In her Double Ten National Day address, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) put forward “four will-nots” — stating that “we will neither act rashly to escalate confrontation, nor will we give in. I will not be provoked into confrontation or conflicts that endanger cross-strait relations, nor will I deviate from the will of the people and sacrifice Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
In response, China said that the statement was full of “two-nation theory,” confrontational thinking, and supported Western, anti-China elements that are trying to contain China.
The term “Western anti-China elements” has always been used by Beijing when discussing international political science, but is the combined result of Beijing’s collision with the international order and its persecutory delusions.
The reason China associates Tsai’s address with this is mainly because of the recent counterattacks initiated by US President Donald Trump and US Vice President Mike Pence against China.
At the beginning of his presidency, Trump was not against China, and even called Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) a man whom he likes and wants to respect. Relations between Trump and Xi were once so close that it became cause for concern in Taiwan.
However, the honeymoon did not last long. Due to issues ranging from the Korean Peninsula, South China Sea and cross-strait relations to the trade war and US midterm elections next month, China has been challenging US interests in the Asia-Pacific and even in the international community.
Even the “cutthroat” diplomatic war against Taiwan has spread into the US’ backyard, and China has blatantly tried to influence the US midterm elections.
These actions were mostly initiated by Xi, leaving Trump no choice but to rise up, defending US interests and the international order.
However, China interprets this as Western, anti-China elements trying to contain China. It is simply reversing cause and effect.
The same trick is also being used against Taiwan. Beijing is forcing Taiwan to swallow the so-called “1992 consensus” and “two shores, one China” as a precondition to restarting negotiations between the two sides of Taiwan Strait, while military aircraft are sent to cruise around and disturb Taiwan. The US had to send warships through the Taiwan Strait along the east coast of Taiwan to access a US aircraft carrier to demonstrate its determination to safeguard the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and deter China from being reckless.
This is similar to the situation in the South China Sea — China’s militarization in the area has caused tension among claimant states in the region, so US-led Western countries have responded by sending aircraft and ships on freedom of navigation exercises there.
The so-called Western, anti-China elements were essentially triggered by China’s ruthless dominance, leading to a response from US-led democratic countries and the formation of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy.
Beijing has accused Taiwan of working with the West to contain China, never reflecting that it is the one that started it all. China’s attempt to annex Taiwan has forced Taiwan to stand on the other side. Its digital totalitarianism forces Taiwan to embrace universal values. Its military coercion forces Taiwan to team up with allies that have common interests.
The situation in Hong Kong has forced Taiwanese to firmly choose democracy, even though Beijing is trying to cultivate its economic pro-unification influence.
The Tsai administration’s policy only reflects the wish of Taiwanese to maintain the “status quo,” which has led to criticism by fundamentalists within the ruling party.
Yet, Beijing still does not want to seize the opportunity for constructive cross-strait dialogue. It goes without saying which country is seen by the international community as a troublemaker and “status quo” breaker.
Tsai’s style of “resilient, but gentle rejection” can be seen as a calm and wise strategy in the face of Chinese provocation and the fight between the US and China — two great powers.
Some have said that not escalating the confrontation and not giving in is strategically inconsistent. However, the key is to avoid Taiwan becoming a battlefield for a war between China and the US.
As former American Institute in Taiwan director William Stanton said, the US constantly reminds the government not to give China any excuse to use military force against it, and as long as Taiwan does not maliciously provoke Beijing, if it were to attack and occupy Taiwan, the US would certainly get involved.
If Taiwan is to avoid battling Goliath as tensions between the US and China escalate, it must not give Beijing the opportunity to use escalating cross-strait tensions as its trump card.
Whether the trade war and geopolitical conflict eases after the US midterm elections, Taiwan must be prepared for the worst-case scenario.
If the trade war becomes protracted, Taiwan is bound to be affected, and a stock market and currency crash would be just the beginning. The most urgent task would be striving for stability, a healthy economy and good standards of living.
As for geopolitical conflict, all a small country like Taiwan can do is keep away from trouble, while doing its utmost in terms of fundamental aspects like security and national defense.
China is using nationalism to manipulate its domestic and foreign affairs, making Taiwan the pre-emptive frontline of the US-China confrontation.
The Tsai administration and the nation’s 23 million residents are in the same boat.
As US historian Stephen Kotkin said recently, the region facing the highest geopolitical risk is not the Korean Peninsula, Russia, the Middle East or Iran. Instead, due to the trade war, the Taiwan Strait is in crisis.
This analysis demonstrates how patience and “resilient, but gentle rejection” is much needed.
If conflict is inevitable, let it rather take place in the South China Sea, which is far from China and has nothing to do with the global value chain.
In the face of dramatic changes, perhaps the best outcome Tsai can work toward is for Taiwan to become the relatively tranquil eye of the storm.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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