According to recent media reports, Zhou Zhihuai (周志懷), head of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences — China’s highest institution for Taiwan studies — has stepped down and is to be replaced by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations Vice President Yang Mingjie (楊明杰). This information has been met with great interest, as the institute is closely connected to the Chinese Ministry of State Security and its Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO).
Yang is 52 years old, which means that academics born after 1960 are now taking over in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) think tanks. Yang’s predecessor was 57 when he took over at the institute, meaning he is being promoted to a leading position at a younger age. In addition, Yang holds a bachelor of arts degree from Peking University and a doctorate from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the best educational track record of all TAO heads.
The institutes, where Yang worked for 26 years, is a direct subsidiary of the Chinese Ministry of State Security. Yu Keli (余克禮), another former director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies, also came from the ministry, providing evidence that it is becoming more involved in Taiwan studies.
Could Yang’s appointment serve as a prelude to the replacement of TAO Minister Zhang Zhijun (張志軍)? Zhou may have turned 60, but the age limit for officials is not carved in stone.
After President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) inaugural address on May 20 last year, Zhou said it was clear that Tsai’s cross-strait policy was flexible and that she was trying to create favorable conditions for a breakthrough. This expression of goodwill toward Tsai has been criticized as a mistake, and there were rumors that he would be made to retire.
Could Zhou’s sudden replacement be the beginning of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) adjustment to China’s Taiwan approach? Zhou was appointed head of the institute at the same time Zhang was made minister in 2013. This could mean that Xi is unhappy with these two officials who have been simultaneously involved with Taiwan, and he might also replace Zhang to bring in new blood.
This theory might have credence, as it has also been rumored that Zhang would be replaced.
Yang has not had much contact with Taiwan studies. His expertise is in arms control and antiterrorism, which implies that Xi wants to discard the promotional approach and look for people in other fields.
Yang also has a good understanding of US diplomacy, which is an indication that Taiwan is quickly becoming even more important in US-China relations following US President Donald Trump’s call with Tsai and recent rhetoric regarding Taiwan.
This is something the current Institute of Taiwan Studies team finds hard to handle, which is why Xi is making changes.
Trump only called Xi 22 days after his inauguration. This was of greater concern to Xi than to Trump, because by that time, Trump had already spoken with 16 other heads of state. Trump wants to create the impression that he does not care about China, which, in the words of Mao Zedong (毛澤東), could be described as “strategically taking the enemy lightly while tactically taking them seriously.”
When Trump implied that he would not accept China’s “one China” principle, the CCP questioned Xi’s approach to the US, so he was anxious for Trump to mention “one China” before the meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing next month.
Not very strange, then, that in addition to making a big deal about the telephone conversation between Trump and Xi, the Chinese media also focused on Trump’s mention of the “one China” policy.
However, this also exposed a CCP weak spot: In addition to a lack of self-confidence, the stability of Xi’s power depends on what Trump says.
Trump’s playing of the “Taiwan card” comes at no personal cost, and he is only pulling tricks to confuse Beijing. In December last year, Trump said: “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things.”
It now looks as if Trump has gotten what he wanted, but he is still relenting. The White House has pointedly said that Trump had “agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our [the US’] ‘one China’ policy.”
This is evidence that Trump’s “Taiwan card” is effective, because Xi requested the statement only because he was feeling pressured. If Trump wants to, he can play that card again.
From another perspective, the US’ “one China” policy is not the same as the CCP’s “one China” principle.
The CCP stresses that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan is part of China. However, US policy relies on the three Sino-US communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six assurances.”
This means that Trump has put “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” into effect.
Fan Shih-ping is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Political Science at National Taiwan Normal University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry