How Asia views Obama’s Pacific initiative

Much has been made of US President Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia,’ but for countries in the region there are lasting consequences of being caught between the US and China


Sat, Nov 24, 2012 - Page 9

A lot has happened in Asia while the US was off fighting its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and most of it can be summed up in one word — China. Fueled by China’s amazing growth and the promise of its huge and expanding consumer market, the Asia-Pacific region is now, as experts like to say, the global economy’s center of gravity. Sorry, Europe.

However, prosperity requires stability.

As US President Barack Obama tours the region to push his year-old “pivot to the Pacific” policy, the big question on everybody’s mind is how much of a role Washington, with its mighty military and immense diplomatic clout, can play in keeping the Pacific — well, pacific.

Here follows a look at how different countries perceive the US’ Pacific policy and how it impacts them.



As far as Beijing is concerned, Obama’s pivot was pulled right out of the old Cold War containment playbook. Afraid of China’s rise, Beijing believes, Washington is trying to enflame new tensions by isolating it and emboldening the countries that China has territorial disputes with, which is just about everybody with whom it shares a border.

“Using China’s rise and the ‘China threat’ theory, the US wants to convince China’s neighbors that Asia-Pacific needs Washington’s presence and protection in order to ‘unite’ them to strike a ‘strategic rebalance’ against China in the region,” security academic Wang Yusheng wrote recently in the China Daily.

It is a strategy that is bound to fail, Beijing says.

China sees its rise as inevitable and unstoppable and believes its neighbors will ultimately opt for stronger ties, while gradually excluding the US.

Beijing also views its economic dominance as an unalloyed good. As it tests out its first aircraft carrier, stealth jets, cyber-capabilities and high-tech missiles, it is in an increasingly strong position to deny Washington access to its shores as well as to some key Pacific sea lanes, which could be a problem if Obama’s pivot ever has to go from push to shove.



Without a doubt, Japan is Washington’s most faithful security partner in the Pacific — and it is the most pinched by China’s rise.

For months, Japan and China have been in an increasingly tense dispute over a group of small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea — the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), known as the Senkakus in Japan, which Taiwan also claims.

The near-constant presence of Chinese ships around them has stretched the Japanese Coast Guard to its limits. Japan’s air force says Chinese surveillance flights in the area have increased significantly.

Wary of getting caught up in the volatile brew of nationalism, historical animosity and populist politics that is fueling the flare-up, the US has been careful not to take sides. Instead, it has urged the two countries to work out their problems among themselves, diplomatically.

That has confounded many in Japan, which hosts 52,000 US troops under a treaty signed in 1960 that obliges the US to defend territories under Japanese administration. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that includes the isles at the center of the current tensions with China. Tokyo would have preferred at least some moral support to its claim.

“It’s strange,” said Kazuhiko Togo, a former senior diplomat who now heads the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University. “I trust the US as our ally, but we need to address this issue of US ‘neutrality.’”



Washington took a similarly standoffish stance early this year in the dispute between Taiwan, China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Sea islands, believed to be rich in gas and oil, and straddling busy shipping routes.

The Philippines — the US’ closest ally in that dispute — eventually pulled its ships out of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島), but Chinese vessels have remained.

Manila-based political analyst Ramon Casiple said the disputes have left the US’ allies more aware of their own vulnerabilities and what they can — or cannot — expect from the US.

“America’s treading a very fine line,” Casiple said. “It has to reassure its allies that at the end of the day the US would be there for them.”

He added that the US has made it clear it is not willing to risk a major confrontation in which its options would be limited “to either intervene or lose influence.”

However, there is one other thing it might do in the meantime.

When US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Vietnam in June, he hinted that the US Navy would like access to Cam Ranh, a deep-water port facing the contested waters of the South China Sea. Hanoi’s counter-proposal? Lift a ban on selling it lethal weapons.



Best friends forever? Not so much.

As China has become stronger and more important to the US economy, Washington has become extremely wary of engaging Taiwan as a full security partner — a big pullback from the 1950s and the 1960s, when the two had a formal defense treaty and the US based thousands of troops on what it considered a — if not the — key forward base to keep China at bay.

Today, cooperation is limited to some intelligence sharing, the training of Taiwanese air force personnel in the US, occasional security consultations and very restricted arms sales — definitely not the kind of advanced F-16 aircraft and diesel submarines the Taiwanese military really wants.

Even so, political scientist Alexander Huang (黃介正) of Taipei’s Tamkang University says Taiwan can play a role in Obama’s pivot — but only if Washington decides to make a clear commitment.



Ah, North Korea.

It has a new leader, about whom, typically, the world knows almost nothing, a nuclear weapons/ballistic missile program that it likes to trot out every so often to raise regional tensions and a belligerent attitude toward the US.

However, Obama has a friend in Seoul.

Back in the 1950s, the US fought on Seoul’s side in the Korean War — and contemplated attacking China with nuclear weapons before it was over. China still supports the North and Washington continues to have about 28,500 troops in the South.

South Korea also buys about 70 percent of its weapons from the US and a big payday for a US company might come soon after Obama’s inauguration, when South Korea is expected to formally announce the winner in a US$7.6 billion project to build 60 sophisticated fighter jets.

The deal will be South Korea’s biggest-ever weapons procurement. The top contender is believed to be Lockheed Martin’s stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — which after a long run of development problems and cost overruns could certainly use a multi-billion dollar boost. Boeing and European aerospace giant EADS are also in the running.



Australia got one of the first waves from the pivot when the US announced last year it would begin rotating up to 2,500 US Marines through the northern city of Darwin. Now the US is seeking access to an Australian navy base south of the western city of Perth and to bombing ranges in the northern Outback.

Some experts fear the relationship may be moving too fast.

On one hand there is broad support for Australia’s defense relationship with the US, so having US Marines was seen as a natural step. However, it has also raised concerns that Washington will push for more — something Australia might not be ready for. After all, China is central to Australia’s economy, buying the bulk of its mineral and coal resources.

“What worries us is the way in which it seems to confirm that the US and China are increasingly viewing each other as strategic rivals,” said Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at Australian National University.

“We worry about the idea of the US-China relationship becoming more adversarial,” he said. “America wants to remain the dominant power in Asia and China wants to become the dominant power in Asia. What the rest of us all want is for neither of them to be the dominant power in Asia.”

By AP writers Christopher Bodeen in Beijing, Peter Enav in Taipei, Jim Gomez in Manila, Kim Hyung-jin in Seoul, Elaine Kurtenbach in Tokyo, Chris Brummitt in Hanoi, Jocelyn Gecker in Bangkok and Kristen Gelineau in Sydney.