At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th National Congress last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) rose to unprecedented political supremacy in Communist China, something not seen since the time of Mao Zedong (毛澤東).
Xi has packed the regime’s topmost policymaking organs — the CCP Central Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee — with allies and cronies, without any possible successor in sight. This signifies that Xi is to extend his tenure beyond his current five-year term, which ends in 2022.
As the nation’s “core leader,” Xi holds the posts of CCP general secretary, chairman of the Central Military Commission and president (head of state) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In addition, Xi has created and led more than a dozen “leading groups” or “working groups” on issues as varied as national security, finance, Taiwan and cybersecurity, and thus has been called China’s “chairman of everything.”
The CCP congress has elevated Xi to the same glorified status as Mao, the founding father of the PRC, and former leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), chief architect of China’s “open-door” reforms, by amending the CCP’s charter and adding to it “Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics” as “a new component of the party’s guide for action.”
Xi suggested in his political report that if Mao made China independent and Deng made it prosperous, he would make it strong again — thus he is ushering China into a “new era.”
Does Xi command the same exalted authority and influence in the party and the nation as Mao and Deng before him? The answer is: not quite.
After all, both Mao and Deng had been revolutionary leaders in China’s Civil War, founders of the PRC, and their decades of struggle and self-sacrifice gave them an aura of charisma and authority that Xi could never match. The power and influence of Mao and Deng were not based solely on leadership posts, but on deeds and accomplishments.
What has Xi achieved since his rise to power in 2012? Most observers would agree that the sweeping anti-corruption campaign to purge corrupt cadres has been his most resounding success.
In the course of the campaign, a large number of senior officials were investigated and persecuted.
Xi’s political ally Wang Qishan (王岐山), who headed the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said that 440 so-called “tigers,” or senior officials with vice-ministerial rank or above, including 160 generals, were removed.
Among them were super-sized tigers Zhou Yongkang (周永康), a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and China’s internal security czar until November 2012, and two ranking generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄), who were former vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission and politburo members.
The purges eliminated Xi’s political opponents and their followers, creating open positions. Through patronage, Xi rewards his cronies and co-opts supporters, enabling him to place his allies in key positions and to consolidate power.
In stark contrast to his predecessor Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), who was seen as a weak leader, Xi exercises full command over the PLA, institutes reforms and reorganization with an iron hand and has downsized the PLA by 300,000, including removals of a large number of corrupt and disloyal PLA officers.
Since 2012, Xi has promoted 29 PLA officers to the rank of full general and has appointed them to command positions and other vital posts in the PLA hierarchy.
Xi’s war on corruption is immensely popular and has won him public support, but it has caused widespread resentment in the party and at state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Cadres have resorted to feigned compliance, passive resistance and other tactics to boycott Xi’s anti-corruption effort. Will the countermeasures of the bureaucracy adversely affect state performance, especially in the economy?
Because economic growth is a pillar of the regime’s legitimacy and Xi’s leadership, he has reason to be concerned.
In his report, Xi de-emphasized market reform and liberalization.
Instead, he emphasized making the SOEs stronger and larger and only made a fleeting promise to “support the growth of private businesses.”
Ironically, most SOEs are corrupt and inefficient and are generally under the control of “princelings,” Xi’s cronies and support base.
With China’s rise in economic and military might, Xi exercises greater global influence than Mao or even Deng. Although Deng’s “open-door” reforms launched China’s economic take-off, China was still too poor and weak in comparison with the US. Thus, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Deng’s advice to the CCP and PLA leaders was “strategic patience” (biding one’s time and building one’s capabilities) and “don’t stick your head out,” meaning that China should refrain from taking the lead in international affairs and avoid confrontation with the “hegemon” (the US).
Deng’s prescription appeared anachronistic to Xi and his hawkish advisers. Xi called China a “great power” or a “strong power” dozens of times at the CCP’s congress and pledged: “China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country.”
Xi also asserts that, under his stewardship, China has entered a “new era” — an era that sees China moving onto the central stage of world affairs.
Not surprisingly, Xi has highlighted his “One Belt, One Road” initiative, an ambitious plan to build roads, railroads and other infrastructure designed to enhance and expand China’s global economic and political influence.
Moreover, Xi has presented China’s construction of artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea as one of his shining achievements, although such activities have raised tensions with several ASEAN countries and the US.
Indeed, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson criticized China’s excessive territorial and sovereign claims and its violation of norms and international order.
In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, Tillerson said that the US would not overlook China’s provocations in the South China Sea, but would strengthen security cooperation with India, Japan and Australia — which share democratic values — to contain China’s expansionism.
Despite Xi’s claim regarding China’s role as a major and responsible country, his report neither mentioned North Korea nor its nuclear threat to Asia and the world.
US President Donald Trump and his predecessors have repeatedly urged China to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear program and provocative behavior, but to no avail.
Beijing would never admit it, but intelligence collected by the UN, the US, Israel and other counties clearly indicates that China is an enabler of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.
The PLA hawks see North Korea as China’s security buffer and as a valuable chip that can be leveraged to counterbalance the US, Japan and South Korea. Their primary concern is not North Korea’s nuclear arms, but rather how to forestall and deter a US use of force that could result in the collapse of the North Korean regime and a unified Korea, with US troops on China’s border.
Xi shares the hawks’ policy preferences on the Korean Peninsula and will not help the US solve its problems.
Trump should no longer harbor any illusion regarding China’s cooperation on North Korea. Instead, he should devote his time and effort to cope with China’s closed market, systemic theft of US intellectual property and unfair trade practices.
Trump must grasp Xi’s challenge to Pax Americana: his grand strategy to defeat the US and create a new world order by supplanting it as the global superpower.
Xi has promised greater professionalization of PLA officers and more innovative weaponry. Through these efforts, coupled with already implemented reforms, reorganization, structural changes, and the rejuvenation of leaders in the PLA, Xi is trying to forge a first-class combat force capable of fighting and winning by mid-century.
Communist China has its own ideology, policy agenda and national interests, which are vastly different from those of the US and its allies and partners. It is imperative that Trump and his top advisers see China as it truly is.
Parris Chang is president of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic, Strategic Studies, a former deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council and professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University.
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