The issue of whether Taiwan should sign a peace agreement with China to end the Chinese Civil War and bring cessation to hostilities between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been in the news of late. That the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have to this day not settled their differences is troubling, and in large part unprecedented in international affairs.
I am reminded of the US Civil War, which did come to terms. To be sure, the reunification of the Confederate States of America and the United States of America — a major accomplishment in US affairs — would be a sticking point in the debate over Taiwan, the citizens of which for the most part desire no such unification — although the point is arguable, and there are Taiwanese who do desire a permanent union with China.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) recently said that if elected next year, a KMT government would be “within its rights” to sign a peace agreement (“Wu Den-yih says KMT could sign peace treaty if it regains presidency next year,” Feb. 15, page 1).
This is a simplistic, mechanical view that does not consider what it could mean for Taiwan, China and the world, and fails to examine the advantages and/or difficulties a peace agreement would engender.
Of course, the PRC in all likelihood would not sign any such agreement with the ROC, given the state of affairs and lack of recognition between the two. The KMT needs to see this truth before it can in any way move forward: Just as much as the PRC, the ROC is not actually in any position to do much of anything in terms of a covenant.
This lack of recognition of the international status of the ROC by the PRC, particularly, makes the whole enterprise seem unlikely. That could end the discussion outright — and could end my comments here as well.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spokesman Johnny Lin (林琮盛) has said: “Wu’s so-called cross-strait peace treaty cannot guarantee peace; Taiwan’s sovereignty is the only foundation for building peace and stability.”
This need not necessarily be true and is in essence a limited view. One form of peace agreement or another could be based on Taiwan/the ROC’s sovereignty, and were this allowed and agreed to, a breakthrough could be near.
Yet again we must add: “If the PRC would agree;” but this might not be an impossibility, although to what extent this would indicate “one country, two systems” is a factor.
Chang Kuo-tsai (張國財), another observer in this debate, has said that such an agreement would be “pointless,” citing tired military “principles” and just-as-tired historicity in terms of peace agreements made with the Nazis in the 1930s.
These agreements were hollow and futile, but have little relevance in today’s world. The 21st century is definitely not a world of such brutal, violent dictatorships, although there are those who would argue that the PRC is very much such a state.
“Would such a move bring peace? Or would it consign Taiwanese to servitude?” Chang asked, but this is going too far and looking at the idea in the most negative light (“Signing a peace deal with China is pointless,” June 5, page 8).
Lo Cheng-chung (羅承宗) has said that “as the frequent movement of goods and people has shown, a state of peace already prevails across the Taiwan Strait” (“Cross-strait peace treaty unnecessary, academic says,” Feb. 20, page 3).
It was also reported that more than 2.6 million Chinese tourists last year visited Taiwan, and there are more flights between China and Taiwan than between China and any other Asian nation. No doubt this could point to the validity and usefulness of further peaceful efforts.
Meanwhile, the DPP has said that it would subject any peace agreement with China to a national referendum. This is a good idea, and I have a feeling that Taiwanese might just agree to it, in spite of the complexity.
The PRC was never at war with Taiwan, and this might also lead in a positive direction; although, that Taiwan, as the ROC, exists in fact and law would make things difficult. If the ROC signed any agreement, China would probably object to it, but this might be sidestepped if China were to agree to work with “Taiwan,” which it recognizes as an autonomous state in its way.
Seeing our way clear to understanding what the ROC is in relation to what Taiwan is would be necessary — and just as complex.
“Instead of asking China to sign a piece of paper that guarantees nothing, the KMT should ask China to renounce using armed force against Taiwan and all plans related to that purpose,” Chang wrote.
His second statement is true enough, but this does not refute the efficacy and rationality of the first. A signed agreement following international law would be, first, a breakthrough for Taiwan and China in terms of their relationship, and second, a step toward world peace that both sides could be proud of.
In all of this, with the hostility and lack of recognition that hangs like a cloud over this issue, it would be necessary for China to clear the air and see the soundness of ending war and hostility. This is by no means a definite possibility, but the opportunity should not be ignored by either party.
Some of the commentators I have cited would say that the ROC no longer exists anyway, and only Taiwan is left. Of course, the PRC was never at war with Taiwan, and thus if there is no ROC, there is no real possibility of any treaty, or much of anything else. Everyone might thus be forced to ignore the whole enterprise and drift back into the “status quo” — the economic peace that is in effect.
That might be comforting in its static, immobile surety, but leaves a lot undone. “Peace” might become “petrified” and “evolution” might become “abeyance.”
The idea that Taiwan should amass an even stronger military to somehow contest China — no doubt an impossibility — and create peace, is a contradiction. Nations do not aggregate military force to make peace, they do it to make war.
The resulting militaries, staring eye-to-eye across a line in the sand, would become a sort of mutually assured destruction, which admittedly would result in a sort of peaceful belligerence, but would leave the citizens of the countries as hostages, repressed collateral. That is not peace.
Huang Tien-lin (黃天麟), a national policy adviser to the president, said it would be “ridiculous that the KMT would promote signing a peace agreement ... it is a ‘one country, two systems’ agreement and ‘peace’ is ‘united front’ terminology” (“Proposed KMT ‘peace agreement’ a misnomer,” April 3, page 8).
This is more negativity, and all of this need not be true if China could agree to a meeting. Although again improbable, it might not be an impossibility, and the two sides could work on something — if not an actual peace agreement, perhaps an announcement — that would show goodwill on both sides and an effort to promote peace. That, few would argue with.
Indeed, such an agreement, or announcement could wipe the slate clean on the Chinese Civil War, a dark period of world history. Out of that war emerged the PRC and the ROC, for many years neither especially credible or responsible actors on the world stage.
In this light, a treaty or accord — or declaration or proclamation — would shine a new peaceful light on world affairs.
Great nations endeavor toward peace. It is hoped that Taiwan and China, now great nations in their own right, can move in this direction soon.
David Pendery is an associate professor at National Taipei University of Business.
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry