There is a glaring problem with the Ministry of National Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review. With a target annual budget set at only 2.05 percent of GDP, the ministry simply does not have the funds to carry out the plans stated in the review.
Is it any wonder that the nation’s allies frequently question its resolve to defend itself?
Taiwan faces a clear and immediate threat from China, with the military balance on the Taiwan Strait skewed heavily in Beijing’s favor. If the government fails to take the threat seriously, choosing to rely solely on appeals to respect democracy and human rights, while hoping that other nations will come to its rescue, then Taiwan will lose the ability to set the agenda for its own future.
In the 20 years since the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has completely reversed. The telltale signs of this reversal can be seen in Taiwan’s spending on national defense.
Using 1998 — before the Asian financial crisis — as the basis for comparison, spending on national defense that year totaled NT$257.48 billion (US$8.53 billion at the current exchange rate), while last year’s reached NT$321.7 billion.
On the surface, this appears to be a significant increase. However, if last year’s figure is adjusted for inflation, it would only come to NT$265.4 billion.
That means since 1998, the national defense budget increased by a mere 3 percent. Given that the regional security picture has significantly deteriorated in the past two decades, this is utterly inadequate.
By way of comparison, during the same period, the education budget rose from NT$187.1 billion to NT$387.9 billion, while spending on social security and welfare increased from NT$157.7 billion to NT$460.6 billion.
These budgetary allocations show that since the first direct presidential elections were held in 1996, the political strategies of each successive government have converged on the same electoral tactic, namely currying favor with voters, while neglecting the most basic function of government — to protect its citizens.
When discussing this problem, politicians often respond matter-of-factly that “there are no votes in defense.”
Important decisions on issues such as whether to abolish military conscription or increase defense spending are mainly driven by political considerations, rather than the formation of a viable, long-term national security strategy.
The current situation is akin to watching a suicide in slow-motion.
Although Taiwanese make a lot of noise about democracy and human rights and cling to the ideals of “love and peace,” without matching this “soft power” with a credible defense force as an insurance policy, these values are nothing more than a castle built on sand. When a big wave comes, all will be swept away.
One can only look on with jealousy at Sweden, which has reinstated military conscription and increased spending on defense.
Then there is Belgium, a chocolate superpower, but whose government has decided to increase military spending annually by 10 percent to build a missile defense system.
At a recent NATO leaders’ summit, members reiterated their target to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense and reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance’s ethos of collective self-defense, that is, “an attack on one is an attack on all.”
Israel, a nation that faces a similar existential threat to Taiwan, spends 8 percent of GDP on defense. Singapore sets aside 5 percent of GDP, while in northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are expanding their defense budgets every year.
Meanwhile, the mini arms race between Southeast Asian nations shows no sign of abating. Taiwan, on the other hand, has been caught out napping.
The countries that are investing in their national defense are doing so for entirely rational reasons. For these countries, bolstering their defenses is not just about providing the fundamental benefits of a deterrence against external threats and guaranteeing their continued existence as nation states. They also view investment in defense as fundamental to national development and integral to their economies.
It is about viewing defense not as a resource-chomping expense, but rather as a value-adding investment.
This is why Beijing is pursuing a policy of integrated military and civilian development, while in the US the Pentagon is pushing robotics, unmanned vehicles and other information technologies through its “third offset strategy.”
These strategies aim to merge the creative economy with the reorganization of the military. The core idea behind these strategies is to transform the defense industry into a “defense economy.”
If Taiwan can rouse itself from its slumber, it certainly still has the resources, technology and time to catch up. Taiwan must start out by moving to a “defense economy,” as the US is doing.
Aside from the oft-cited example of building an indigenous submarine program, Taiwan has a solid foundation in guided missile technology. It also leads the way in information security and smart fabrics, and is a key exporter of military-grade notebook computers.
Since many countries would not want to purchase these technologies from China for their armed forces, security services and other areas of government, Taiwan is well-positioned to carve out a niche in this area, which could boost economic growth while satisfying domestic national security requirements.
Taiwanese politicians should stop viewing increased spending on defense as a waste of money.
The government should invest in domestically produced air defense and anti-ship missile systems as a quick way for the military to plug the capability gap until the new submarines come into service.
Additionally, Taiwan should be conducting research into cyberwarfare — both offensive and defensive — as well as developing smart military uniforms.
The military should abandon its policy of always accepting the lowest bids during tenders and instead purchase military-grade notebooks for the armed forces, in addition to integrating precision electromechanical battlefield robotics with unmanned vehicles.
All these are vitally important to national security, but they also have the added benefit of propelling economic growth and providing a technological lift. There is not a moment to lose.
Su Tzu-yun is chief executive officer of the Center for Advanced Technology at Tamkang University.
Translated by Edward Jones
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