It was only a month ago that Zhao Minghao (趙銘昊) — a research fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing and a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific’s China National Committee — was considering the effects of a US attack on North Korea, a thought that many analysts are continuing to consider.
At that time, it was also generally believed that China would not impose any real sanctions on North Korea, but the past few days have thrown that in doubt.
Over the past year, it has become clear that a week in politics is a considerable amount of time.
However, from a Taiwanese point of view, it is worth reflecting on possible futures.
If the US is thought of as a powerful arbiter, then the White House possesses a lot of tools designed to curb North Korea: pressure through sanctions and commercial and diplomatic isolation; display of the vast superiority of its overall anti-ballistic defense capabilities and destructive power, which is also an assurance to its allies; and some willingness to talk rather than twitter.
The effectiveness of this depends on a new, uneasy US-China alliance. This must be forged and maintained on some condition of increased stability. Anything less will wreak havoc.
US President Donald Trump must begin to speak diplomatically rather than merely threaten North Korea’s destruction, which neither China nor the North think could happen given the vulnerability of South Korea.
It cannot be assumed that violence could not break out — the North is a rogue state, threatening the US on Tuesday last week with the “greatest pain” it has ever suffered; Trump and his Twitter-finger is an independent unstable factor; the Chinese have not said how far they will go in support of the North; and the UN is making only limited commitments, with its new sanctions aimed at reducing the North’s fuel and income — not a very convincing reaction for the short-term.
Most war commentary in the West concerns the US-Korean relationship and the possibilities of a considered attack from the US or a rogue attack from North Korea, which claims it has successfully developed a hydrogen bomb that can be miniaturized and loaded onto a long-range missile to directly threaten US territory, notably Guam, and feasibly the US mainland.
It is this miniaturization that has altered all game plans, because it has revolutionized short-term effects and judgements. This is especially true for the US, whereas Taiwan, China, Japan and North Korea’s other neighbors have lived with this threat for years.
What about the threat of an attack by China on North Korea?
This might sound ridiculous, but there is a lot that is ridiculous about world governance at present, especially the manner in which crucial diplomacy seems to be (mis)handled.
In all public statements, the Chinese leadership has declared itself more opposed to war than Trump has, while at the same time asserting that China has no real commercial power to stop North Korea.
It makes this claim given that the North is a determined dictatorship that says its long-term fear is the US’ military threat; that the North’s technology changes this fear; that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un relies on hard power to retain internal control; and that his people will take a huge degree of hardship to aid the regime — there is little indication from North Korean sources of any rise in internal dissent.
Beijing believes that its commercial and soft power over North Korea are too weak to stop it; that if it exerted more commercial power, the North would turn further toward Russia, adding another unstable element; and that the problem is engendered in the Korea-US relationship.
Therefore, the final role must be played by the US or the UN, Beijing has concluded.
However, nearly every claim depends on stability among what are inherently unstable elements.
The one real policy that could ameliorate this is a more sensible understanding between the US and China. Let us assume that this last element remains in absentia.
Soft power is thought of as an alternative to hard, military power — a cultural-diplomatic element that keeps our global system revolving around some center of gravity. If people wear Levis, listen to Bob Dylan and love watching House, then they are not likely to truly hate the US. Grumbling is another matter.
Millions of Chinese do wear, listen and love all of that, but if the matter is continually thought about simplistically, two addenda will be missed: Commercial power lies between hard and soft power, and the exertion of hard power in one place (the North) might benefit the soft power of the aggressor (China) in other places.
The entry of the US into the Vietnam War and the length of the ensuing horror was in part predicated on a belief among powerful Americans that a hard victory in Asia might extend US soft power amongst its allies, as well as attract the vacillating Third World neutrals into supporting the US in the Cold War.
The US also hoped for more success in penetrating the markets of developing economies (commercial power), attaining bases for strategic defense initiatives (hard power) and entrenching the superiority of its cultural hegemony (soft power).
The White House viewed that to be a robust, virtuous circle in the middle of what must have seemed to be endless bi-polar threats.
What if a similar perspective is taken on China, North Korea and the global system in the world of Trumpism?
China gains soft power if it stops North Korea through economic aggression, while some White House statements by no means preclude that both soft and commercial power could be gained for China through a direct military attack on the North.
If Twitterdom and Trumpism in its combined weight can stamp any imprimatur, it could be deduced by Chinese strategists that they have been given the US president’s endorsement to directly destroy North Korean capacity. The gate to threaten such an attack is open.
North Korea and China have been growing apart for several reasons, perhaps stemming from China’s fear of defense missile proliferation by the West resulting from Kim’s gangsterism.
It must not be forgotten that these two nations share a long border and there are real environmental risks if radiation spills across it. Nor can China trust Kim — shared ideology goes far, but not far enough in a world of realpolitik.
Moreover, that ideology is no longer clear. Economic liberalism since 1978 in parts of China has made a difference — remember all those millions of Chinese wearing Levis.
As early as February, the North’s state media accused China of “dancing to the tune of the US.” Since coming to power in 2011, Kim has executed his uncle and brother, both seen by his circle as too close to China.
More important is China’s need for soft power, which has convincing global reach.
This is where the Vietnam model comes in.
Successful intervention in the North — short of full-blown warfare — would provide China with more hard, soft and commercial power. It would weaken the US’ grip on the region and threaten general US hegemony without any direct threat from Beijing to the US, while the Chinese middle-class millions could continue listening to Dylan.
This could be achieved without a gunshot, but for Taiwan, it could spell disaster as long as success is measured in terms of retention of the diplomatic and military “status quo” with China.
There are two broad possibilities in this hypothetical situation:
One is that Beijing will take advantage of its change in global status and demand international recognition of “one China.” This would give it a high possibility of again claiming victory without firing a shot.
Globally, this would be considered a result of its improved soft power rather than an application of hard power. It would be bad for Taiwan, but it would not be an utter disaster.
Other nations in the region might consider this to be reasonable and provide some breathing space when discussing other major issues, particularly regarding the South China Sea.
The second possibility is that China’s new status would encourage Beijing to further improve its image by allowing Taiwan to join the international community as a sovereign nation.
The upswing in China’s commercial presence could mean that China and Taiwan lose nothing in terms of economic growth, employment and welfare. Both would benefit from peace in many areas, including lower military expenditure and trade growth due to improved regional prosperity and confidence.
Many readers might have problems with this hypothetical treatment of a serious issue, but it might be salutary to reflect now, rather than later, on how political and diplomatic relations between China and the US might develop.
Random elements open up the field — it would be clarifying for the US and China to sit down and think of their neighbors. North Korea cannot be expected to do it.
Ian Inkster is a professorial research associate at the Center of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London; a senior fellow at the Taiwan Studies Programme, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham; and the editor of the journal History of Technology.
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