The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominates trade in Asia, plays an increasingly important economic role in the US and Europe and is a major investor in Africa. Beijing’s military strength is also rising as it asserts once dormant territorial claims, but its international sway has yet to match its economic resources.
The challenge is not just influencing foreign nations. It is also appealing to younger ethnic Chinese in ethnic Chinese enclaves such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. To succeed, the PRC must demonstrate greater trust in its own people.
The Chinese Empire once dominated East Asia, but the empire turned inward, leaving “China” as little more than a distant and abstract bit of exotica for Westerners.
The communist revolution marked another sharp turn inward. Only after Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) death and Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) rise did China seriously re-engage the world.
Even so the PRC’s influence remains primarily economic. China’s military power is on the rise, but threatening to use it has pushed people away in lands as diverse as Taiwan and Japan.
Ancient Chinese culture is venerable and sophisticated, but an artifact to most people, including younger Chinese. The popular culture that appeals is a mix of Western and newer Eastern, such as from South Korea, at least until the recent contretemps over the latter’s participation in the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system.
Yet, there never has been a greater opening for increased Chinese leadership with the election of US President Donald Trump. Although the US’ global influence will not disappear, Washington appears ready to allow others to set the international rules of economic engagement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has responded by backing “openness” and “economic liberalization,” using the January forum in Davos to appeal to business and political elites around the globe.
Protectionism was like “locking yourself in a dark room,” Xi said.
Although his message was welcome, many in the West observed that his government followed a very different course at home, cracking down on contact with foreigners and foreign thoughts. Chinese people are supposed to adopt Chinese ideas, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Indeed, the PRC’s leadership seems particularly sensitive to the lack of support for Beijing from ethnic Chinese elsewhere. Last month, Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲), No. 4 in the CPP hierarchy, announced a program to attract young people in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
The government plans on organizing for residents of Hong Kong and Macau “to visit the mainland on study trips and experience it for themselves” to “strengthen the love of both region and country among the people of Hong Kong and Macau.”
Moreover, Beijing will push for increased exchanges with younger Taiwanese, ruled by a party long dedicated to independence. The objective is to “build up public support for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.”
However, it will take more than free trips to build loyalty to Beijing. China is a land worth visiting and the Chinese are worth engaging, but young people in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau have tasted political freedom.
This concept is not a Western import.
As a student, Hu Ping (胡平) was sent to labor in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. On his return to the city he advocated freedom of speech, later received his doctorate at Harvard University and eventually settled in New York, where he is editor-in-chief of the journal Beijing Spring.
He contends that Chinese support for liberty grows out of the Chinese experience. He cites the example of Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun (習仲勳), who was purged during the Cultural Revolution. The latter’s “concept of tolerance and freedom arose mainly from personal experience,” and not from reading Western thinkers, old or new.
Acknowledging this universal desire to determine one’s own future is necessary to appeal to younger Chinese at home and especially those in territories which recognize the importance of individual autonomy and liberty.
The rising generation’s demands reflects a basic and enduring human experience. It is a powerful, unquenchable human desire.
Thus, respecting the demand for self-government would be the most effective response to separatist sentiments. People who do not trust those who govern are unlikely to embrace the government. Beijing cannot compel genuine loyalty.
With Washington turning its back on its international role, China has an opportunity to play a larger role in shaping foreign attitudes and institutions.
However, taking advantage of that opportunity requires living up to the ideals being advanced. If Beijing wants to lead, it must appeal to those determined to control their own destinies.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan.
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