Knowing how skillful China’s foreign relations officials are, I expected them to handle Taiwan’s attendance at this year’s World Health Assembly (WHA) by tormenting Taiwan until the last moment and then “magnanimously” allowing the WHO secretariat to send it an invitation to attend as an observer.
Apart from such an invitation making it abundantly clear that Taiwan is part of China, China would have said that although the Democratic Progressive Party does not accept the so-called “1992 consensus” or the “one China” principle, in consideration of “Taiwanese compatriots’” health and welfare and in the interest of worldwide disease prevention, it still agreed to allow “the authorities of Taiwan, China” to send observers to the WHA under the “one China” principle.
It would have been hard for Taiwan’s government to decide whether to accept or reject such an arrangement, but luckily no such thing happened.
When the campaign for Taiwan to take part in the WHO first started in 1997, anyone with expertise in diplomatic relations would tactfully tell campaigners that Taiwan was in a weak position and that there was no point to these hopeless efforts.
At the beginning, the response of friendly nations to the nation’s lobbying ranged from indifference to diplomatic niceties at best, but there was no great enthusiasm.
However, gradually, some friendly nations became willing to talk to Taiwan’s lobbyists and listen to their tale of woe.
Next, some of those nations began to think that it was wrong to completely exclude Taiwan from the WHO, and more and more of these allies made formal interventions at the WHA in favor of Taiwan’s right to attend.
This kind of support reached a high point in 2008, when — apart from the nation’s diplomatic partners — the US, Japan, some EU member states and other Western countries openly voiced their support for Taiwan.
However, that same year, the government of then-president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), perhaps because of poor diplomatic judgement or as an expression of its policy of fawning over China (or a combination of the two), sent emissaries to Geneva, Switzerland, where they reached an understanding with China.
This understanding placed Taiwan’s attendance at the WHA within the model designed by China for Taiwan’s participation under the “one China” principle. It also involved accepting an arrangement whereby China decides whether Taiwan can attend, thus putting all the power in China’s hands.
Therefore it should come as no surprise that this year, after China said that Taiwan could not attend the WHA because it does not recognize the “1992 consensus,” the WHO secretariat said it could not send Taiwan an invitation because the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had not reached a consensus.
Although China has a hard-line policy of blocking Taiwan’s participation in international organizations wherever possible, Taiwan is not completely at China’s mercy.
China is big and keeps getting stronger, but it is not so strong that the whole world must obey it, and although Taiwan is relatively small and keeps getting weaker, it is not so weak that it can only accept China’s arrangements without the ability to resist.
This can be seen with regard to many international organizations, such as the WTO and regional fisheries management organizations: Although China does not want Taiwan to participate in any of these bodies, it is still an observer in some and a member of others, and China cannot eliminate Taiwan’s space for independent participation.
No matter how unhappy China might be, it cannot instruct these organizations not to send invitations to Taiwan for the simple reason that participation in these organizations is not subject to China’s approval, and Taiwan takes part in them in its own independent capacity.
In contrast, Taiwan’s attendance at the WHA is based on the understanding between the Ma administration and China under which Taiwan has no diplomatic space, but merely “attends” with China’s agreement; it can only attend if China gives permission.
This is the arrangement that Ma’s government accepted.
It also accepted that China would request for the WHO secretariat to send Taiwan an invitation every time.
Because the decision is in China’s hands, Taiwan has to leverage its resources and keep China happy, otherwise China can terminate or suspend its participation at any time.
The question President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) government should be asking about attendance at the WHA should therefore be how to get out of this model, because only by getting out of it will the nation be able to carry on as normal even when it has incurred China’s displeasure.
If the WHO secretariat does not send Taiwan an invitation this year, Taiwanese will feel shocked and angry, but they will soon get over it.
The best approach to participation in the WHO would then be to start over again.
China may be powerful, but it has made a foreign-policy mistake by negating the cross-strait “status quo,” because this allows Taiwan to escape the framework that was set up by the Ma administration and China.
Furthermore, China’s statement that it is blocking Taiwan’s attendance for political reasons gives Taiwan an opportunity to regain the moral high ground.
If the door to Taiwan’s attendance at the WHA opens again, China will of course be standing in the doorway. What happens next will depend on the determination and efforts of all Taiwanese.
Chiang Huang-chih is a professor in National Taiwan University’s College of Law.
Translated by Julian Clegg
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under