On Sunday last week, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) was inaugurated at the party’s 20th national congress. Most observers and media outlets were focused on how Wu would formulate the party’s direction and cross-strait policy.
KMT members and supporters worldwide were paying close attention to this issue, but the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and other Taiwan-related departments in China were also interested. As expected, the congress unanimously passed the party’s new political program, which reflects the special features of the “Wu era.”
The program removes Hung Hsiu-chu’s (洪秀柱), Wu’s predecessor, emphasis on deepening the so-called “1992 consensus” and signing a peace accord with China to promote cross-strait exchanges and peace in the Taiwan Strait and replaces it with the “1992 consensus” and “one China, different interpretations.”
This entails safeguarding the development of Chinese culture and emotionally reconnecting the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, which long ago gained an understanding of these changes, broke with precedent and did not send a congratulatory telegram ahead of the congress’ opening.
This was in line with the cold treatment in the telegram that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) sent to Wu upon Wu’s election three months ago, in which he addressed Wu using the informal “you” (你) rather than the courteous nin (您), making it clear that he was showing Wu that he is the boss.
Beijing has wary about Wu due to his longstanding, strong pro-Taiwan leanings, which is why Xi used stronger language in his message congratulating Wu on his election, expressing a hope that Wu would persist in opposing Taiwanese independence and follow the “correct” path toward peacefully developing cross-strait relations.
This reveals the CCP’s concern that Wu will not be strong enough in his opposition to Taiwanese independence, that he does not have a good grasp of the issue and that he might waver.
With the CCP holding its 19th National Congress later this year, Beijing is tightening its Taiwan policy, which means that Wu also is coming under greater pressure. A month before Wu took over as chairman, Xinhua news agency issued a list of vocabulary that had been banned from use or that should be used with caution. The list included “Republic of China” and “one China, different interpretations.” Its publication has been interpreted as being aimed at the KMT.
That is not all. China Review News (CRN), registered in Hong Kong and backed by Beijing, has published a series of “quick reviews” critical of Wu.
The first one — published on July 26 with the headline “Still holding on to the outmoded ‘one China, different interpretations’ idea” — opened strongly with “‘one China, different interpretations’ is an old and torn banner” and concluded with a direct strike at the core issue, saying that “the Mainland no longer takes an ambiguous and flexible attitude toward ‘one China, different interpretations’” and warning Wu that “the KMT should not stick to outmoded ideas and paint itself into a corner. The result of ‘one China, different interpretations’ is two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.”
This makes it clear that Beijing, having extended courteous treatment to Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), when he was president, seems to have lost patience with a KMT that continues to deceive itself and others, despite the fact that its sun is setting.
On Aug. 9, CRN issued another quick review, this time with the headline “Cutting peace accord, eliminating peaceful political program: a changing KMT.”
The review added force to the rejection of Wu’s cross-strait policy, saying: “if the impoverished KMT betrays its founding ideas and walks down the road of ‘Taiwanization,’ it will discard the only advantage it has left for dealing with cross-strait relations. It will no longer have a future, and no hope of one day staging a comeback.”
Rarely has a Beijing-backed media outlet directed such severe criticism against the KMT since the severe criticism directed against then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) in the 1990s. It is not difficult to imagine the pressure Beijing is putting on Wu.
However, anyone who understands the pro-localization movement occurring in Taiwan from the 1990s onward knows that, if the KMT is to have a chance of surviving and a chance of staging a comeback, it will have no choice but to align itself with those who are Taiwan-centered.
This is why Wu, who clearly understands Taiwan’s shifting public opinion, took his time to give an explicit analysis, despite Beijing’s increasing pressure ahead of his inauguration as KMT chairman, of what “one China, different interpretations” really means in his inauguration address, without actually using the phrase.
Wu said that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the principle that there is only one China, but they agree to verbally state their own interpretations of what that means.” This explanation must be interpreted as being aimed directly at Zhongnanhai.
However, this does not mean that Beijing is looking on Wu as an enemy. Although CRN did not hold back in its criticism of Wu, the major state-run media headquartered in Beijing have not chimed in.
Following Wu’s inauguration, TAO spokesman An Fengshan (安峰山) said neutrally that the KMT and CCP have agreed on five shared visions for peaceful cross-strait development since 2005 and established a shared political foundation upon which the two parties insist on the “1992 consensus” and opposition to Taiwanese independence.
He added that interparty exchanges have improved based on this foundation and brought fruitful results such as promoting peaceful cross-strait development and improving the well-being of people on both sides.
This reveals Beijing’s two-handed strategy for dealing with Wu.
On the one hand, it pressured Wu prior to the KMT congress and his becoming chairman to keep him from straying too far toward pro-localization. This pressure was also intended to test the force of the KMT’s response and decide to what extent Beijing can expect to influence the party. On the other hand, Beijing has held back to leave room for maneuver.
No matter what, Beijing will never put the same trust in Wu that it put in Hung or compare him to Ma, with his strong Chinese nationalism, or to New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫), who was willing to say the phrase “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China.”
However, because Wu unambiguously recognizes the “1992 consensus,” which Beijing sees as important and because he clearly states his opposition to Taiwanese independence, in addition to the fact that Beijing has no choice but to settle for second best, the CCP is working hard to co-opt Wu to prevent him from straying from opposition to Taiwanese independence, which the KMT and CCP have agreed on over the past 12 years.
Now that Wu has taken over the party, it is just a matter of time until he pays his first visit to China as chairman. Beijing is likely to make good use of that opportunity to arrange the whole itinerary and focus on narrowing the distance between them and Wu in order to increase its influence over him.
The relationship between the KMT and CCP under Wu’s chairmanship will be ambiguous.By relying on a carrot-and-stick approach, Beijing expects to increase the force behind its attempts to maintain influence over the KMT. This will likely be Zhongnanhai’s long-term strategy while Xi is at the helm.
John Lim is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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