Thankfully, the Australian police confirmed to the media that Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Deputy Secretary-
General Alex Tsai (蔡正元) and Chinese businessman Sun Tianqun (孫天群) had, since the end of last month, used a combination of threats and enticements on self-confessed Chinese spy William Wang Liqiang (王立強).
Had the police not provided this information, Taiwanese might have had their heads turned by the false reports concocted by the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
If the police had not exposed the mendacious script allegedly prepared by Tsai and Sun, the false allegation that Wang had accepted a large sum of money from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would have been hyped and turned into a “scandal” serious enough to influence the results of Saturday’s presidential and legislative elections.
At a news conference that Tsai called to tell his side of the story, the arguments he presented did not in any way clarify his relationships with Sun and the CCP.
There is enough information available to expose the narrative of the KMT and the CCP, which has two important parts:
First, Tsai said that Sun and Wang had contacted him on their own initiative. This raises points of doubt that Tsai intentionally concealed. If Wang really did come knocking on Tsai’s door, why would Tsai and Sun need to threaten him and offer him inducements? Also, why would Wang report the matter to authorities in Australia?
Moreover, Chinese authorities said right from the start that Wang was a con artist and not a special agent.
This is a sensitive issue that affects Taiwan’s national security and the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific. Set aside that Sun’s and Tsai’s political standpoints and ideology are in tune with the CCP. If they really did not know each other before this situation arose, and if Tsai agrees with Sun’s statements that Hong Kong-based businessman Xiang Xin (向心) is not a Chinese spymaster, as Wang claims, and Wang himself is a fake spy, why would Tsai stick his neck out to act as Sun’s accomplice by threatening and enticing Wang, and making counterallegations that the DPP was involved?
Clearly, Tsai and Sun know each other very well and are closely connected.
Second, there are complicated relationships involved.
Since Wang applied for political asylum in Australia on Nov. 24 last year, the KMT and CCP have insisted that Wang is a fake spy.
The case has caused serious concern and alarm among the members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance — the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It also explains why nearly 70 percent of Taiwanese are in favor of the Anti-infiltration Act (反滲透法).
The fact that the Australian police stepped in early to spoil the joint conspiracy allegedly prepared by Tsai, Sun and double agents of the KMT and CCP also shows the complicated relationships behind the incident.
Amid such a complex geopolitical situation, why did Tsai and Sun still dare to work together to threaten or entice Wang into retracting his confession before the elections by saying that he is actually a fake communist spy? Why did they concoct the lie that DPP politician Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) was involved and that Wang had accepted a large sum of money from the DPP?
All this shows how far the CCP is prepared to go in its campaign to subvert Taiwan’s democratic order.
Chen Tsai-neng is a doctoral candidate at National Chung Hsing University’s Graduate Institute of International Politics.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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