Last month, former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) Culture and Education Foundation held a seminar to mark the third anniversary of his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Singapore in 2015, entitled: “Where now for the cross-strait relationship?”
At the powwow, Ma delivered a speech that caused a momentary stir in political circles. Ma proposed a “new three noes” policy: no exclusion of the possibility of unification, no independence and no use of force.
The question of whether Taiwan and China would ever “unite” touches upon the most hotly contested topic in domestic politics: the cross-strait relationship and the nation’s status.
However, it is not simply a question for Taiwanese to discuss among themselves in a political vacuum. China makes an explicit claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, while the US has a large degree of influence over the nation’s security.
By proposing that Taiwan should not exclude the possibility of unification, Ma has tossed a hand grenade into cross-strait politics.
When analyzing the repercussions of his speech, the changing relationship between Taipei, Beijing and Washington should be examined from three interdependent perspectives: The socio-political situation in Taiwan, the effect of Beijing’s “big stick” Taiwan policy and the deterioration of US-China relations since April.
During the course of Taiwan’s transition to democracy and the localization movement in the 1990s, the Qiandao Lake incident in 1994 was a true watershed moment that resulted in an almost 180° shift in Taiwanese attitudes toward the nation’s status and identity.
Prior to this, during the authoritarian party-state era, there was almost a universal belief among Taiwanese that they were “Chinese” and that Taiwan was “China.”
However, after the incident, when 24 Taiwanese tourists were kidnapped and murdered by three Chinese in the Qiandao Lake scenic area in China’s Zhejiang Province, identification as “Taiwanese” entered the mainstream and China began to be seen as a separate country.
Taiwanese who identified as “Chinese” were reduced to an insignificant minority almost overnight. Ever since, appeals for Taiwan to unify with China have largely fallen on deaf ears.
The last time that unification with China was advocated as a formal policy during a presidential election campaign was in 1999. Then-vice president Lien Chan (連戰) of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) floated the idea of a “confederation” system between Taiwan and China as a “transitionary” concept. Lien’s unification scheme poisoned the KMT’s campaign. After that, the party’s subsequent presidential candidates have made sure that the party never again advocated a pro-unification cross-strait policy.
This included Ma, who during his 2007 campaign proposed a policy of “no unification” as part of his original “three noes” formula to stay on the right side of public opinion and attract centrist voters.
On the campaign trail during the run-up to the Nov. 24 nine-in-one elections, the KMT’s six main mayoral candidates scrupulously avoided making any reference to Ma’s “new three noes.”
Responding to a question from a reporter, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), who became Kaohsiung mayor-elect, said: “Now is precisely not the time to talk about unification or independence.”
Han’s reply made it clear that there has been no discernible change in attitude toward unification or independence in Taiwanese society.
It is inconceivable that Ma, who held office as president for eights years, is not fully cognizant of the public’s attitude toward unification. The only logical explanation for Ma’s shift in wording from “no unification” to “not ruling out unification” is that — having understood the vast disparity in power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait following China’s rise — advocating “unification at some point” is the best hope to keep the Republic of China alive.
Ma’s view just so happens to chime perfectly with Xi’s revamped Taiwan policy of wielding a big stick.
The next question is what Beijing’s reaction to Ma’s “new three noes” policy has been.
Although Ma still retains a degree of influence in political circles, his willingness to advocate not excluding the possibility of unification is unquestionably viewed as a powerful shot in the arm by Beijing. At the same time, it also helps to build trust with China’s leadership and promote his credentials as a future peacemaker between the two sides.
However, if Ma hopes to be effective in such a role, gaining the trust of Beijing would not be enough — he would clearly also need to obtain the trust of Taiwanese and the approval of Washington. If he failed to do so, he would simply become a Lien Chan mark II.
Ma would do well to ponder this carefully.
Based on the premise that Beijing snubbed the “one China, different interpretations” formula, was it wise for Ma to have fired this new formula into the public sphere? Now that it is out in the open, if the idea tanks, it will be difficult for Ma to put the toothpaste back into the tube.
Furthermore, in recent years, the US’ stance toward security in the Taiwan Strait and the Taiwan-China relationship has been to oppose any changes to the so-called “status quo.” Does Ma’s proposal to keep unification on the table constitute a change to the “status quo?”
Supposing Ma’s “new three noes” becomes official KMT policy, or if Ma runs for the presidency again. Washington would probably require further explanation.
Since the US-China trade dispute began, Washington has changed its stance toward China’s ascendance. There is now a consensus among the White House, the US Congress and prominent think tanks that Washington must issue a forceful response to China’s meteoric rise. This change in thinking will undoubtedly affect the relationship between Taipei, Washington and Beijing.
Ma understands that Taiwan’s security is reliant on the US. In the end, whether Ma’s new formula will obtain US approval, or whether it will be viewed as a ploy to weaken Washington’s containment of China, one thing is for sure: It will not be easy to get the US to change track now that it has recalibrated its China policy.
However Ma’s latest foray into cross-strait politics goes down in Washington, as a politician who still retains some influence, his intentions behind unveiling his “new three noes” formula were clearly twofold: to test Taiwanese when pressure increases from the Xi regime’s increasingly assertive Taiwan policy and to probe the relationship between Taiwan, the US and China.
John Lim is a professor of law at the University of Tokyo and an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Edward Jones
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