Chinese State Counselor Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) visited Washington earlier this month and met with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for bilateral talks. The two discussed issues including North Korea and bilateral trade, and announced that China and the US are to hold a Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in the second half of this year.
On the surface it appeared to be a routine dialogue, but there was more to the meeting than meets the eye.
During the past year or so, Yang has made a number of trips to the US and was responsible for handling important affairs between the two nations. Whether dealing with US President Donald Trump’s provocations over China’s so-called “one China” policy, organizing the first summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) or last year’s inaugural US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, Yang has discharged his duties with aplomb.
However, Yang’s latest diplomatic mission was particularly tricky since the talks touched on the essence of the US-China relationship, the US-Chinese strategic relationship, the US-Chinese stance on nuclear weaponry, trade issues and the thorny problem of Taiwan.
During a visit to Beijing in March last year, Tillerson appeared to endorse some of China’s so-called “14 principles” — Chinese diplomatic speak imbued with hidden meanings.
Tillerson referred to the US-China relationship as “built on non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect and always searching for win-win solutions.”
This was interpreted by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) as an endorsement of Xi’s “new model of major power relations,” and Tillerson was subsequently attacked by US media and think tanks as having inadvertently handed Beijing a diplomatic coup.
At the time, Tillerson referred to the adoption of the “one China” policy and the Three Communiques, which he said have allowed for long-term stability between China and the US and would assist in providing the framework for the next 50 years of China-US relations.
Few could have predicted what followed: There is now no trace left of the trumpeted US-China 50-year framework. The Trump administration has instead announced a succession of reports: the National Security Strategy report, National Defense Strategic Outline and the Nuclear Posture Review, which not only define China and Russia as “rivals” and “strategic competitors,” but also classify the two nations as “revisionist powers” seeking to challenge the global order and global values.
If the US is using phrases such as “rival,” “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power” to describe China, how does it define its relationship with China now and moving into the future?
During a news briefing on Feb. 8, US Department of State spokeswoman Heather Nauert said: “We’re not seeking an adversarial relationship with the Government of China. We are simply identifying actions that China has taken that undermine a rules-based order.”
There will clearly be a difference of opinion between the two nations, which would be reflected in bilateral exchanges on areas including trade, security, the Internet, human rights, democracy and freedom of the press, and these exchanges can be expected to be extremely frank and direct.
Some understanding of Yang’s thoughts following his meeting with his US counterpart can be gleaned from a statement by Chinese Ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai (崔天凱).
The basic position of the US-China relationship is one of mutual respect and beneficial cooperation, Cui said, adding: “We don’t think there is a zero-sum game between China and the US.”
Cui went on to say that China does not seek hegemony, has never been afraid of external forces and absolutely would not abandon its legitimate rights. This statement shows that there is potential for the conflict between the two nations to turn red hot.
The “Taiwan problem” is undoubtedly an issue that Beijing wishes to discuss, but that the US is unwilling to engage in.
China’s Xinhua news agency claimed that when Yang clarified China’s position on Taiwan during the talks and asked the US to deal with the issue seriously and conscientiously, Tillerson said the US continues to uphold the “one China” policy.
However, Tillerson’s reply does not adequately reflect the growing number of Taiwan-friendly bills passing through the US Congress.
Edward Chen is a chair professor in the Chinese Culture University’s political science department.
Translated by Edward Jones
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