By the standards of previous Taiwanese election campaigns, the buildup to next year’s presidential and legislative elections has so far been rather tame. Nevertheless, the two largest parties have been trading small fire — or, to use a Taiwanese analogy, brandishing their swords like characters in a puppet show.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) was asked by a reporter whether his party is focusing 70 percent of its campaign resources on defeating the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) presidential candidate, Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), and 30 percent on seeing off the threat from Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who in August launched the Taiwan People’s Party.
Cho said that the DPP was 100 percent focused on protecting Taiwan, provoking a reaction from Ko, who issued the acid retort that the DPP “loves to say it is protecting Taiwan, but never actually does anything.”
Even if this were simply Ko making an offhand comment, it would be a shame to disregard it entirely just for this reason. The basic theme is that the protection of the nation is paramount, and this just happens to be an important duty for the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As such, it should be treated with gravity, not levity. It is therefore important to explore whether there was any merit in Ko’s retort.
Ko probably meant two things: first, that the DPP is all mouth and no action, and second, that, in contrast to the DPP, he has less to say and just quietly gets on with the job of administration. If the DPP wanted to hit back, it could say that Ko could not even find it in himself to pledge that, if president, he too would protect Taiwan — let alone commit to any concrete action.
However, if the DPP were to use this line of attack, it might come unstuck rather quickly. After all, pledging concrete action to protect the nation requires sound policies, a clear plan to achieve them and the political courage to carry them through.
While formulating long-term policy might not produce immediate results at the ballot box, rather than continually keeping its powder dry, the government needs to develop some robust policies that could be tested on the public. Simply loosing-off soundbites does not cut the mustard with the electorate.
However, Ko is the mayor of the nation’s capital, and does not have the elevated status of the incumbent national leader, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).
The reason that Ko, who has positioned himself as the third political force in Taiwan, brought up this particular issue, was not only to fulfill the function of the opposition providing oversight and checks and balances on the government: He has surely already taken into consideration how positioning himself in this way would attract swing voters, help his own political image, garner more support for the Taiwan People’s Party and possibly get a few more votes his way.
Voters are quite reasonably beginning to question the government on a number of its key policy areas. Some outside of the government bubble are pushing officials to respond to concerns raised by outside observers, particularly in relation to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.
This concern was voiced last week at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference in Maryland. US representatives expressed their concern to Taiwanese delegates regarding the nation’s transition to a professional, all-volunteer military, while simultaneously retaining a standing army formed from Taiwanese who would receive compulsory military service training lasting four months.
US delegates pointed out that the truncated compulsory military service period would be shorter than in South Korea and Israel, which run similar conscription-based militaries.
US officials at the conference said that they hoped Taiwan would reflect deeply on this issue, including how to develop a capable reserve army, while effectively balancing personnel costs.
This is not the first time that the US has expressed such concerns. In the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power report last year, officials criticized the government’s reform plans for the military, while the American Institute in Taiwan has repeatedly expressed similar concerns.
The main concern from Washington’s perspective is that moving to an all-volunteer military would be expensive, which could force the military to trim budgets in other areas. Another concern is that, at a policy level, the government must enhance Taiwan’s determination to defend itself against threats from China.
Faced with these warnings, the Ministry of National Defense, tasked with implementing the government’s military reforms, has sought to justify the rationale behind its plans. However, it has yet to put forward a persuasive argument that allays the concerns of critics.
For instance, given Taiwan’s severely declining birthrate, how would the military be able to sustain an effective reserve force? The ministry has yet to provide any data or evidence that proves that its plan is sustainable.
It is odd that we rarely see Washington’s view of the government’s national defense policy — the concrete manifestation of the DPP’s pledge to “protect Taiwan” — adopted by Taiwanese political parties and politicians as a topic for debate. This is especially surprising considering that it would place Tsai in an extremely awkward position, forcing her to argue that critics of her government’s policy — and by extension US officials — are nitpicking or do not understand the real situation “on the ground.”
The government must take more proactive measures to reassure the electorate that it is doing everything in its power to “100 percent protect Taiwan.” Only then would it be able to refute Ko’s stinging accusation that it is all talk and no action.
Tzou Jiing-wen is the editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper).
Translated by Edward Jones and Paul Cooper
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