Foreign policy is the extension of domestic policy. This perspective is necessary to understand a sudden change in the China-US trade dispute.
Early last month, US President Donald Trump announced that tariffs on US$200 billion of Chinese imports would be raised after China broke an agreement.
On May 9, Chinese Vice Premier Liu He (劉鶴) brought Trump a “beautiful letter” from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) as he led a delegation to Washington for a new round of talks, but the letter must have been blank, as it failed to stop Trump from raising the tariffs.
Although China threatened to retaliate, no immediate action was taken until the Chinese Ministry of Finance unveiled countermeasures, raising tariffs on US$60 billion of US goods on May 13, followed by China Central Television’s tough statement that night.
Obviously, something important happened between the delivery of the “beautiful letter” and May 13.
It turns out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Politburo moved its regular end-of-the-month meeting to May 13.
In the last sentence of its report on the meeting, Xinhua news agency intriguingly said that “other matters” than the original agenda were also discussed.
Those “other matters” probably referred to retaliatory measures against the US.
Previously, on May 6, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, which leans toward former Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s (江澤民) faction, reported that Xi refused to yield to Washington, saying he would take full responsibility.
After the politburo formally decided to retaliate, all its members would have collective responsibility.
There are two types of responsibility in this case. The first is the newspaper’s reference to Xi’s responsibility for breaking the deal reached by Liu and the US, which led to Trump’s decision to raise tariffs.
The second refers to the politburo’s responsibility for raising tariffs on US$60 billion of US goods in retaliation.
However, Xi has tried to shirk responsibility by intentionally mixing the the two.
What exactly was in the agreement that Xi broke? It was first said that the deal demanded that Beijing curb intellectual property theft and carry out systemic reform. Now, he is said to be unwilling to reveal the text of the deal, because it might hurt his prestige. As it is nothing new for the CCP to break written agreements, how could it possibly keep a verbal agreement with Washington that has not been made public?
Xi also broke an agreement reached by Liu and Washington last year, and this time the trick has caused alarm inside the CCP.
Some Taiwanese try to defend Xi, saying that he was pressured by the hawks, but they are simply finding excuses. Xi first gained power by inciting anti-Japanese nationalism, but then chose to shake hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — with a scowl on his face.
He is set to visit Japan this month in an attempt to drive a wedge between Japan and the US, once again agitating anti-US nationalism.
The US and Japan differ in terms of national strength, Chinese’s general impression of them and their relations with CCP nobility.
Is Xi trying to consolidate power, or is he making preparations in case he loses it? People are to once again find out whether patriotism is the last resort of the hoodlum.
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
Translated by Eddy Chang
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China provides a pertinent reminder of why Taiwanese protested so vociferously against attempts to force through the cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014 and why, since Ma’s presidential election win in 2012, they have not voted in another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate. While the nation narrowly avoided tragedy — the treaty would have put Taiwan on the path toward the demobilization of its democracy, which Courtney Donovan Smith wrote about in the Taipei Times in “With the Sunflower movement Taiwan dodged a bullet” — Ma’s political swansong in China, which included fawning dithyrambs