Taiwan of such a development? Gilley is cautious here. This would not automatically be good news for Taipei, he argues. Three disaster scenarios for an attack on Taiwan are offered. First comes a last-ditch move by a tottering CCP. Second is an early gambit by a newly-installed democratic leadership in Beijing to prove its patriotic credentials. And third is "a sudden policy decision in later years as China's democracy enters its troubled youth."

He therefore concludes it will be of paramount importance for

whoever is in charge of the central government in Taipei not to use the democratization of China as the occasion to make a bid for

independence. Sudden change in China should be seen as a danger signal by Taipei. The continuance of the present status quo depends on political stability on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Any change, even one to democracy, will be very dangerous, because it could lead to unpredictable

decisions at top Chinese government levels.

Furthermore, a change to democracy might well be

specifically threatening. It would be unlikely to happen without considerable social debate, and possibly unrest, and the traditional response of governments to this is to try to unite the people by focusing attention on foreign

adventures. While China is

concerned with getting rich, war is unlikely. It's when something threatens to upset the apple-cart that Taiwan is most in danger.

"Russia's attacks on Chechnya reflect the dangers of preemptive bids for independence when a former empire is going through democratization," Gilley writes.

He goes on to make the point that for Taiwan to declare independence when such changes in China were on-going might jeopardize the growth there of the very democratic and associated freedoms that Taiwan currently so conspicuously enjoys.

Given Taiwan's long insistence that China be democratic before any political coalition could be considered, he writes, it would be dishonest for Taiwan to retreat from that position. Various forms of

"contract" -- in other words

agreement freely entered into and of benefit to both parties -- are

possible, Gilley argues. One might be a confederation such as the British Commonwealth, with China and Taiwan only as loosely associated as the UK and Canada."Given the island's close economic integration with China, "he concludes, "political cooperation could be widely

welcomed beyond the tired old pro-China crowd in Taipei."

China's Democratic Future, then, is an intelligent and cogent book,

elegantly written and closely

argued. It may both appear and prove to be over-optimistic, but as a bid for sanity it's none the worse for that. The author worked in Hong Kong for a decade as a

journalist on the Far Eastern Economic Review, is now an

adjunct professor of international affairs at the New School University in the US, and is the author of two other books on Chinese politics.