On Monday, Mike Burgess, the director-general of the Australian Signals Directorate, gave a speech at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s national security dinner in Canberra.
He defended the government’s decision in August to ban Chinese telecommunications giants from Australia’s 5G network on the grounds of national security.
Burgess did not mention China or any specific Chinese companies in his speech; he only mentioned “high-risk vendors” and concerns over foreign espionage or interference and cybersecurity.
However, his reference to high-risk vendors was clearly aimed at China’s Huawei Technologies Co (華為) and ZTE Corp (中興通訊), both of which were shut out of Australia’s 5G network.
Historically, Australia had protected the sensitive information and functions at the core of its telecommunications networks by confining its high-risk vendors to the edge of our networks, Burgess said.
He said that his agency had discussed ways in which foreign vendors, such as Huawei or ZTE, could be included in non-core, peripheral aspects of the planned 5G network, but, in the end, it was decided that their high level of integration means that “the distinction between core and edge collapses in 5G networks,” leaving the entire network open to vulnerabilities even by the use of foreign companies in peripheral functions.
The US and Australia have made moves to keep Chinese companies out of crucial cyberinfrastructure networks. The UK, Canada and New Zealand have been less circumspect. Together, these five countries form the Five Eyes alliance intelligence sharing group. This has implications for the potential security vulnerabilities within the group.
Most countries conduct espionage against others, whether friend or foe.
However, the high level of control and influence the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exerts over China’s private sector in general, and the tech sector in particular, makes Chinese tech companies all the more problematic.
An article in the Strategist, the analysis site of the independent think tank the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, raised concerns about the “deeper fusion between the party-state apparatus and business enterprises” in China, including new legal frameworks that could require Huawei and other private businesses to support Chinese intelligence activities.
According to the article, every major Chinese tech company, Huawei included, has in the past few years been required to establish a party branch or committee, and that these party committees can exert influence over a company’s decisionmaking with little transparency.
Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law states that: “All organizations and citizens shall, in accordance with the law, support, cooperate with and collaborate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of national intelligence work they are aware of.”
Article 12 states that national intelligence agencies have the power to “establish cooperative relationships with relevant individuals and organizations, and entrust them to undertake relevant work.”
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not happy with Australia’s decision, accusing it of ideological bias against Chinese companies.
This has nothing to do with bias: It is a rational precaution to a real threat to national security.
The CCP needs to understand that the tight control it insists on exerting over all aspects of its organizations, whether in the state or private sectors, subjects its companies to legitimate suspicion from other countries.
China, especially under President Xi Jinping (習近平), is increasingly being regarded as an adversary by many countries, including the US and Australia.
The CCP has the right to govern its own nation as it pleases, but it cannot expect to do so without its choices impacting the ability of its companies to conduct business with their foreign counterparts, especially when this business entails legitimate national security concerns.
This is just one more example of how the CCP’s model of governance is detrimental to China’s development and engagement with the international community.
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