Forty years ago, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) made a celebratory tour of the US in the wake of Washington’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Deng’s trip from Jan. 28 to Feb. 5, 1979, started in Washington, and he made stops in Atlanta, Houston and Seattle.
One of the memorable scenes of the trip was a gala in Deng’s honor at the Kennedy Center in Washington on Jan. 29. The Chinese leader, wearing a dark Mao suit, and then-US president Jimmy Carter, in a black tuxedo, stood side by side with arms aloft and smiled broadly, as the orchestra played Getting to Know You, symbolizing the beginning of a new era of US-PRC friendship and cooperation.
If Carter thought the Chinese connection was a diplomatic coup enabling the US to play “the China card” against the Soviets, he was terribly mistaken, and the cost was enormous.
To establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC, the US had to accept Beijing’s three demands: to severe official ties with the Republic of China (ROC); abolish the US-ROC mutual defense treaty; and withdraw US military installations and personnel from Taiwan.
During his stay in Washington, Deng also succeeded in persuading Carter to give China’s invasion of Vietnam the “green light.” The invasion took place on Feb. 17, 1979, less than two weeks after Deng returned home.
Deng received more than “moral support” from Carter in Beijing’s plan to “teach a lesson” to Vietnam, as the Carter administration also provided intelligence support to aid China’s war effort.
Deng’s “shopping list” was long. He believed that “technology is the No. 1 productive force” for economic growth, the only way that China could surpass the US as an economic power was through massive scientific and technological development, and that an essential shortcut would be to take what the Americans already possessed.
Hence, under Deng’s guidance, then-Chinese Science and Technology Commission director Fang Yi (方毅), signed agreements with the US government on Jan. 31, to speed up scientific exchanges.
In the first five years of exchange, about 19,000 Chinese students studied at US universities, mainly in the physical sciences, health sciences and engineering. Their numbers continued to increase.
China’s strategy was to obtain the US’ assistance in physics, atomic energy, computer science, astronautics and other fields, and an innocent and sympathetic Carter administration complied.
Deng might have thought in 1979 that, with the US cutting official ties with the ROC and terminating the mutual defense treaty, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime in Taiwan would be weakened and would readily accept Beijing’s terms of unification.
Deng’s “Taiwan dream” was dashed soon after his return from the US. Although Carter no longer recognized the repressive authoritarian KMT regime, Americans and their representatives in the US Congress valued the security, freedom and friendship of the 17 million Taiwanese and tried to do what was possible to forestall possible annexation by the Chinese communists.
Much to the chagrin of Chinese leaders, the US Congress in the spring of 1979 enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), despite Carter’s objections.
The TRA is a US law, but it contains provisions that commit the US to Taiwan’s security. More specifically, it stipulates an obligation to provide Taiwan with “such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary” for Taiwan’s defense, declaring an intention to “resist any resort of force” against Taiwanese, and warning Beijing that any such use of coercion to achieve unification would be a matter “of grave concern to the United States.”
Many experts consider the TRA a functional substitute for the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, which was terminated at the end of 1979, as it incorporated in substance the same protective relationship the US has maintained with Taiwan since the 1950s.
The TRA passed the US Senate and the House of Representatives by such overwhelming, veto-proof margins that Carter had no choice but to sign it, which he did on April 10.
Chinese leaders were enraged, but the PRC was not strong enough militarily and politically to challenge the US then.
To absorb Taiwan has been the dream of the Chinese communist leaders since Mao Zedong (毛澤東), but in 1990 Deng called on the party cadres to keep a low profile, bide their time, observe the principle of strategic patience and work hard to prepare for the opportune moment.
However, from time to time, some hawkish military officials have ignored Deng’s advice and ventured to confront the US over Taiwan.
In October 1995, general Xiong Guankai (熊光楷), former Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) deputy chief of general staff and chief of military intelligence, told retired US Department of State director for Chinese Affairs Charles Freeman Jr that China was prepared to sacrifice millions of people, even entire cities, in a nuclear exchange to defend its interests in preventing Taiwan’s independence.
“You will not sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan,” Xiong told Freeman.
Was Xiong bluffing? It was typical communist psychological warfare to intimidate and deter the US from defending Taiwan.
However, the US was not intimidated. In December 1995, the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier sailed through the Taiwan Strait, with a cruiser, a destroyer, a frigate and two support ships to counter the Chinese campaign of threats and intimidation. It was the first time that any US aircraft carrier had appeared in the Taiwan Strait since Deng’s US trip in 1979.
By this time, Deng was already out of China’s policymaking structure, and some militant elements in the PLA decided to test the US’ determination.
In February 1996, a month before Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, the PLA amassed about 150,000 troops along China’s southeastern coast for a live-fire military exercise. On March 8, two weeks before Taiwanese were to cast their votes, the PLA launched missiles directed near Kaohsiung and Keelung.
The Chinese communists strongly disliked Taiwan’s process of democratic change under then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), a native of Taiwan with a doctorate from Cornell University in New York. To some PLA leaders, for Taiwan’s millions of voters to elect their president was virtually a declaration of Taiwanese independence, in defiance of Beijing’s repeated claim that Taiwan is a province of China.
The PLA exercises, including firing missiles at both sides of Taiwan, was designed to create economic, social and political turmoil, disrupt the presidential election and help defeat Lee.
The US response was swift, firm and decisive. Then-US secretary of defense William Perry warned a visiting PRC diplomat that any military action against Taiwan would have “grave consequences” for China.
On March 9, 1996, the US decided to deploy two aircraft carrier groups in the waters near Taiwan, an important decision proposed by Perry and approved by then-US president Bill Clinton to present China with an overwhelming display of US military force during the confrontation over Taiwan.
The USS Independence and USS Nimitz battle groups, with dozens of warships, were the largest concentration of US naval power in East Asia since the Vietnam War. Its mission was “preventive defense,” but the US was ready, if necessary, to use force to stop China’s egregious actions.
Faced with much superior US forces and shocked by the powerful US intervention, the PRC backed down quickly and an international crisis was averted.
China’s threat of force backfired. Lee was elected with 54 percent of the votes.
The US action was a clear reaffirmation of the US’ defense commitment to Taiwan under the TRA.
In April 1996, soon after the Taiwan crisis, Clinton visited Tokyo and signed a new agreement with Japan to extend, broaden and solidify the US-Japan security agreement.
Since his rise to power, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping (習近平) has been promoting a grand strategy to challenge the Pax Americana and a “China Dream” to absorb Taiwan. His New Year offer of unification, through threat of force and incentives, was resoundingly rejected by Taiwanese and President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).
Likewise, the US has unveiled a National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy to counter China’s rising hegemony, deter China’s economic and military aggression and safeguard security in the Indo-Pacific region, including the US’ defense commitment to China.
The US is boosting security ties with Taiwan and its policy to help Taiwan defend itself is in the US’ national interest, based in the TRA. Xi should make no mistake.
Parris Chang is professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University and president of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies.
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