Following the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)’s heavy defeat in the Jan. 11 presidential and legislative elections, many voices inside and outside the party have been calling for introspection.
Some want to change the party’s official name and review the so-called “1992 consensus,” under which representatives of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party supposedly acknowledge that there is only “one China,” with each side of the Taiwan Strait interpreting “China” in its own way. These suggestions have in turn provoked a clamor of opposition to “desinicization” from conservative factions within the KMT.
If the KMT wants to survive as a party that can compete for political power in Taiwan, it must institute reforms to align its political orientation with mainstream public opinion.
Still, there are plenty of people among the KMT’s supporters who have an emotional attachment to China. Reformists in the party must therefore propose arguments and standpoints that, while complying with majority public opinion, also do not cause a division in its ranks. Only by doing so can this century-old party, which arrived in Taiwan from elsewhere, hope to successfully transform itself into a Taiwanese party.
Regarding the naming issue, if people insist that the Chinese Nationalist Party must change its name to the Taiwanese Nationalist Party, that is something that would have to be forced down some people’s throats. Should that really come to pass, it would definitely open up further rifts in the party, causing it to perish before it has the chance to transform itself.
However, another way would be to simply remove the word “Chinese,” thus changing the party’s title to the Nationalist Party. Such a change should be acceptable to Taiwan-centric reformers in the KMT, but it could not called “desinicization,” because it would only mean restoring its historical name.
In 1912, year the Republic of China (ROC) was founded, the party, then led by Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), was called the Nationalist Party and it was not until 1919, the eighth year of the ROC, that Sun reorganized the party and changed its title to the Chinese Nationalist Party.
Going back to the original title of Nationalist Party would make it more flexible and inclusive, and more in line with mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.
As to the matter of the “1992 consensus,” young and middle-aged members of the KMT, who run the gauntlet of public opinion, all know that the “consensus” is outdated. However, if the KMT really abandoned the “consensus” by removing it from the party’s policy platform, it would probably cause a major confrontation from within.
A more pragmatic approach would be to refer to it the way the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) dealt with its Taiwan independence clause by “freezing” it. Such an approach would involve adopting a new policy platform or resolution that “freezes” the “1992 consensus.”
For example, the KMT could adopt a new resolution to the effect that it would cease to recognize the “1992 consensus” until such time as China accepts the part that allows each side to interpret “China” in its own way, and until China faces up to the existence of the ROC (Taiwan).
This approach should be more acceptable to conservative elements in the KMT, while also paving the way for the party to transform itself and go forward.
There are two routes that the KMT can follow:
It could refuse to transform the party or institute reforms. This choice would allow the KMT to continue sharing political power at the local government level, and to have a proportion of councilors and legislators.
However, a party that refuses to root itself in the soil would eventually shrivel and die. It would be like a terminally ill patient who receives palliative care. Although it would suffer a bit less, it would only be waiting for its life to end.
It could also dare to reform and transform the KMT into a truly native Taiwanese party. However, based on the existing political ecology and culture within its ranks, this route would be arduous and full of risks.
Any carelessness could lead to another major split that would make it hard for the KMT to ever have another chance of standing at Taiwan’s political helm. It would be like undergoing a risky surgical operation. Especially now with the newly established Taiwan People’s Party circling overhead like a vulture, the risk factor for KMT reform is even greater.
Following President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) election victory, an increasing number of political observers are debating the idea that the DPP could be the ruling party for a long time. If the KMT fails to transform and revive itself, it would be hard for any of the handful of significant smaller parties to threaten the DPP’s hold on government power.
This might not be a good thing for Taiwan, and it might not be good for the DPP either.
However, if the KMT cannot reform itself into a party whose sole loyalty is to Taiwan, the public would never dare to place central government authority in its hands.
For the KMT, the mission of reform and localization is one that is easier said than done.
Its success and failure depends on whether the KMT’s young and middle-aged members can seize on the public mood and demonstrate their genuine determination to institute radical transformation.
Shao Li-chung is former president of Radio Taiwan International.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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