Since the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) defeat in the Jan. 11 presidential and legislative elections, Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu’s (韓國瑜) fans have united in showing their support, the KMT’s young and middle-aged politicians have formed a “+1” alliance to push for party reform, and supporters have urged KMT Legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) to run for party chairperson and KMT Legislator Wayne Chiang (蔣萬安) for Taipei mayor so that they can launch the party’s reconstruction.
To be blunt, reconstruction of the party will take time, and those with special agendas might pursue power in the name of reform.
THE KO DILEMMA
However, the only KMT-related issue that interests the public is whether Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), after cutting ties with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), would seek to ally with the KMT in a bid for the presidency in 2024, especially since his top aide, Tsai Pi-ju (蔡壁如), has proposed creating a “greater opposition alliance.”
This could happen. After all, as the pan-blue and pan-green camps battled it out, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) chaired by Ko still received more than 1.58 million party votes in its first election, winning a total of five legislator-at-large seats and the eligibility to nominate a presidential candidate for 2024.
That is impressive. While the DPP has a slim majority in the new legislature, the TPP is likely to play a critical role. If Ko can perform steadily during his second term, his accumulation of political power is assured.
GOU’S GAMBLE
Moreover, Hon Hai Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘), who used to ally with Ko, switched his endorsement from the TPP to the People First Party during the campaign, which was clearly a bad move, considering the election outcome.
Gou has lost all the bargaining chips for him to challenge Ko, who is likely to dominate the “third political force.” The proposal of a “greater opposition alliance” shows Ko’s ambition to integrate opposition forces and develop an advantage.
As Ko continues to accumulate power, even if his overall political strength is not yet up to that of the KMT, he might have leverage over the party.
After senior politicians such as former KMT chairmen Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) withdraw from politics, almost no one inside the KMT would be able to compete with Ko.
Time will not be kind to former KMT chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) or his ambitions to run for president in 2024. As for Han, returning to Kaohsiung to avoid a recall seems to be his only option after suffering such a major defeat in the presidential election.
A NEW HOPE
The KMT has placed great hope in both Chiangs. The two KMT lawmakers do have potential, but, unlike Ko, they lack the advantage of being a local government head. Their inability to dominate the issues, attract media attention, and criticize party leadership boldly and resolutely indicates that they have room for improvement.
All of this gives Ko a perfect opportunity to become the unifying figure under which the “non-green” camp can come together. It seems that the KMT can only “ally with Ko against the pan-green camp” and regain its strength by taking advantage of him. The new KMT lawmakers might resent this, but it is a political reality.
Niu Tse-hsun is a professor in Chinese Culture University’s advertising department.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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