Australia’s recent white paper on foreign policy highlights how the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region is shifting away from the US.
The US has ruled the waves with its large and powerful navy, but China increasingly insists that much of the South China Sea and the islands it has built are its sovereign territory. It has set up military facilities and structures to forewarn all against challenging this new regional order.
This is happening as US power is waning internationally, which has been further compounded by the confusion and uncertainty under US President Donald Trump, whose rhetoric on China during the presidential election foresaw tense times ahead.
However, as president, Trump has toned down his rhetoric on China — one reason being the need for China’s help in persuading North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jung-un, to abandon his nuclear weapons.
The shifting power balance is causing serious concern in Australia, which has depended on the US security umbrella since World War II.
This concern is stated bluntly in the white paper, which says: “Navigating the decade ahead will be hard because as China’s power grows, our region is changing in ways without precedent in Australia’s modern history.”
One Australian commentator said: “Australia is a country worried about a future under a mighty and demanding China and afraid American leadership has already checked out.”
At its worst, Hugh White, a defense analyst writing in Quarterly Essay, an Australian journal, said: “How the contest [between the US and China] will proceed — whether peacefully or violently, quickly or slowly — is still uncertain, but the most likely outcome is now becoming clear. America will lose, and China will win. America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power.”
What are Australia’s choices? According to Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in his introduction to the white paper, “Australia must be sovereign not reliant.”
How do you do that when, as Turnbull said recently, the US and Australia are joined at the hip in their security partnership?
Catherine McGregor gave one way in her column in the Sydney Morning Herald: “It might be time to consider theatre missile defense and even nuclear missiles for our submarine fleet. The regional balance is shifting rapidly.”
However, that takes time and resources.
Another way is to create a counterbalancing regional group of like-minded nations.
“What we are seeking to do is to balance against bad behavior [from China]. The key is a rules-based order. We urge China to defend and strengthen that order,” because “it is the rules-based order that helped China’s rise, and it can help other countries to rise too,” Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop said, adding that “among the like-minded democracies are the US, Japan, India and Australia. Another balancing group would be the 10-nation Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN].”
However, it is not as neat as that. For instance, some of the ASEAN countries have made their peace with China, especially as the US does not seem as committed to maintaining its primacy and dominance.
That leaves the US, Australia and Japan in a counterbalancing role, as India would like to keep its options open.
Sydney Morning Herald columnist Peter Hartcher highlighted Australia’s predicament: “The US cannot be relied upon to protect the regional order. It [Australia] doesn’t envisage an Indo-Pacific region without America. But it implicitly accepts that the region has already lost American leadership.”
Australia hopes to persuade China to maintain regional stability without pushing its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, Australia is committed to support in every possible way the US’ continued commitment to regional security.
That is the problem.
China does not regard Australia as a disinterested party, being part of the US alliance system. The Chinese government has criticized Australia for making “irresponsible” remarks about Chinese island-building in the South China Sea, such as expressing concern at the “unprecedented pace and scale” of China’s activities in the region crucial for shipping.
Within Australia, China is attempting, as the Sydney Morning Herald editorialized, “through control of Chinese-language media in Australia, to keep local populations of Chinese background loyal to its political program and ignorant of alternatives,” thus arousing “understandable suspicion.”
Australia will find it increasingly difficult to reconcile its primary security relationship with the US — and with China, as its largest trading partner.
Beijing keeps reminding Australia of China’s primacy as a trading partner.
A recent Chinese official commentary said: “China continues to maintain its position as Australia’s largest trading partner, the largest export destination and the largest source of imports.”
Australia is thus on notice that China has considerable leverage, even as Australia sets forth its foreign policy white paper.
Sushil Seth is a commentator based in Australia.
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry