Former American Institute in Taiwan director William Stanton recently said that Washington constantly reminds the Taiwanese government not to give China any excuse to use military force against Taiwan and that as long as Taiwan does not maliciously provoke Beijing, if China were to attack and occupy Taiwan, the US would certainly get involved.
A US opinion poll conducted last year showed that a majority of Americans hold this view and that public opinion in the US toward China is hardening, making US involvement likely, Stanton said.
His analysis is a textbook exposition of the US’ “one China” policy. So long as the core of the US’ “one China” policy does not change and even though, as Stanton said, Taiwan now has more friends across US government departments than ever before, the government must remain cognizant of its limited room for maneuver.
Stanton also said that if the Taiwanese public today peacefully decided to unify with China, the US would not oppose such a move.
This viewpoint accords with the spirit of the Three Joint Communiques issued by Beijing and Washington in the 1970s and 1980s — that is, finding a peaceful solution to the “Taiwan question.”
In essence, if China’s Taiwan policy does not incite protest from Taiwanese or threaten the interests of the US and its Indo-Pacific allies, Washington would be able to live with a so-called “amicable unification.”
Of course, implicit in this view is the assurance that the public would always have the right to say no to unification.
By way of illustration, in comparison with former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) government, Washington maintained a friendlier relationship with the administration of former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
What the Taiwanese public cannot understand is why the so-called “peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem” mantra is still being used as a framework for US policy. It belongs to a bygone era and the China policy of then-US president Richard Nixon.
Ever since former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) opened up China to the world, his successors have continued to give successive US administrations a false expectation that Beijing’s economic reform would eventually be followed by political reform and, similar to Taiwan’s experience, China would transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
Today, such an expectation would increasingly appear to be based on pure fantasy.
As the US’ China policy is formulated, Washington is unwilling to accept any provocation of China by Taiwan. The implication is that Taipei should cooperate with the US in the latter’s strategic interest, despite Taiwan now being a thriving democracy and Taiwanese being the masters of their own destiny.
Taiwan, as a de facto independent nation state, still feels it is unable to challenge the US’ strategic narrative.
Past governments would sometimes undertake actions that would upset the US’ chess pieces and strain Taiwan-US relations. President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has learned from the mistakes of past administrations and persistently follows a policy of “maintaining the status quo.” In doing so, she has won the approval of Washington.
During this period of reversal in the US-China relationship, Tsai’s policy of “maintaining the status quo” with China has allowed US President Donald Trump to build a domestic political consensus to remold the US’ policy. Trump also has enough domestic support to reinforce the Taiwan Relations Act.
However, Taiwan’s democracy continues to go from strength to strength, and while the policy to maintain the “status quo” might win kudos on the international stage, domestically, the pan-green camp has become deeply suspicious of the approach. Tsai needs to find more creative ways to persuade the public that the protective umbrella provided by the policy to maintain the “status quo” is really in its best interests.
In opposing a malicious attack and occupation of Taiwan by China, while also imploring Taiwan not to give Beijing any excuse to mount an attack, US policy contains the implication that any peace or unification plan agreed between Taiwan and China must be acceptable to the US. This US framework is the method that the government has been pursuing to allow Taiwan to become a normalized nation state.
With these US red lines in place, if Beijing were to make a rash move, the US would get involved. A good example of this is the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which occurred during the tenure of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝).
If Taiwan steps on the US’ red line, the reaction in Washington would be difficult to predict. Chen’s difficult time in office is testament to this. China can pursue peaceful unification, not unification through force. This is the space that US policy affords China.
With regard to unification through peaceful or forceful means, the will of the public will be the determining factor. In other words, if the public continues to resist unification, it would not be a problem, but if such resistance spills over into a push for full, legal independence and the founding of a new country, its success or failure would depend on Washington’s attitude at that moment.
Before making any move, the government would need to carefully weigh all its options and consider what can and cannot realistically be achieved, to ensure long-term stability in the Strait. When the moment comes, it will be an acid test of Tsai’s leadership.
The US and China have become strategic competitors, but the situation has not yet deteriorated into an openly hostile relationship and both nations still have converging interests. At this critical juncture, if the government were to engage in rash behavior, these interests would be challenged and severely tested.
In all likelihood, all of the government’s previous hard work would be for nothing and the losses would outweigh the gains.
Nevertheless, Stanton’s warning that Taipei should not do anything that would give Beijing an excuse to attack does not mean that the government’s only option is to submit to Beijing’s nefarious schemes, make concessions, show goodwill and generally pander to China.
Instead, the government must use the convergence of interests between Taiwan and the US, clearly demonstrate the public’s rejection of unification and the shared will of Taiwanese, and ratchet up the pressure on the international community to facilitate Taiwan’s transition to a normalized country.
The economy, national defense and soft power must all be geared toward a policy of “strategic patience” as the nation waits for the historic point of intersection to materialize.
Some argue that maintaining the Republic of China “status quo” is a road to nowhere and that the only way to ensure Taiwan’s survival is by finishing the job of regularizing its national status.
In reality, “finishing the job” is easier said than done and would require superhuman skill, wisdom, caution and pragmatism to succeed while avoiding inadvertently precipitating a national calamity.
Translated by Edward Jones
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