In the three years leading up to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines, clashes between the US and Chinese navies in the region reached a peak, with many observers at the time expressing concern that there was the potential of war.
However, after the court published its verdict, despite global media providing blanket coverage to voices from both camps, tensions in the sea began to dissipate. In the past six months, no further confrontations took place.
The factors that brought about this change and an analysis of how the situation might play out are as follows:
First, the Philippine government’s lawsuit against China was welcomed and supported by the US and Japan. Former US president Barack Obama’s administration sought to use the structures and principles of international law as the basis to solve conflicts in the South China Sea.
Regardless of whether Beijing chooses to accept the ruling, it is out there in the open and acts as a yardstick with which to measure China’s actions in disputed waters.
As Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Perfecto Yasay Jr have both carelessly let slip, the ruling will be the basis for discussions with China over disputed waters.
Both the US and the Philippines have sought to use the ruling to portray China as a violator of international norms. For now, they have achieved their goals and can tone down the rhetoric. Duterte has even moved quickly to mend fences with Beijing and in return has received a broad package of economic assistance from China.
Second, US President Donald Trump’s administration has yet to formulate a policy regarding the South China Sea.
US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during his confirmation hearing in January said: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”
The reaction from several Chinese media outlets was unequivocal: If the US intends to blockade China from islands or reefs under its control, this will spark a military confrontation.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a comparatively restrained response and called on the US to take care over its actions and words.
On Feb. 10, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, during a visit to Japan, sought to calm tensions, saying the US believes that at present there is no need to take any drastic military measures in the South China Sea and that resolution through diplomatic means should be the priority.
However, Mattis also clearly stated that US commercial ships and navy vessels would continue to sail through the disputed waters.
Eight days later, the Pentagon dispatched the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to patrol the South China Sea. It was a reaffirmation of the US’ commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation in the contested waters.
The carrier battle group sailed close to islands controlled by China, on several of which China’s military is believed to have already deployed missile launchers. If US warships sail too close to these islands during future exercises, there is the potential for conflict.
Third, Duterte is pursuing an independent foreign policy that involves distancing his country from the US to forge closer relations with China. Having greatly improved relations with Beijing, the two sides have reached an agreement over the disputed Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島).
Philippine fishermen are now able to fish in the waters surrounding the shoal. The Philippines has essentially forced Beijing to accept one element of the court’s ruling, which has allowed Philippine fisherman to once again exercise their traditional fishing rights.
Duterte’s low-key approach to dealing with China has enabled him to claim victory on one of the court’s rulings and at the same time win a large package of economic assistance for his country. Duterte can chalk this up as a significant foreign policy success.
Fourth, this year, the Philippines is serving as chair of ASEAN. With the South China Sea still a hot-button topic among ASEAN members, everyone is eager to see how Manila will handle the topic.
Following a visit to the Philippines by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Zhenmin (劉振民), the ministry announced that, during the visit, the two sides agreed that they would continue to work toward finding common ground with other ASEAN members to implement a comprehensive “declaration on South China Sea conduct” and a set of “principles for conduct on the South China Sea” through a process of consultation, and to have a draft framework for the “principles for conduct” ready before the middle of this year to strive for unanimous agreement at the earliest possible date.
In addition, the two parties agreed to begin discussions on establishing a bilateral problem-solving mechanism to address shared problems and promote maritime cooperation and security between the two countries, it said.
It appears that Beijing is open to making concessions, although it will first formulate the draft framework for the principles for conduct itself. With a draft in place, there is the possibility that a final agreement could be reached.
Any agreement would include a recognition of the “status quo” that acknowledges the islands and reefs held by each country in the Spratly archipelago, as Chinese generals would never agree to withdraw from the islands and reefs it has seized, even in the face of military coercion.
At present, there is therefore no prospect of China withdrawing from any of them.
Looked at from another perspective, if China, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia all agree to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling regarding the Spratlys — which is that all of the archipelagos’ islands and islets are in fact “rocks” — then each of these countries would still be able to claim control of waters extending to a 12 nautical mile (22.2km) radius around each of their possessions.
This would not have a material effect upon each of the claimant nation’s abilities to exploit natural resources in any of the locations they control. However, it would be unfair toward Taiwan, as Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) qualifies as an island.
This is what the Philippines is trying to achieve. If Itu Aba is downgraded to the status of a rock, it will make it easier for the Philippines to deal with islands and reefs occupied by other nations.
Manila has already let it be known that it would not be opposed to a joint development of the Spratly Islands with China. Beijing might well only agree to consider this after principles for conduct in the South China Sea have been signed by the Philippines and other ASEAN members.
If the Philippines and China enter a joint development agreement, this will affect the rights and interests of Taiwan, which should give the government pause for thought.
Chen Hurng-yu is a retired National Chengchi University professor of history.
Translated by Edward Jones
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