There is a great deal of conversation in Taiwan about what the situation in Hong Kong means for cross-straits relations. Developments over the weekend are certain to intensify those discussions. But what about the US approach to the turmoil? There are important lessons there as well.
Critics of the administration allege it has not paid enough public attention to the protests. But it has actually said quite a bit. Setting aside the President’s occasional off-hand remark or tweet — which often confuse as much as they clarify — his administration (and it does work for him) has been consistent. The State Department has issued official statements. Hong Kong has been highlighted in several very carefully crafted, high-profile speeches, including the President’s address to the UN General Assembly.
The most extensive statement of policy came on October 24. Vice President Mike Pence gave remarks on China at the Wilson Center in Washington. There, he called for a “peaceful resolution” of the impasse and invoked China’s obligations under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. He praised Hong Kong for its free economy, independent legal institutions and “lively free press.” He expressed support for the protesters, and notably urged to them to hew to the path of non-violence.
Only judged by the immediacy of social media could this be seen as insufficient.
The executive branch of the US government cannot respond to every new headline declaring Hong Kong “in flames” or “descending into chaos,” every performance of the US national anthem, or each report of police excess. The administration has a broader responsibility for relations with Hong Kong and US-PRC relations. It’s only prudent for it to keep a healthy distance from day-to-day skirmishing.
Congress is different. It assumes no responsibility for that broader dynamic. Congress reacts to what it sees in its collective media feed. It is focused on abuses by the Hong Kong police and the mainland’s very real encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy. Unlike the administration, the excesses of protestors are not of much concern to it. Neither are the subtleties of the Hong Kong-Beijing relationship.
Congress’ principle policy vehicle is the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA) which passed Congress just last week.
The bill’s message of support for Hong Kong’s treaty-bound liberties is crystal clear. The language of it, however, is quite modest. It requires the Secretary of State to certify to Congress at least once a year that the health of “one country, two systems” warrants the continued separate legal treatment of Hong Kong and the mainland. As a matter of law, the State Department already makes such a judgment. The new bill simply adds the formal certification. It also directs the government’s attention to sanctions that are, in fact, already available to it. Both provisions provide the administration waiver authority.
The HKHRDA is bigger than the sum of its parts in one other way, too. It seeks to squeeze the Trump administration into action. Yet, until a few days after the bill’s passage, when the President hinted at a veto, it didn’t seem to mind. Early on, the administration offered some suggestions on the bill’s text, but left its final shape and timing to Congress. Now, whatever his hesitations, the President’s options are limited. The bill clearly has a veto proof majority. If he’s uncomfortable with it, at this point, his only resort may be to utilize the loopholes the bill provides him.
There are three lessons for Taiwan in the way all this has unfolded.
First, it demonstrates the American resistance to foreign influence in policy development. As noble as protestors’ aspirations are, they are not Americans. Ultimately, they will not drive America’s China policy. Anyone familiar with the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) years will remember the application of this impulse to Taiwan. By the same token, neither can a future Taiwan government positively disposed toward Beijing assume Washington will facilitate cross-straits rapprochement. The US has a range of interests at stake vis-a-vis China that demand its current assertive approach. This will not change to accommodate Taipei.
Second, Congress is an equal of the executive branch on matters of foreign policy. It does not have to wait for the administration to offer proposals. If it perceives a lack of initiative on the part of the government, it can step in to fill the gap. This is critically important for Taiwan. Taiwan is not the hostage to US presidential administrations it is often portrayed to be. Congress can reinforce shared US-Taiwan interests and priorities. As for any sudden moves casting doubt on American security commitments to Taiwan, they would be met with a firestorm on Capitol Hill that would make the current effort on Hong Kong look like mere paper-shuffling.
Third, even during tense and chaotic political times in Washington, the US is capable of formulating policy responses to pressing matters. It is not pretty. American politicians don’t seclude themselves at a seaside resort and emerge with oracles for its friends and allies. Its debates and disagreements are largely public. What the US has is a process for mashing through all the inputs and coming up with a policy that can command a working consensus. That consensus remains deeply pro-Taiwan.
The way “one country, two systems” is playing out in the streets of Hong Kong is a clear cautionary tale for Taiwan. That is lost on no one. But it also reinforces some truths about the way US foreign policy operates. Taipei can take comfort in them.
Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
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