Since US president-elect Donald Trump won the US presidential election, concerns over his actions and comments have reverberated around the globe, stirring up worries about a possible “black swan effect.” Among them, the telephone call between President Tsai Iing-wen (蔡英文) and Trump has brought issues such as Taiwan-US relations and Sino-US relations back to the fore, together with a debate on the exact nature of the cross-strait “status quo.”
In an interview on Dec. 11 with Fox News, Trump said that he did not know why the US had to be bound by its “one China” policy in the absence of a deal on other matters, such as trade, money, tariffs, the South China Sea and North Korea.
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) warned against any attempts to undermine the “one China” principle or damaging China’s core interests.
White House press secretary Josh Earnest responded by saying that the “one China” policy had been followed by US presidents from both parties and that the US government did not regard Taiwan or US-Taiwan relations as a bargaining chip.
The question is, under Trump, are there any alternatives to the US’ “one China” policy or China’s “one China” principle — the cornerstones that have enabled Taiwan, China and the US to maintain the cross-strait “status quo” over the years? How would Beijing interpret it and react to attempts to formulate a possible alternative?
Taiwan cannot maintain a wait-and-see approach: It has to take the initiative and take advantage of the current momentum to maximize its strategic interests, balancing China and the US.
Trump is first and foremost a businessman, and this will be reflected in the pragmatic approach to governance that he says he will take. His priority would be creating jobs for Americans and to “make America great again.”
Therefore, at the top of his list would be economic development: Whatever contributes to that would be given priority, while any obstacles to that end would be removed.
The strategic interaction between the US and China will shift from global cooperation and the maintenance of differences followed by US President Barack Obama to the issues that Washington is most concerned about, such as the appreciation of the yuan, the protection of intellectual property rights and the trade deficit.
For Trump, who is steeped in business strategy, the accumulation and exploitation of bargaining chips is the way to win. The Taiwan issue is a sensitive one in Sino-US relations. It can, to some extent, force Beijing to address Sino-US trade problems, forcing it to change course and make policy adjustments favorable to the US.
Second, in response to Trump’s unpredictable governing style, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has been taking a rather a moderate approach, delaying his reaction until Trump is inaugurated and his national security personnel are in place.
However, in terms of cross-strait relations, Beijing’s strategic bottom line would not change, except for perhaps the exertion of more pressure on Taiwan to accept the so-called “1992 consensus.” Two recent incursions into Taiwan’s waters and airspace and the first island chain reveal much about Beijing’s intentions, and more such encounters and incidents are expected, affecting nations nearby and forcing Washington to come forward to coordinate.
Moreover, despite the increase in international visibility after the Tsai-Trump call, Taiwan would still have to deal with increased pressure to accept the “1992 consensus.” Whether Trump will support Taiwan’s participation in international events and accelerate the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) depends on whether Taipei’s policy will benefit his “America first” approach and whether he will be able to find a way to avoid Beijing’s attempts to restrict the development of cross-strait relations while improving Taiwan-US relations.
From the perspective of national security strategy, the following points need to be considered:
First, it is necessary to interpret the strategic framework of “maintaining the status quo.” This should be based on national interests, safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereign interests and territorial integrity, taking advantage of economic performance and international participation to escape the pattern of cross-strait relations dominated by China.
Strategically embedded in the overall security structure of the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan should redefine its strategic position and importance, and take the initiative in stabilizing regional security.
Second, Taiwan should find a balance in the development of Taiwan-US, Sino-US and cross-strait relations. This is mainly to deal with the uncertainties over the fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, accelerating the “new southbound policy,” and the negotiation of TIFA for signing free-trade agreements with the US, all of which have become issues of strategic and economic importance.
Finally, Taipei must be prepared for potential changes in the dynamics of the relationship between Chins and the US.
In the meantime, strategic and economic communications mechanisms should continue, with a possible focus on cybersecurity. In response to this, Taiwan should improve military exchanges with the US and carry out communication between industry, government and academia, expanding the niche of Taiwan’s defense industry.
Wong Ming-hsien is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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