With less than four months to go until the nine-in-one local elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) appears to be too preoccupied with its own internal problems to give its full attention to the race, which will serve as the first test of the party’s chances of winning the 2020 legislative and presidential elections.
Most of the problems stem from KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih’s (吳敦義) failure to control the party, which has resulted in the rise of many other potential leadership figures and caused the party to become even more decentralized.
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) establishment late last month of a new foundation, which is reportedly backed by NT$68 million (US$2.22 million) in funding from Hon Hai Precision Industry Co chairman Terry Gou (郭台銘), has only exacerbated the dispersion of power within the KMT.
How many “suns,” or centers of power, are there in the party?
Although Wu won the KMT’s six-legged chairperson election in May last year by a margin of 144,408 votes, his influence within the party has waned as it continues to lose access to its assets due to an ongoing effort by the Executive Yuan’s Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee to recover properties obtained by the KMT through unscrupulous means during its former one-party rule.
Without control over the KMT’s assets, Wu no longer has the power over party members enjoyed by his predecessors, who could decide which candidates would receive campaign funds from party headquarters and how much.
To make matters worse, Wu has repeatedly been ranked among the most disliked politicians. A poll released by the TVBS Poll Center in September last year, which asked respondents to evaluate 14 high-profile politicians, put Wu in 11th place.
Wu’s unpopularity makes it all the more unlikely for KMT members to be at his beck and call. A party leader without a realistic chance to win the presidency will not be taken seriously, especially if that party is the KMT.
There has been speculation that Ma’s new foundation could be designed to serve as alternative KMT headquarters.
KMT Vice Chairman Hau Lung-bin’s (郝龍斌) recent appearance at several campaign events by party candidates for the Nov. 24 local elections has been interpreted as an attempt by Hau to increase his influence in the party.
New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu’s (朱立倫) every move is scrutinized for signs that he might seek a bigger role in the KMT again.
With Wu’s leadership on shaky ground, some party members have publicly challenged the KMT’s primary mechanism for the November elections, with several defecting to run for office as independents.
Chiayi City Council Speaker Hsiao Shu-li (蕭淑麗) is to stand for Chiayi mayor as an independent against KMT candidate Huang Min-hui (黃敏惠), who governed the city from 2005 to 2014.
KMT Legislator Lin Wei-chou (林為洲) has also insisted on running as an independent for Hsinchu County commissioner, despite the risk of being expelled by the party, arguing that he enjoys higher support ratings than the KMT’s candidate, Hsinchu Deputy Commissioner Yang Wen-ke (楊文科).
By the looks of it, the KMT is drifting away from its oft-stated goal of party unity. Without it, the party appears doomed to become more divided and disorganized than ever.
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