It all started in the summer of 2009.
Former US president Barack Obama was six months into his presidency and desperate for some good economic news.
The US had just suffered its deepest post-war recession, unemployment was heading for 10 percent and Washington had been forced to bail out the banks, but in June of that year, the world’s second-biggest economy turned the corner.
Illustration: Mountain people
A recovery began that has continued uninterrupted ever since.
At the end of this month, the US will have enjoyed its second-longest period of economic expansion in history, beating the upswing under former US presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson between 1961 and 1968.
By next summer, if nothing untoward happens, US President Donald Trump will be able to boast that the US has beaten the record 10-year period of growth between the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and the 2001 dot.com bust. Expect a flurry of self-congratulatory tweets from the White House.
The reasons for the recovery in the US are simple.
Interest rates were cut quickly and aggressively by the US Federal Reserve and kept at rock-bottom levels for seven years.
The Fed also pumped trillions of US dollars into the economy through the process known as quantitative easing — buying bonds to expand money supply.
Swift action was taken to clean up the financial system so that the banks could start lending again.
Obama announced a modest package of tax cuts and spending increases.
Lessons were learned from the mistakes of the Great Depression of the 1930s, when demand was sucked out of an already weak economy and banks were allowed to fail.
Taken together, the measures got the US slowly moving again.
It helped that the authorities in Beijing were simultaneously using even more aggressive measures — big infrastructure projects and expansion of credit — to stimulate the Chinese economy.
The subsequent recovery has been long, but, by US standards, weak.
Traditionally, the US has recovered sharply from downturns and had several years of fast growth.
In the 1960s, for example, the US economy grew by 4.9 percent a year on average, while in the 1990s it expanded by 3.6 percent a year on average.
The average during the current expansion is 2.2 percent and it is the first business cycle since World War II in which there has not been a single year of growth above 3 percent.
At 1.4 percent a year, employment growth has also been modest.
The hire-and-fire culture in the US has meant workers can be laid off in large numbers during recessions and then taken on again during the subsequent recoveries.
In the 1980s upswing, for instance, jobs growth averaged 2.8 percent a year.
Nor has the recovery followed Kennedy’s dictum that a rising tide should lift all boats.
Half of the growth during Obama’s presidency went to the top 1 percent of US households, with the lack of real income growth for the middle class helping to explain both the muted nature of the upswing and the discontent that propelled Trump to the presidency.
Dario Perkins, managing director of global macroeconomics at research company TS Lombard, said the US is not alone in having experienced a long period of growth.
“Among the developed economies, Australia, Sweden, Germany and Canada all have expansions that match or surpass the US achievement, and if we extend the analysis to the emerging economies, we find several countries with even more impressive performances.”
Europe, which suffered a double-dip recession and only began a sustained pickup in 2013, is the one part of the world where the recovery looks relatively immature, Perkins said.
All upturns come to an end sooner or later and the fact that it is now almost nine years since the US emerged from recession has inevitably led to speculation about when and how the next downturn will arrive.
The IMF is worried by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric, with chief economist Maurice Obstfeld warning at its spring meeting last month that there was a risk of the global trading system being torn apart.
Keith Wade, chief economist and strategist at investment firm Schroders, believes Trump is trying to extract concessions from China before the US midterm elections this November rather than seeking to start a trade war.
Nor does he think there is a high probability of the US being derailed by a hard landing for the Chinese economy caused by the collapse of its credit bubble.
That leaves two remaining triggers.
Perkins said that there are only scattered signs of the trends that normally develop in the late stages of an economic cycle — firms running up against capacity constraints, rising inflation and excessive investment.
More likely, he said, the end will come — as it did in both 2001 and 2007 — with the popping of an asset-price bubble.
“Recent history suggests any problems are more likely to start in the financial sector, and with central banks tightening policy and asset prices high by historical standards, this is surely the area to watch over the next 12 to 18 months,” he said.
The upswing in the 1960s eventually came to an end when the US economy ran into inflationary problems amplified by the cost of the war in Vietnam and Johnson’s Great Society welfare programs.
Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy Research in Washington, said there is no real evidence that the US economy is reaching its supply limits and that the concerns expressed over the impact of Trump’s tax cuts for the budget deficit are overblown, but the Fed might see it differently.
Wade said the US central bank has a tricky task in raising interest rates without triggering a sharp downturn and that its dilemma is made worse by the fading impact of the fiscal boost after next year.
The good news for Trump, he said, is that the record for continuous economic expansion will be broken next year.
The bad news is that the “festivities in the White House might be somewhat muted as the president faces the prospect of fighting for re-election during a recession,” Wade said.
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China provides a pertinent reminder of why Taiwanese protested so vociferously against attempts to force through the cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014 and why, since Ma’s presidential election win in 2012, they have not voted in another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate. While the nation narrowly avoided tragedy — the treaty would have put Taiwan on the path toward the demobilization of its democracy, which Courtney Donovan Smith wrote about in the Taipei Times in “With the Sunflower movement Taiwan dodged a bullet” — Ma’s political swansong in China, which included fawning dithyrambs