Before beginning, I would like to offer a quote: “Idealism is for the ages, but practicality is for now.”
The year 1986 marked the founding of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), when martial law was still in force. The mood was tense in anticipation of a brutal crackdown on a cohort of risk-taking founders. Overseas independence activists were barred from returning.
Kuo Pei-hung (郭倍宏) was one of the independence activists residing abroad who, despite having a very successful business, took the risk of returning to Taiwan by illegal entry to evade arrest. The risk taken by Kuo and others paid big dividends in paving the way for Taiwan’s transformation from an authoritarian state to a flourishing democracy.
After about 40 years of frustrations in working to achieve the goal of “authentic” independence, Kuo, the founding leader of the Formosa Alliance, is now calling for a referendum on independence and changing the island’s name from the “Republic of China” to “Taiwan,” amid growing threats from China.
His move conflicts with President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) cautious stance on the independence issue, creating a serious rift between the administration and the alliance. This rift may affect the outcome of next year’s presidential and legislative elections, with negative consequences concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty.
All can agree that Taiwan must not fall into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), either by force or by the “one country, two systems” trap. Under the CCP, 30 to 60 million Chinese perished during the Cultural Revolution, and an untold number of people died during the Tiananmen Square Massacre.
“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” still is the CCP mantra, as demonstrated by its hegemonic occupation of islets in the South China Sea.
Former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀), referring to China’s leadership, once said: “It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big dictatorship, it is the biggest dictatorship in the history of the world.”
Even an old communist guard, [Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) former secretary] Li Rui (李銳), who recently died at age 101, said: “The communist leadership [Mao] put no value on human life, the death of others meant nothing to them.”
Nowadays, arbitrary incarceration of 1 million people in the so-called “re-education camps” in Xinjiang and the daily arrest of people serve as a reminder of the atrocities that the CCP is capable of committing. No one is safe — pan-blue or pan-green supporters. In the event the CCP gets its hands on Taiwan, the 228 Massacre may look like child’s play by comparison.
Against this backdrop, does Kuo wish to proceed with the referendum push?
Assume that the referendum is enacted, it is a sure bet that the CCP threat of invasion would become even more belligerent and intimidating. This threat conflated with a deluge of cyberdisinformation could cause public havoc that may negatively affect the outcome of the referendum.
Basic survival instincts, based on innate evolutionary genetics in human species, could likely set in, causing the public to not vote, or even to vote “no” on independence and “yes” for unification.
When this scenario comes to pass, then Taiwan could be lost without a single shot fired. The US cannot even come to the rescue, because a formal US condition regarding the status of Taiwan requires the consent of Taiwanese.
According to recent polls, nearly 75 percent of the population rejected the “one country, two systems” offer from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), but despite that dislike, an almost equal percentage of the electorate in last year’s local elections voted “no” on the referendum to change the nation’s name from “Chinese Taipei” to “Taiwan” for the Tokyo Olympics.
The unintended outcome of this referendum served as a reminder of the potential pitfalls in holding referendums. Former American Institute in Taiwan director Richard Bush in an open letter to Kuo warned that referendums are prone to distortions and manipulations, and that it may fail to reflect the view of the majority of all citizens. He implied that referendums that were held on Nov. 24 last year were an example of such failure. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Kuo to think twice in pushing for the referendum.
Suppose the Formosa Alliance continues to push for the referendum and the DPP government stands firm against it, the rift between the DPP and the alliance is sure to widen, and the immediate beneficiary will be the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
When the KMT wins next year’s elections, the predictable consequences will be more economic integration of Taiwan with China. There will be more academic and social exchanges between the two sides.
In the media space, the CCP will wield more influence on citizens’ way of thinking, and the gate to deter cybermisinformation will be thrust wide opened.
With China’s economic leverage, Taiwanese’s livelihood could be more dependent on China than ever. With people’s livelihood under the CCP’s sway, coupled with political indoctrination, Taiwanese’s resistance against unification might soften to a point that it is not inconceivable that the CCP may actually welcome a referendum.
