Of the many foreign-policy challenges confronting US President Donald Trump this year, ensuring the democratic security of Taiwan might prove as daunting — and as dangerous — as resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.
That is because by the end of last year, the US’ commitment to Taiwan was put under a partial cloud after a series of calculated moves by China — and an ill-considered one by Washington.
First, China’s financial pressures have increased Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation:
It continues to be effective in excluding Taiwan from international organizations, where it is uniquely qualified to make significant contributions, such as the WHO. It also succeeded in bribing three other economically stressed countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taipei, advancing China’s goal of delegitimizing Taiwan as a political entity.
The US was unable to head off adverse decisions by the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso and El Salvador, but it has imposed diplomatic penalties, hoping to forestall further erosion among the remaining states recognizing Taiwan.
Second, China’s interference in Taiwan’s democracy:
Leading up to Taiwan’s municipal elections and referendums in November, Beijing conducted a vigorous campaign of disinformation to oppose the candidates and positions proposed by the party of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), Beijing’s anti-unification nemesis. It is not clear whether China’s efforts directly caused the results that seriously damaged Taiwan’s political fortunes and those of the Democratic Progressive Party.
However, the perception of effective Chinese election interference has sown considerable disarray and confusion in Taiwan’s body politic and encouraged the Chinese Communist Party to meddle even more vigorously in Taiwan’s presidential election next year. It is conceivable that its illegal electoral manipulation could result in a government in Taipei more favorable to Beijing and much cooler to close US-Taiwan relations, positions opposed by a majority of Taiwanese. Such an outcome could lead to civil unrest, which China’s “Anti-Secession” Law lists as one of the conditions justifying military action.
Third, China’s expanded military threats against Taiwan:
Throughout last year, Beijing conducted a range of provocative naval and air operations simulating attacks on Taiwan that were clearly intended to signal preparation for the real thing. These were accompanied by orchestrated public statements calling on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for actual combat across the Taiwan Strait.
Fourth, China’s renewed direct threat against the US:
Every decade or so, a leading Chinese official or military officer makes a chillingly barbaric statement warning the US of the dire consequences of intervening in a Taiwan-China conflict.
In December 1995, after China fired missiles toward Taiwan and the US sent a carrier task force through the Taiwan Strait, PLA General Xiong Guangkai (熊光楷) bluntly warned visiting former US officials: “You care more about Los Angeles than Taiwan.”
In 2005, General Zhu Chenghu (朱成虎) upped the ante, stating that a US defense of Taiwan would imperil “hundreds of American cities.”
Last month, in the latest threat of mass killings emanating from Beijing, Rear Admiral Luo Yuan (羅援) said the PLA Navy was prepared to sink US aircraft carriers operating in the East and South China seas and presumably the Taiwan Strait.
Why do Chinese leaders permit, and even encourage, such brutal threats against the world’s leading military superpower when they know that retaliation would be swift, certain and totally devastating for China, wiping out all the economic and diplomatic gains of the past four decades?
As China’s leaders are universally judged to be non-suicidal, the answer must be that they do not expect to ever have to carry out their dire threats. Instead, they expect the US to back down and stay out of any actual cross-strait conflict.
However, again, why would Beijing make that critical and highly risky assumption? Because it sees the risk diminishing as China closes the gap of military capabilities with the US — and because Washington has never repudiated its own formula for deciding whether to intervene to defend Taiwan: “It would depend on the circumstances,” which was the answer then-US assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye gave to bluntly inquiring Chinese defense officials during the missile crisis of 1995 and 1996.
No US administration since then has seen fit to disabuse Beijing of the idea that under the “right” circumstances, Washington would stand by as China attacked Taiwan.
Luo seems confident that China’s fleet of attack submarines and arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles have created the circumstances that make such an attack a relatively low-risk undertaking.
That is the dangerous legacy that its predecessors have left the Trump administration in the US-China relationship. The US president and his national security team have taken a number of laudable steps to affirm the Taiwan-US relationship, but the ultimate deterrence gap remains.
Worse, it has seriously deepened after Trump’s precipitous decision to withdraw US forces from Syria. If the often-abandoned Kurds could be so unceremoniously abandoned again, Chinese strategic planners must be asking: “Why wouldn’t Washington forsake Taiwan (again) when the price for defending it appears so much higher?”
This is the year of decision on Taiwan for Washington and Beijing. President Trump can go a long way toward undoing the strategic damage caused by the Syria decision. For Syria, Taiwan, the Middle East and East Asia, he should reverse it. Then he should choose among his many options to restore and create credibility in the US’ commitment to Taiwan’s democratic security by declaring unequivocally that we would help defend Taiwan under all circumstances. He could do so in a message from the Oval Office, a tweet, or a telephone call to President Tsai. Or, perhaps by a visit to Taiwan by US Vice President Mike Pence or US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
As for the effect on trade talks, Beijing has no reluctance to compartmentalize issues when it chooses, or to engage in cross-provocation when convenient. This US administration can be equally adept at exercising cross-deterrence.
Whatever short-term disruption on trade a bold Trump move on Taiwan would cause, it would prove salutary across the board in the long run.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director in the office of the US secretary of defense and taught a graduate seminar on Taiwan-US-China relations at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is a fellow at the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies.
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