As most people have stopped being provoked by things like Taiwanese tea shop chains siding with the Chinese Communist Party and talk show host Brian Tseng’s (曾博恩) joke about democracy advocate Deng Nan-jung’s (鄭南榕) self-immolation, a small crowd seems to have introduced “thought censorship” against people who do not think like them. Suddenly, people of other viewpoints are labeled “traitors to Taiwan” who are sabotaging democracy.
Is that correct? Will this kind of overreaction add to Taiwan’s national identity?
I support the boycott against Taiwanese tea shops that side with the communists and the criticism of Tseng, but such calls should not turn into emotional blackmail, nor should they be used as a criteria to judge whether a person loves Taiwan. These proclaimed “pro-Taiwan” censors are just like the former Taiwan Garrison Command.
Most Taiwanese born after 1990 have a strong sense of “national doom(亡國感),” especially as China has stepped up its “united front” work and is threatening the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong.
As a result, most young people do not have a good impression of China and are more determined to safeguard freedom of expression and democracy. Since the 2014 Sunflower movement, the pro-Taiwan camp has become a part of mainstream youth culture.
However, when it comes to the tea shops and Tseng, the pro-Taiwan camp seems to have become a symbol of the overly touchy, neurotic type, even going so far as to launch online censorship.
Although moderate voters have not started opposing Taiwanese independence, their dislike for the pro-Taiwan camp is growing stronger and they are less likely to identify with them.
Strictly speaking, the cause of the tea shop and Tseng controversies, and even the controversies themselves, are completely different. It is understandable that the pro-Taiwan camp was angered by a joke about the highly respected martyr and that people were hesitant about joining the tea shop boycott, which was based on Chinese national identity, but such calls should not degenerate into emotional blackmail.
Of course, there is precedent for the pro-Taiwan camp’s censorship. In response to the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) pro-unification line in 2014, it used slogans such as “Supporting the KMT means supporting unification” to stimulate public opposition to the party.
The camp is assuming that the public would support Taiwanese independence if it could reinforce the impression that the tea shop chain and Tseng would help the communists annex Taiwan, but this assumption is not true, as the public remains at the stage of merely opposing the communists, while not necessarily supporting independence.
Simply put, if the pro-Taiwan camp continues to push for independence by setting censorship criteria for what it means to love the nation and continues to rely on emotional blackmail, Taiwanese are likely to remain at that stage, even if they are not opposed to independence.
In practice, opposing the communists does not necessarily equate to supporting independence. Unless the camp only wants to reinforce the public’s anti-communist sentiment, it must immediately stop acting like a miniature Taiwan Garrison Command and learn to trust the public’s wisdom and their sense of national doom.
Wu Bo-wei is a nongovernmental organization worker.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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