Looking out at the threats to Taiwan and related American security interests in the Indo-Pacific — and aware of the long lead times required to implement policy initiatives — many of us wish US-Taiwan relations were not tied to the cycles of America’s relationship with China. But whatever official policy may be from administration to administration, they always are. This makes the current tension between the US and China a particularly good time for a reality check.
First, the good news. Taiwan’s support in Washington is strong and getting stronger. The US is more active on Taiwan than any time since the 1990s. Evidence can be found in the raft of measures out of Congress in the past few years, including pro-Taiwan provisions in annual defense authorization acts, legislation in support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, the Taiwan Travel Act, and the recently passed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act — which reiterates American support for Taiwan as central to its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Support is also obvious in Trump administration policy. The President didn’t have to sign the Travel Act for it to become law. A President more solicitous of the Chinese would have allowed it to go into effect without his signature, giving himself plausible deniability with Beijing. Not Trump. More significantly, the administration has regularized the arms sales process and completed a major sale in each of the last two years. Another is likely next year. Judging by the substance of these sales — support for Taiwan’s submarine program, for instance — the US is more open to the potential in US-Taiwan relations today than any time since Bush 43 first came to office.
Second, prudence in Taipei’s approach to cross-Straits issues enables positive US-Taiwan relations. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been an imminently responsible steward of the relationship with Washington. This, in turn, has given friends in Washington the room they need to press Taiwan’s cause.
As long as Beijing’s case against her remains is as strained as it is — condemning trivialities like new museum openings — she will retain high ground in Washington. If she lets intra-party domestic politics get the best of her and presses for explicit signs of support for de jure independence, she will surrender that ground. The Trump administration is not going to press Taiwan to make concessions to the Chinese, but neither does it want a crisis in US-China relations generated by Taipei.
The story of how this dynamic played out during the Bush 43 administration is well-known. Bush came into office with a pro-Taiwan head of steam. He was ready to do big things, like the 2001 arms sales package that included things like destroyers and yes, submarines. Then came 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For good reason, Taiwan was not top of mind for President Bush. What he wanted most from Taipei was that it not create new headaches for him. President Chen (陳水扁) refused to cooperate. The cost was a sour relationship between the two leaders that stunted the promise of that first year.
Third, the US will work with both sides of the political divide in Taiwan. China hawks in Washington like the DPP because it is institutionally dead set against Beijing. Broadsides on Tsai and the DPP from Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office or the Global Times only increase the esteem in which they hold the party. But if the KMT wins the next Presidential election, Washington will make the necessary adjustments. In 2012, the Obama Administration effectively opposed Mme. Tsai’s election in deference to priorities in US-China relations. As tough as the current Administration may be on China, no similar effort will be made by it to prevent the KMT’s return to power.
This said, to ensure the most welcoming environment for a potential return to power, the KMT should start educating Washington from now on the nuances of the US-Taiwan-China relationship. Years of news reports describing the KMT as “pro-China” have almost certainly generated flawed understandings of Taiwanese politics. If left unaddressed, these misunderstandings could provide for a rocky start to US relations with a new government in Taiwan.
Fourth, the US will continue to have a serviceable relationship with Beijing. If there are people in Taiwan hoping for a complete breakdown in US-China relations in the expectation that it will redound to their benefit, they will be disappointed. Absolutely, the US-China relations are entering a new, competitive era. They both have an interest, however, in bounding this competition. They will continue to work through their differences — not settle them, but manage them in a way that does not result in a complete break, or decoupling. The economic stakes alone dictate it.
For proof, look to the areas where the Trump administration has pulled its punches. In Buenos Aires [last] month, it stopped short of economic showdown with China and put the fate of its economic relationship in the hands of a real dealmaker — USTR Bob Lighthizer. It still has not managed a cabinet level visit to Taiwan, something imminently in keeping with US diplomatic commitments to China. And for some mysterious reason, the administration is comfortable confronting China on issues from the South China Sea to Chinese industrial policy, but it cannot get off the dime on a US-Taiwan Free Trade agreement — an initiative also fully in keeping with America’s one-China commitments.
The prospects for US-Taiwan relations are bright. But we can only deliver on them and maintain stability in the relationship if both sides are mindful of the underlying, unofficial realities.
Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
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