As the famed ancient military strategist Sun Tzu (孫子) once said: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without a fight.”
Kuo has been declaring that now is the best time to call for independence, because the international community is very friendly toward Taiwan. This is a very simplistic view: I am sure that Kuo knows that countries, while friendly toward Taiwan, will not unilaterally voice support for Taiwanese independence now, because leaders who are judged for their governing acumen by their citizens would not risk taking such a drastic action that might cause “headaches” without any tangible benefit — unless there were an overwhelming consensus to do so from the international community.
Currently, the US is engaging in a “whole-of-government” approach to stunt China’s hegemonic rise without explicitly saying so. The approach includes a diplomacy component that engages allies to oppose China while conducting “strategic dialogues” with China itself.
This new approach to contain China is diametrically opposite to the past 40 years of engaging China with the expectation that once China attains economic prosperity, a democratic system of government should follow. The new US approach will take time to bear fruit, and when it does, Taiwan’s sovereignty could benefit from it.
The US has always eschewed unnecessary military conflicts, especially the type that has the potential to escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Kuo’s impatience and the potential of drawing the US into a nuclear conflict are possible reasons the US is displeased by Kuo’s referendum proposal.
The US and China are engaging in a protracted competition for economic, military and ideological supremacy. A democratic Taiwan is in alignment with US interests in the ideology domain. It is obvious that Taiwan also occupies a very important geographic location in the Pacific region — it is the first line of defense against China in the Indo-Pacific arena and beyond.
Additionally, Taiwan has the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology that China needs and, currently does not have, for its “Made in China 2025” initiative.
Could it be that Kuo recognizes this and is betting that in the event that China attacks, the US will be forced to come to the rescue, which together with Taiwan’s indigenous defensive assets and the will to fight, are enough to deter an invasion by China?
Regardless, a number of caveats should be considered: Since many issues related to defense here and abroad are classified, we, the public, including Kuo, will not know whether Taiwan can effectively repel a much improved Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike force that leverages the quantity and quality of its military hardware, which in recent years have been improving.
Nor do we know the degree of superiority and the timeliness of US forces against a PLA assault — not to mention the US’ long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to intervention options in the Taiwan Strait.
Even when the US decides to intervene, response time is of the essence to prevent a quick PLA takeover. The US antipathy toward the referendum may contribute to a fatal delay in this critical decision.
US Navy Admiral Philip Davidson and US Senator Richard Blumenthal, during a US Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing held on Feb. 12, gave the impression that the US maintains a significant superiority in undersea submarine warfare over China, but defending aircraft carriers against Chinese missiles seems questionable.
Perhaps, short of an amphibious assault, the CCP cannot realistically take over Taiwan militarily. I speculate that Tsai had been secretly briefed by the US on this matter, and was also warned not to endorse the referendum — the kind of knowledge, among others, she could not reveal to the public.
Without full knowledge, I think Kuo should give Tsai the benefit of the doubt and not go out on a limb pushing for the independence referendum.
In any case, on national security issues, one should err on the side of caution, as the stakes are so high that a wrong choice can result in a loss of a large number of Taiwanese lives in the initial phase of hostility, and in subsequent retribution by the brutal CCP. When the CCP takes over, a vast number of people could be incarcerated in “re-education” camps — or worse.
Remember Li Rui’s words: The communist leadership puts no value on human lives, the death of others, including its own soldiers and citizens, meant nothing to them. The goal justifies the means, no matter the method.
In light of the aforementioned calamity awaiting in the wings in the event that the CCP gains jurisdiction over Taiwan, it is prudent that the alliance drops its referendum push for now. The bickering between the DDP and the alliance must cease, and personal egos on either side must not take hold.
Look at the “forest” and not the “trees,” fight the “war” not the “battle.” Focus on winning next year’s elections together.
A comeback by the China-friendly KMT that has largely lost Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) anti-communist soul could spell further integrations with China in all aspects of life. Unless one enjoys living in a CCP-style system, life will be disastrous, if not fatal — to any parties.
Chin B. Su is professor emeritus of electrical and computer engineering at Texas A&M University.
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under