The Sunflower movement was a milestone in Taiwanese politics and the start of the “natural independence” political generation. The movement was powered by members born in post-democratization Taiwan, believing in the values of democracy and freedom and rejecting the idea that China could claim sovereignty over Taiwan.
Former vice president Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) on Saturday last week was elected chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). This could also be said to be a major milestone: It represents the decline of the “natural unification” KMT that came from China and the start of a “local unification” KMT.
It is not that Wu is the first Taiwanese to become KMT chairman. Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was successor to the localization of the party initiated by his predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). Lee might have been the designated successor of the KMT chairmanship and the presidency, but the military and the party itself were still very much under the sway of former premiers Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) and Lee Huan (李煥), both of whom hailed from China.
As a result, even though Lee Teng-hui wanted to expedite the localization of the party and worked with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on constitutional reform and democratization, he met with considerable opposition. Eventually, he was forced to leave the KMT after a party coup at the hands of more traditional elements.
Wu belongs to the second generation of Chiang’s localization of the party. However, his situation is different from Lee Teng-hui’s, as they inherit different circumstances with different resources available to them. Now that the KMT has lost control of the executive and legislative branches of government and has been hit by a DPP campaign to divest it of its ill-gotten assets, Wu will inherit a much reduced party.
However, Wu’s victory represents a triumph of the alliance of local Taiwanese politicians over the traditionalists, mostly politicians who came from China or their families did. This is essentially a complete blood transfusion for the party.
Wu lacks the homesickness or nostalgic yearning for China — and therefore the sense of “natural unification” that had such a hold over his predecessors — and can empathize with the public’s view of China.
For him, unification is founded simply on considerations of political interests, cross-strait trade and policy differentiation with other parties.
He will also have to mitigate the excesses of KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu’s (洪秀柱) position, a move that will not be popular in Beijing. Between Taiwan and China, Wu is going to have to walk something of a tightrope.
A subtle development is obvious in the communication between Wu and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). In his response to a congratulatory message from Xi on his election, Wu wrote: “In 1992, both sides reached the conclusion that they should adhere to the ‘one China’ principle, but verbally agreed to make their own interpretations of what that means,” adding that he wished to return to the position of former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) as opposed to that of Hung’s “one China, same interpretation” framework and a peace deal, which Beijing had taken to heart.
Beijing was evidently unhappy that Wu wanted to return to “one China, different interpretations,” as seen in Xi’s use of the polite or familiar forms of “you” in the respective letters to Hung and Wu. In its Taiwan policy, Beijing has little time for green or blue politics.
In his letter to Wu, Xi was interested only in adherence to the so-called “1992 consensus” and the “Chinese renaissance.” He seems to believe that all he needs to do is secure Wu’s allegiance to be able to secure the KMT, and therefore Taiwan. This rigid approach is going to give Wu little choice but to steer the KMT away from China and further along the path of localization.
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