Beating the odds and most pundits, US President Donald Trump’s victory in the election last year indicates a sharp departure from the course of the political establishment prescribed in Washington’s elite circles. The impact of his administration is expected to generate gigantic storms in the coming years, shaking the global political architecture and economic order established since World War II.
As early as at the dawn of the 20th century, the US’ economic strength superseded Great Britain’s to become the world’s largest economic powerhouse. Nevertheless, the causes contributing to its economic ascendancy was not its strong conviction on abstract ideas of free trade or market competition.
Founded as a backward agricultural state lagging behind most European countries in terms of economic and industrial development, to catch up with Western powers, the US adopted trade protectionism and economic nationalism by strategically shielding domestic industries from overseas competition and aggressively compelling other countries to open their markets.
Hence, one should not be surprised that in the aftermath of World War I, Americans shied away from the reluctant reality that economic well-being had been tightly integrated with the world economy. Nevertheless, most US political elites would rather stick to their conventional wisdom by singlemindedly prioritizing domestic interests, while declining to assume global leadership, as well as refusing to shoulder its corresponding international responsibilities.
As the trend of protectionism gradually prevailed in 1920s Europe, an unexpected financial meltdown in the US stock market in 1929 sounded the death knell for the global economy. The consequence was the Great Depression, which not only left millions of Americans unemployed, but also trapped the world economy in a miserable abyss.
While liberal economists and globalist advocates frequently call the Great Depression the notorious outcome of “beggar-thy-neighbors” trade protectionism policy, the question rarely asked is why Americans chose this path — strikingly different from what most economic experts would have advised, but similar to last year’s US presidential election.
Is it possible that people voting for Trump were hoodwinked by his populist rhetoric? Or is it likely that the answer is actually more complicated and profound than what the media have described as the rise of US isolationism?
Essentially, the key to Trump’s triumph can be attributed to the tension and imbalance between the growing dissatisfaction of many regarding their deteriorating livelihoods and Washington’s excessive spending on international commitments.
It is critical to note that free trade and internationalism have never been unwavering pillars of US foreign policy. Conversely, they might truly be prevailing practices and the dominant thinking underneath its economic policy platform.
However, a significant turning point in protectionism came after the enormous economic losses of World War II, which prompted elites to recognize the US’ pivotal role in the stability of the global order. As a result, they decided to break from its previous direction of political isolationism and trade protectionism. Instead, Washington elites determined to take a more proactive and ambitious approach than ever by shaping the post-war order into a favorable international environment according to US values and interests.
Most importantly, being a single and primary creditor after the war, Washington had abundant assets and political leverage to support all expenditures needed to construct the post-war order. Furthermore, with the rapid expansion of the Soviet Union and the advent of the Cold War, the political deterioration between the East and the West drove the US toward unwilling internationalism in the 1950s.
On the economic front, by converting its values to liberalism, like free trade, and providing public goods, like its domestic market, the US has been the so-called “beneficent hegemon” ever since and consolidated its embedded privileges in various international institutions.
Despite the ups and downs of the economy in the second half of the 20th century, Washington largely insisted on its “economic internationalism” approach by promoting multilateral trade negotiation, like the WTO, and facilitating cross-border policy cooperation in international economic governance, like the G7 and the G20. As a result, economic globalization, propelled by Washington, was regarded as an irresistible and justifiable trend, swiftly spreading around the world with the help of catchwords like free trade, integration and market competition.
Nevertheless, the winds began to change in the 2000s. With then-US president George W. Bush’s “war on terror” and the economic disaster of the 2008 global financial crisis, the US economy was severely damaged and Americans’ rage against the consequences of economic globalization reached a climax. Regrettably, the voices of anger and anxiety from economically vulnerable people were largely ignored, dismissed or marginalized by most liberal-oriented media.
This discontent had certainly not disappeared during the eight years of former US president Barack Obama’s progressive period in office. On the contrary, the energy of anti-political establishment and anti-elitism movements gradually accumulated and contributed to Trump’s victory. It is fair to say that Trump’s “America first” policy is simply reflecting the fact that a significant number of people feel alienated and abandoned by the Washington elites, as those globalist politicians have misled the US to commit too many costly overseas engagements, but devote too little effort to improve the lives of average Americans.
They would rather elect a president who truly feels what they feel and places domestic development as his top priority, instead of scattering money to remote countries overseas, defending some unattainable solemn international morality.
From this perspective, Trump’s ostensibly “abnormal,” “erratic” or “politically incorrect” policies actually indicate a sheer U-turn from globalism to unilateralism. In fact, the latter has deeper roots in US history.
Therefore, Trump’s “America first” policy should not be erroneously interpreted as “isolationism,” which means that policymakers believe that what serves US national interests best is to significantly reduce or terminate involvement overseas to preserve its power. Conversely, globalism implies that Washington elites consider that what helps its interests most is to facilitate a friendly international environment suitable for its interests and values.
Trump’s policy is neither isolationism nor internationalism, as he is not trying to break up with allies or abolish all treaties, but to renegotiate with foreign partners on his own terms. Similarly, Trump not only downplays the importance of international organizations, but is also unwilling to purse his policy agenda through multilateral approaches.
As a result, his political idiosyncrasies are deviating completely from the internationalism of previous presidents since World War II and becomes more approximate to “American unilateralism.”
In addition, unilateralism tends to view US interests as the top priority and pays less attention to the interests of other countries. Thus, under the Trump administration, US global leadership is likely to transform into an “American interests first” doctrine. The good old days of free leadership and no-charge global public good might come to an end.
Instead, by taking off the ostentatious cloak of a superpower’s moral obligations, the US could enjoy more leeway and leverage to preserve its power and reinvigorate its economy.
As for Taiwan, US unilateralism is likely to open a window of opportunity as well as pose challenges.
As Trump’s political style is less bound by bureaucratic constraints, Taiwan will have a better chance to advance its relationship with the US. However, although Washington might agree to facilitate trade negotiations with Taiwan, its requests for economic concessions from Taipei are likely to be aggressive.
It remains to be seen whether Trump’s unilateralism will be a boon or bane. However, the most crucial task for Taiwan is to not count on Washington’s good will, but to actively enhance its strengths to become an indispensable strategic ally in the global geopolitical landscape.
Eric Chiou is an assistant professor in the Office for Global Political Economy at National Chiao Tung University.
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