As relations between Beijing and Washington trend toward a more explicitly competitive orientation, leaders on both sides are contending with an unstated challenge that has vexed policy makers since the end of the Cold War: what will be the fundamental basis for US-China relations? Though Chinese officials will often refer to US alliances in Asia as a relic of the Cold War, the reality is that the US-China relationship itself is a relic of the Cold War that (unlike US alliances in Asia) has not successfully redefined its fundamental purpose for the 21st century. Without an answer to that critical question, even competition will ring hollow as a basis for relations between the world’s two most powerful nations.
The decision by President Nixon to engage with Chairman Mao (毛澤東) was born out of the critical assessment that the Sino-Soviet split had made China a potential asset for the United States to use against the Soviet Union. By exploiting that opportunity, Washington was able to greatly intensify pressure on Moscow and hasten the success of George Kennan’s grand strategy of containment. Yet out of that great victory, no one has been able to determine the fundamental purpose of the US-China relationship. While the Clinton administration initially sought to use the lure of market access to encourage Beijing to improve its human rights record and liberalize politically, the rapid failure of that strategy again left a void. From that point on, the US strategy was to use its relationship with Beijing to encourage China to emerge as a country that supported and contributed to the post-war liberal order; or, in the words of then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, encouraging China to be a “responsible stakeholder.”
The flaw with this approach is that, unlike during the Cold War, it is entirely one-sided. This was a US strategy, not a mutual strategy that both Beijing and Washington understood and approved. The results have therefore been predictably mixed: while China has joined multilateral institutions like the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the WTO, it has also sought to carve out exceptions for itself from international laws and norms it finds to be counter to its interests. China has therefore emerged as not a revolutionary power, but not entirely supportive of the status quo either. This again raises the question of the purpose of US-China relations — if not to counter the long-dead Soviet Union and not to shape China’s decision-making to be more responsible and supportive of the status quo, what is the ultimate purpose of US-China relations?
To date, the Trump administration’s answer has been to describe the relationship as fundamentally competitive. As described in its National Security Strategy, “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.” In the National Defense Strategy, the Trump administration goes further, declaring “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security.”
Still, as currently defined, strategic competition is an inadequate foundation for relations between China and the United States. Not only is it inherently negative in its orientation, its objectives are also undefined. What are China and the United States competing over? What will it mean to “win” that competition? What happens to the country that “loses”?
While many readers may have ideas about how to answer these questions, allow me to offer my own suggestions.
This is not the emergence of a New Cold War, despite what some in the media may say. The dynamic could not be more different — the two sides are greatly integrated with one another in many significant ways, they greatly benefit from this integration, and neither side seeks the destruction or collapse of the other. Instead, what we are seeing is the emergence of an old-style of major power competition that is more reminiscent of Europe in the 19th century, as Beijing seeks to establish a sphere of influence over the Asia-Pacific in which China is recognized as the dominant power and the role of the United States is greatly circumscribed. While these objectives should be concerning to the United States — and especially to China’s neighbors — analysts and policymakers would be ill-advised to assume dynamics similar to those between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
What China and the US are therefore competing for is influence, access, and advantage across all elements of national power. Victory for China will be seen in Beijing’s ability to establish itself as the only critical decision-maker for all major issues involving the Asia-Pacific, to diminish American power and influence in the region, to establish explicit or implicit exceptions for itself in international laws or norms, and to establish international mechanisms that emphasize a central role for China. While this may include traditional tensions over issues like territory, freedom of navigation, and international security, it will also involve the development and formalization of technical standards, the formulation of international financial mechanisms, international norms about human rights, and the content and enforcement of international laws. It will be a competition between nations, a competition between liberalism and illiberalism, and a competition between differing views of international order.
The basis for US-China relations should therefore to be to recognize that competition and manage it responsibly to avoid conflict while embracing opportunities for cooperation where their interests converge. Previously concluded confidence-building measures are an example of how Beijing and Washington can work together, out of mutual interest, to reduce the potential for accidents and miscalculations. Responsible competition, as first described by Vice President Joe Biden in 2015, should be an objective that both sides can accept and work toward.
This will have significant implications for Taiwan. Due to its geographic location and its unique status, Taiwan has long been a leading indicator of China’s approach to international affairs and national security. Taiwan greatly benefits from a liberal order and from its strong — if unofficial — partnership with the United States. Success by either side will have a direct and significant impact on Taiwan’s ability to determine its own destiny. Taipei and Washington therefore share a significant interest in sustaining a liberal order based on established laws and norms, and on sustaining American power and influence in the region across all elements of power. It is imperative, therefore, that we work together towards those shared ends.
Abraham M. Denmark is director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and formerly served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. The views expressed are his own.
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